scholarly journals Debt Covenant, Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism

Author(s):  
Lies Zulfiati ◽  
Elsa Lusiana
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Robert Jao ◽  
Devina Ho

This study aims to examine the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and debt covenant on accounting conservatism. The population in this study is a non-financial company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The number of observations of this research is 682 data year company. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. Data analysis used is multiple regression analysis method. The empirical results of this study indicate that managerial ownership and debt covenant has a positive and significant effect on accounting conservatism; while institutional ownership has a positive and not significant effect on accounting conservatism. The results of this study can be a consideration for investors to assess the application of accounting conservatism in the preparation of financial statements in making the right investment decisions.


Author(s):  
Chusnul Nuraeni ◽  
Annafi Indra Tama

The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of managerial ownership, debt covenants, political costs and growth opportunities on the level of accounting conservatism, case studies on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2011-2015. Testing this hypothesis uses multiple regression analysis. The regression coefficient test (T Test) in this study shows that the debt covenant and growth opportunities have a significant negative effect on the level of accounting conservatism, while the managerial ownership and political cost variables have no significant effect on the level of accounting conservatism. Suggestions for this study are to be able to expand the research sample so that the results can be generalized and can also be used to add or replace other variables that can affect accounting conservatism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Shella Deslatu ◽  
Yulius Kurnia Susanto

Accounting conservatism is defined as managerial accounting choices of accounting methods and estimates within Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that result in the persistent understatement of cumulative reported earnings and net assets over period of time. The objective of the research is to analyze the influence of managerial ownership, debt covenant, litigation, tax and political costs, and growth opportunities on accounting conservatism. The research consists of 22 manufacturing companies listing on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research using purposive sampling method whereas the criteria are manufacturing companies which are consistently listing on Indonesia Stock Exchange and using a accounting conservatism during period 2005 until 2008. Multiple regression is used to analyze the data. The results of the research showed that litigation had significant effect to accounting conservatism. Managerial ownership, debt covenant, tax and political costs and growth opportunities had not significant effect to accounting conservatism in manufacturing companies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-151
Author(s):  
Shella Deslatu ◽  
Yulius Kurnia Susanto

Accounting conservatism is defined as managerial accounting choices of accounting methods and estimates within Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that result in the persistent understatement of cumulative reported earnings and net assets over period of time. The objective of the research is to analyze the influence of managerial ownership, debt covenant, litigation, tax and political costs, and growth opportunities on accounting conservatism. The research consists of 22 manufacturing companies listing on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research using purposive sampling method whereas the criteria are manufacturing companies which are consistently listing on Indonesia Stock Exchange and using a accounting conservatism during period 2005 until 2008. Multiple regression is used to analyze the data. The results of the research showed that litigation had significant effect to accounting conservatism. Managerial ownership, debt covenant, tax and political costs and growth opportunities had not significant effect to accounting conservatism in manufacturing companies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-79
Author(s):  
Evi Vidiana ◽  
Diana Dwi Astuti ◽  
Wiwik Fitria Ningsih

The principle of accounting conservatism is still considered a controversial principle on the one hand accounting conservatism is considered as an obstacle that will affect the accounting conservatism as the dependent variable, then managerial ownership quality of financial statements, on the other hand accounting conservatism is useful to avoid managers' opportunistic behavior with regard to contracts used by financial statements as contract media. used in this research is, public ownership, debt governance, grow opportunities and capital intensity are used as factors that can influence conservatism as well as being an independent variable. The sample of this research is manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange (IDX). Samples are selected using the purposive sampling method. The number of companies taken as samples are 5 companies from 14 companies in 2014-2018. The results of research from research this is that from the five variables namely managerial ownership, public ownership, debt covenant, growth opportunities and capital intensity, there are three variables that have a significant influence on accounting conservatism.


Author(s):  
Olliza Mayesti ◽  
Resti Yulistia Muslim

The objective of this study is to examine whether corporate governance influence the relation between accounting conservatism and Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC). The accounting conservatism proxy used in this research is accruals obtained from differences between net income and cash flow. Sample consists of 31 manufacturing companies that listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange since 2003­2006. Hypotheses are examined by using multiple regressions. The result shows that there is a negative influence of accounting conservatism to Earnings Response Coefficient. Managerial ownership as a moderating variable did not affect the relation between accounting conservatism and Earnings Response Coefficient, but independent board of commissioner composition as a moderating variable affected the relation between accounting conservatism and Earnings Response Coefficient.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-29
Author(s):  
Dovi Septiari ◽  
Wirdani Atika Sari

Accounting conservatism is the precautionary principle to the profit recognition and one of the corporate governance to reduce the ability of the manager in manipulate and exaggerating the financial statements. Corporate governance is a internal control system which has its business objectives through securing company’s assets. This research is aiming to see the correlation among auditor independence and good corporate governance in accounting conservatism. Characteristics of good corporate governance in this are managerial ownership, profitability, company size and leverage. This research uses two measurements of conservatism non operating accrual and market to book ratio. This research as carried out at manufacture company in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010-2014. Sample selection do by purposive sampling method and obtained 49 companies in criteria accordingly. This research used data analysis and multiple liniear regression program eviews 9. The result showed that the effect of auditor independence is not significant in accounting conservatism in indonesia. Good corporate governance influential only the size of the company and ownership. The measurement of non operating accrual and market to book ratio show different results. Further research is expected to use another proxy for other variables to measure accounting conservatism.


Author(s):  
Nur Fatwa Basar ◽  
Andi Hendro

The purpose of this study was to analyze the direct effect of political cost and debt covenant on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study also analyzes the role of debt covenants as a moderator between the effect of political cost on accounting conservatism. The companies that are the samples are companies indexed on the IDX30 other than financial services companies and companies with non-rupiah financial reports. the data used is secondary data from the financial statements of 20 companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. data analysis using multiple linear regression and analysis of variance. The results showed that political cost directly affects accounting conservatism positively and significantly. whereas debt covenant does not have a direct significant effect on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study shows the role of debt covenants in strengthening the effect of political costs on accounting conservatism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1223-1236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jungeun Cho ◽  
Won-Wook Choi

This study examines the effectiveness of accounting conservatism in monitoring and controlling managers’ decision-making regarding opportunistic investment. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with over-investment. This suggests that conservative accounting policies serve as an efficient monitoring and controlling mechanism for opportunistic investment decisions. We also find a stronger negative association between accounting conservatism and over-investment in firms with low managerial ownership and low ownership by foreign investors. The results of our analysis imply that the impact of timely loss recognition on over-investment is more significant in firms with high agency problems and weaker monitoring ability, and that this factor complements other governance mechanisms, thereby helping to control managers’ myopic investment decisions. We provide evidence for a role of financial disclosure in mitigating managers’ opportunistic over-investment decisions. Though managers’ over-investment decisions are motivated by private gain, which reduces firm performance and compromises investors’ welfare, limited research exists on the role of financial information in alleviating such behavior. We suggest that timely loss recognition in financial statements can serve as an effective monitoring mechanism to aid in control of managers’ myopic over-investment.


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