scholarly journals An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance

Author(s):  
Chen Man-Xue ◽  
Zhang Chun-Xiao ◽  
Lu Kang-Yin
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Jiao Xue ◽  
Heng Fan ◽  
Zhanxun Dong

This study empirically examines the relationship between executive compensation and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) behaviors by identifying the influence of short- and long-term incentive on the propensity and scale of M&A. When the short-term incentive is insufficient, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial compensation mechanism. Thus, lack of executives’ incentive promotes the propensity to engage in M&A and significantly affects the scale of M&A. With regard to long-term incentives, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial creation mechanism. Shareholding of executives promotes M&A propensity, and does not significantly affect the scale of M&A. This study significantly contributes to research in M&A behaviors by revealing the beneficial distribution mechanisms of M&A behaviors.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amarou Yamina ◽  
Bensaid Mohamed

Abstract The purpose of this article is to model the executive compensation in France. From a sample of 90 companies included in the SBF 120 over 2004, we examine whether there is a significant link between the overall executive compensation and corporate performance, and then determine the relationship between the fixed and variable part of the compensation with performance. Our findings highlight in particular the level of total executive compensation that is linked with relatively improved performance. And clearer, the pay of executive increases with the increase of financial performance, whereas, the bonus depends on level of accounting performance. The grant of options to executive is relatively linked to the financial performance of the enterprise level.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Majd Iskandrani ◽  
Hadeel Yaseen ◽  
Asma’a Al-Amarneh

The wave of the recent financial crisis has reawakened interest in corporate governance as well as the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. Notably, corporate governance has been presented as a mechanism to absorb fiscal crisis faced in emerging economies. The principal aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance among commercial banks operating in a small emerging market, namely Jordan. Primary data were collected for a sample of 13 Jordanian commercial banks listed at Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period of 2010 -2016. The findings of this paper suggest that corporate performance measured by return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) has no influence on CEO compensation. Furthermore, this paper examines the impact of a firm’s size on the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance. The results reveal a significant relationship between executive compensation and firm’s performance among the smaller sample firms.


2012 ◽  
Vol 566 ◽  
pp. 525-529
Author(s):  
Lu Zhuang Wang ◽  
Hui Yu

This paper studied the relationship between executives' compensation gaps and enterprise’s performances of Textile industry in China. By linear regression and relative analysis, it is found that the correlativity of executives’ compensation gap with performance is weak or none with only effective gap between the president and CFO, the compensation gap of executives in coastland areas is larger than inland areas, a positive correlation existed between ownership concentration and enterprise performance, ownership concentration is negatively correlated to executive compensation gap, and the state-owned stock ratio and asset-liability ratio have negative correlation to enterprise performance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document