scholarly journals Menilik Akseptabilitas Perkawinan Sesama Jenis di dalam Konstitusi Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 620
Author(s):  
Timbo Mangaranap Sirait

Diskursus hubungan antara hukum dengan “moral” dan “fakta” selalu saja menarik untuk dibahas di kalangan sarjana hukum. Hukum kodrat irrasional adalah teori hukum besar yang pertama yang cara pandangnya theocentris mengakui bahwa hukum bersumber dari “moralitas” Tuhan YME. Derivasi nilai moral universal ternyata semakin bermetamorfosa dalam berbagai fenomena kehidupan kemudian dituntut agar diperlakukan setara di hadapan hukum. Di berbagai belahan dunia, Gerakan LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Biseksual, dan Transgender) dengan perjuangan perkawinan sesama jenis berkembang semakin luas dan telah memfalsifikasi dominasi perkawinan kodrati heteroseksual. Untuk itu, perlu ditilik secara reflektif filosofis akseptabilitas Konstitusi Indonesia atas perkawinan sesama jenis ini. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan metode pendekatan yuridis normatif melalui cara berpikir deduktif dengan kriterium kebenaran koheren. Sehingga disimpulkan: pertama, kritikan hukum kodrat irrasional yang teosentris terhadap perkawinan sesama jenis, menganggap bahwa sumber hukum adalah “moral” bukan “fakta”, oleh karenanya aturan perundang-undangan dipositifkan dari/dan tidak boleh bertentangan dengan moral Ketuhanan. Oleh karena itu, menurut hukum kodrat irrasional perkawinan sesama jenis tidak mungkin dapat diterima dalam hukum karena bertentangan dengan moralitas Ketuhanan Y.M.E. Kedua, bahwa Konstitusi Indonesia menempatkan Pancasila sebagai grundnorm dengan sila Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa menjadi fondasi dan bintang pemandu pada Undang-undang Perkawinan Indonesia, yang intinya perkawinan harus antara pria dan wanita (heteroseksual) dengan tujuan membentuk keluarga (rumah tangga). Perkawinan sesama jenis juga tidak dapat diterima karena ketidakmampuan bentuk perkawinan ini untuk memenuhi unsur-unsur utama perkawinan, untuk terjaminnya keberlangsungan kemanusiaan secara berkelanjutan (sustainable).The discourse of relationships between law, moral and facts are always interesting to be discussed among legal scholars. Irrational natural law is the first major legal theory that which theocentris worldview admit that the law derived from the “morality” of the God. The derivation of universal moral values appear increasingly metamorphosed into various life phenomena then are required to be treated equally before the law. In different parts of the world the movement LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) struggle for same-sex marriage has grown falsified domination of heterosexual marriage. Therefore it is necessary be a reflective philosophical divine the acceptability of the Constitution of Indonesia on same-sex marriage. This research was conducted by the method of normative juridical approach, in the frame of a coherent deductive acknowledgement. Concluded, Firstly, criticism Irrational natural law against same-sex marriage, assume that the source of the law is a “moral” rather than “facts”, therefore the rules of law are made of / and should not contradict with the morals of God. Therefore, according to irrational natural law that same-sex marriage may not be accepted in law as contrary to morality God. Secondly, That the Constitution of Indonesia puts Pancasila as the basic norms to please Almighty God be the foundation and a guiding star in the Indonesian Marriage Law, which is essentially a marriage should be between a man and a woman (heterosexual) with purpose of forming a family. Same-sex marriage is not acceptable also because of the inability to fulfill marriage form of the major elements of marriage, ensuring the sustainability of humanity in a sustainable manner.

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-281
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Kużelewska ◽  
Marta Michalczuk-Wlizło

Abstract There is room for everyone in the Catholic Church, but there is no consent for same-sex marriage in that Church as marriage only between a baptized man and a woman is a sacrament. Same-sex marriage is inconsistent with the Holy Scripture where marriage is based on God’s natural law. This official Scripture’s interpretation results in lack of possibility to reconciliate the official teaching of the Church with the recognition of same-sex marriage. The world is moving forward and so are the opinions of Christians and their growing support for same-sex marriage. Such marriage is recognized in thirty states worldwide, including states with dominant Catholic religion. Regardless the official teaching, the Catholic Church’s position is not uniform. The paper discusses the official interpretation of the Scripture concerning homosexuals, analyses the position of the Catholic Church toward same-sex marriage and indicates differences in Christians’ attitudes with respect to same-sex couples in Western and Eastern Europe.


Author(s):  
Holning Lau

Courts have played an integral part in advancing the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) communities in many parts of Asia. Yet courts in other parts of Asia have entrenched LGBT subordination. A vast expanse separates Asia’s most progressive LGBT judicial decisions from the most oppressive. This divergence stems from various factors, including differences among Asian courts’ judicial philosophies and cultural backdrops. Judicial developments in Asia have disrupted conventional narratives in Anglophone literature about LGBT rights. Conventional wisdom says there is a standard sequence for developing LGBT rights. It is commonly believed that countries will protect sexual orientation rights before gender identity rights; that they will legislate against discrimination before legalizing same-sex marriage; and that legal protections of LGBT rights begin in the West, and then the rest of the world subsequently imports these legal constructs. Developments in Asia have, however, challenged these narratives. While many Asian courts have galvanized reforms to protect LGBT rights, it is important to remember that these courts are nonetheless constrained in their ability to effectuate change. Case studies from Asia demonstrate that protecting LGBT rights often requires political branches of government to cooperate with courts. Political actors may resist implementing court-ordered reforms, especially if public opinion does not support the reforms.


Author(s):  
Stephen Macedo

This chapter considers the main arguments raised by conservatives against same-sex marriage and gay rights more generally. Defenders of same-sex marriage acknowledge the fact that marriage is in many ways a conservative institution. Libertarians, liberationists, and some liberals doubt that marriage is fair given the diversity of people's conceptions of meaning and value in life. Many adopt an unnecessarily critical posture toward civil marriage. This chapter offers a sympathetic account of marriage that recognizes the importance for many people of marital commitment while also honoring, and indeed helping to secure, the equal liberty and fairness prized by liberals. It shows that the debate over gay rights has been shaped by the repeated articulation of a demand for public reasons and evidence to justify the shape of the law touching on gay rights and marriage. The demand for reasons was laid down by the dissenters in Bowers v. Hardwick (1987).


The differences between states and within states are profound, and while that has long been true, it is much more consequential to LGBT individuals since the legalization of same-sex marriage. Social change relating to LGBT issues were originally addressed in a 1997 article written by Thomas Stoddard titled “Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change.” This chapter uses his framework and examines legislative responses to the legalization of same-sex marriage focusing on place.


Culture shifts relating to LGBT rights were originally addressed in a 1997 article written by Thomas Stoddard titled “Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change.” This chapter uses his framework for social change and examines how rule shifting and cultural shifts interact with the legalization of same-sex marriage.


Author(s):  
Gary R. Hicks

The public’s perception of, beliefs about, and interest in LGBT individuals and the issues impacting them has long had great significance to the community’s social, political, and legal progress. The last decade has seen monumental changes in public attitudes about LGBT people and the laws that affect them in the United States and around the world. Much of this change has been positive, including the landmark Supreme Court decision to legalize same-sex marriage. In some parts of the world—even those that have witnessed great strides for LGBT equality—there have also been signs of a backlash against the community’s newfound rights and visibility in society. Stereotypes of LGBT individuals, mostly negative, have been responsible for much of this reaction, as well as their historically negative view in by the public. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the mass media has played a major role in creating and perpetuating these stereotypes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Vos

In response to Alasdair MacIntyre’s and Brad Gregory’s claim—that the Reformation’s concept of morality in terms of obedience to divine commandments has been a major factor in a catastrophic breakdown in modernity of the teleological view of life and the virtues—this essay aims both to correct this criticism and to reread Calvin from the perspective of virtue ethics. Calvin’s utterances about the nature of the law, virtue, the self before God, one’s calling in the world, natural law and reason appear to be much more in alliance with a teleological, virtue ethical view than MacIntyre suggests. This opens up the possibility of a fruitful interplay between a Reformed account of law and Christian virtue ethics.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Byrne

This essay concerns the question of whether it is possible to have an account of what judges ought to do when they decide cases if one accepts Stanley Fish’s thesis that man is a socially constructed creature, who can only see the world around him in terms of the practice that he is involved in. It puts forward the view that such a position is defensible, provided that one makes different metaphysical commitments to the ones made by Fish. It is argued that Fish is best understood as a metaphysical idealist. The essay seeks to demonstrate that Martin Heidegger’s conception of the self and interpretation are similar to those of Fish, but that, when understood as involving a commitment to metaphysical realism, Heidegger’s philosophy can hold the possibility of strong legal theory open in a way that Fish’s cannot. Michael S. Moore’s natural law position is used in order to articulate what such a position might be. Moore’s example of what a judge ought to do if called upon to define ‘death’ as a concept is used to illustrate the difference between Fish and Heidegger when it comes to metaphysics and strong legal theory, despite their similarities when it comes to an account of interpretation and of the self.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Damele

Legal argumentation is usually considered the more formal (or, at least, formalistic) kind of practical argumentation, thanks to the long tradition of “legal syllogism” as its formal instrument, but also to its legal restraint (the formalistic aspect). Yet, in arguments such as those used, for example, by high courts in their justifications, we may find not only strict formalism and adherence to the letter of the law, but also the attempt to resolve differences of opinion and conflicts of interest, and perhaps also the rhetorical attempt to persuade the legal community, the legislator or even public opinion of the soundness of the court’s decision. But there could be more than that.


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