scholarly journals Which Possibility Is Necessaryfor Basic Conditionals?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moyun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Original Model ◽  
Truth Table ◽  
True Basic ◽  
A Current ◽  
As If

A current dispute in the psychology of conditionals is which possibility is necessary for basic conditionals such as if p then q. There are three accounts with different predictions about the question. The original model theory predicts that if p then q means the disjunction of three possibilities: possibly pq or possibly ¬pq or possibly ¬p¬q ( ¬ = “not”), in which each is unnecessary. The revised model theory predicts that it means the conjunction of the three possibilities, in which each is necessary. The suppositional theory predicts that people interpret it as a hypothetical test based on the conditional probability of p given q, in which only the pq possibility is necessary. Two experiments investigated possibility and truth judgments about basic conditionals given sets that consist of one or more of the four truth table cases of basic conditionals. The results demonstrate that both judgments approximate to the prediction of the suppositional theory rather than the original and revised model theory, and so people show the suppositional interpretation of basic conditionals, in which only the pq possibility is necessary for basic conditionals. Only the pq possibility is necessary for judging a basic conditional true. A true basic conditional mentally implies that only the pq possibility is necessary. These findings support the suppositional theory, but not the original and revised model theory.

scholarly journals Mental Models in Deductive Reasoning

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan A. García-Madruga ◽  
Francisco Gutiérrez ◽  
Nuria Carriedo ◽  
Sergio Moreno ◽  
Philip N. Johnson-Laird
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Deductive Reasoning ◽  
Semantic Content ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Linguistic Structure ◽  
The Third ◽  
As If

We report research investigating the role of mental models in deduction. The first study deals with conjunctive inferences (from one conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from one disjunction and the same two conditionals). The second study examines reasoning from multiple conditionals such as: If e then b; If a then b; If b then c; What follows between a and c? The third study addresses reasoning from different sorts of conditional assertions, including conditionals based on if then, only if, and unless. The paper also presents research on figural effects in syllogistic reasoning, on the effects of structure and believability in reasoning from double conditionals, and on reasoning from factual, counterfactual, and semifactual conditionals. The findings of these studies support the model theory, pose some difficulties for rule theories, and show the influence on reasoning of the linguistic structure and the semantic content of problems.

Towards a New Model for Causal Reasoning in Expert Systems

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Keith Wright
Keyword(s):  
Expert Systems ◽  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Causal Reasoning ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Probability Judgment ◽  
Probability Assessment ◽  
Conditional Probabilities ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Causal Strength ◽  
As If

This paper presents ideas for improved conditional probability assessment and improved expert systems consultations. It cautions that knowledge engineers may sometimes be imprecise when capturing causal information from experts: their elicitation questions may not distinguish between causal and correlational expertise. This paper shows why and how such models cannot support normative inferencing over conditional probabilities as if they were all based on frequencies in the long run. In some cases, these probabilities are instead causal theory-based judgments, and therefore are not traditional conditional probabilities. This paper argues that these should be processed as if they were causal strength probabilities or causal propensity probabilities. This paper reviews the literature on causal and probability judgment, and then presents a probabilistic inferencing model that integrates theory-based causal probabilities with frequency-based conditional probabilities. The paper also proposes guidelines for elicitation questions that knowledge engineers may use to avoid conflating causal theory-based judgment with frequency based judgment.

Two meanings of “if”? Individual differences in the interpretation of conditionals

2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 790-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Oberauer ◽  
Sonja M. Geiger ◽  
Katrin Fischer ◽  
Andrea Weidenfeld
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Mental Model ◽  
Truth Table ◽  
Response Patterns ◽  
Mental Model Theory ◽  
Evaluation Task ◽  
The Given ◽  
Classical Truth ◽  
Rule Out

This work investigates the nature of two distinct response patterns in a probabilistic truth table evaluation task, in which people estimate the probability of a conditional on the basis of frequencies of the truth table cases. The conditional-probability pattern reflects an interpretation of conditionals as expressing a conditional probability. The conjunctive pattern suggests that some people treat conditionals as conjunctions, in line with a prediction of the mental-model theory. Experiments 1 and 2 rule out two alternative explanations of the conjunctive pattern. It does not arise from people believing that at least one case matching the conjunction of antecedent and consequent must exist for a conditional to be true, and it does not arise from people adding the converse to the given conditional. Experiment 3 establishes that people's response patterns in the probabilistic truth table task are very consistent across different conditionals, and that the two response patterns generalize to conditionals with negated antecedents and consequents. Individual differences in rating the probability of a conditional were loosely correlated with corresponding response patterns in a classical truth table evaluation task, but there was little association with people's evaluation of deductive inferences from conditionals as premises. A theoretical framework is proposed that integrates elements from the conditional-probability view with the theory of mental models.

Conditionals and directionality: On the meaning of if vs. only if

2002 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Santamaría ◽  
Orlando Espino
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Conditional Statement ◽  
Directional Bias ◽  
Negative Contingency ◽  
Conditional Statements ◽  
As If

The aim of this study was to test the predictions of the current theories of reasoning about the comprehension of conditional statements. We used two types of conditional statement that are logically equivalent: if p then q and p only if q. The model theory of reasoning considers that these conditional forms differ in their initial meaning, because the negative contingency is considered only in the p only if q form. Mental-rule theories maintain that the interpretation of p only if q depends on a rephrasing of the statement as: if not q then not p. Alternatively, a directional bias may explain the differences between if p then q and p only if q. We report three experiments that demonstrate the existence of a directional bias in the comprehension of the conditionals. The results were not predicted by either the mental-rules theories or the model theory; they could, however, be easily assimilated by the model theory.

The dual reading of general conditionals: The influence of abstract versus concrete contexts

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moyun Wang ◽  
Xinyun Yao
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
Truth Table ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
Direct Reading ◽  
Frequency Information ◽  
A Current

A current main issue on conditionals is whether the meaning of general conditionals (e.g., If a card is red, then it is round) is deterministic (exceptionless) or probabilistic (exception-tolerating). In order to resolve the issue, two experiments examined the influence of conditional contexts (with vs. without frequency information of truth table cases) on the reading of general conditionals. Experiment 1 examined the direct reading of general conditionals in the possibility judgment task. Experiment 2 examined the indirect reading of general conditionals in the truth judgment task. It was found that both the direct and indirect reading of general conditionals exhibited the duality: the predominant deterministic semantic reading of conditionals without frequency information, and the predominant probabilistic pragmatic reading of conditionals with frequency information. The context of general conditionals determined the predominant reading of general conditionals. There were obvious individual differences in reading general conditionals with frequency information. The meaning of general conditionals is relative, depending on conditional contexts. The reading of general conditionals is flexible and complex so that no simple deterministic and probabilistic accounts are able to explain it. The present findings are beyond the extant deterministic and probabilistic accounts of conditionals.

“The” Interpretation(s) of Conditionals

2008 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Schroyens ◽  
Walter Schaeken ◽  
Kristien Dieussaert
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Probability Estimate ◽  
Interpretive System ◽  
The Difference ◽  
New Evidence

Abstract. Recent studies indicate that a vast majority of people judge the probability of a conditional <if A then C> as equivalent to the conditional probability of <A, given C>. This means that in evaluating the applicability of a conditional people do not seem to take into account situations in which the antecedent <A> is false. This has been taken as evidence against the model theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) . This theory, however, claims that the conditional interpretation in which false-antecedent cases are relevant is only one of many possible interpretations of “if.” We present new evidence that confirms this flexibility of the interpretive system. When people are primed by thinking (1) about truth and the difference between the <if A then C> and <if A then possibly C> or (2) are invited to judge which situations are consistent with the conditional, they are more likely to select a probability estimate that takes into account the false-antecedent cases.

scholarly journals Symmetry and asymmetry between inferences between disjunctions and conditionals

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moyun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Mental Model ◽  
Response Pattern ◽  
Probabilistic Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
Material Implication ◽  
Mental Model Theory ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
A Current ◽  
Mental Logic

How people make inferences between disjunctions and conditionals is a current important question that can test existing main psychological accounts (mental logic, the probabilistic approach, the original and revised mental model theory) for propositional reasoning. In order to test these accounts, one experiment investigated how relations (material implication, subcontrariety, contradiction, and contrariety) between two basic components (A and C) in disjunctions (e.g., A or C; not-A or C) and conditionals (e.g., if not-A then C; if A then C) and inference directions (disjunction-to-conditional versus conditional-to-disjunction) between disjunctions and their corresponding conditionals affect human inferences between both. It was found that participants’ inferences were symmetric between the two inference directions in compatible relations and incompatible relations where two basic components were on different dimensions, but not in the other relations. Which of the two inference directions was easier depended on relations between two basic components, because some relations tended to elicit particular interpretations of premises and conclusions, or belief biases. The present overall response pattern is beyond all the existing accounts for inferences between disjunctions and conditionals. Inferences between disjunctions and conditionals are complex and so there may not be a unified account for them.

A DEA model to evaluate Brazilian container terminals

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 743-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Fagundes Costa ◽  
Lidia Angulo Meza ◽  
Marcos Costa Roboredo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Current Model ◽  
Original Model ◽  
Container Terminals ◽  
Peer Evaluation ◽  
Data Envelopment ◽  
First Time ◽  
A Current ◽  
Decision Making Units

This study aims to evaluate the main Brazilian port terminals specialized in the operation of containers between the years 2010 and 2014. Therefore, it was applied Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and some of its complementary models, represented by the Cross Evaluation, in order to implement a peer-evaluation and improve the discrimination of the 100% efficient terminal; and a current model known as DEA-Game Cross Efficiency that combines DEA and Game Theory. This article proposes an adaptation to the original model, since it considers a radial output orientation, regarded as more compatible with the problem under analysis. DEA-Game was applied for the first time in port performance measurement and it was shown more suitable than the others, since the Decision Making Units (DMU) are seen from the perspective of a non-cooperative game and the results proved to be a Nash equilibrium.

The contrast effect in reading general conditionals

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (12) ◽  
pp. 2497-2505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moyun Wang ◽  
Xinyun Yao
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Contrast Effect ◽  
Response Pattern ◽  
Acceptance Rate ◽  
Truth Table ◽  
Dynamic Threshold ◽  
Similar Response

To adjudicate between deterministic and probabilistic accounts of the meaning of conditionals, we examined the influence of context on the reading of general conditionals. Context was varied with the contrast context, where participants judged uncertain conditionals after certain conditionals, and the control context, where participants judged only uncertain conditionals. Experiment 1 had participants to judge whether a set of truth table cases was possible for the conditional. Experiment 2 had participants to judge whether the conditional was true for a set of truth table cases. The findings are as follows. Possibility and truth judgments showed a similar response pattern. The reading of general conditionals varied with conditional contexts. The predominant reading was deterministic in the contrast context but was probabilistic in the control context. Conditional contexts yielded a significant contrast effect. Meanwhile, conditional probability P( q| p) made a smaller difference to the acceptance rate in the contrast context than in the control context. The overall pattern is beyond both the deterministic and probabilistic accounts. Alternatively, we propose a dynamic-threshold account for the relative reading of general conditionals.

scholarly journals Frames, Windows, and Mirrors. Sensing Still Bodies in Films by Manoel de Oliveira

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Hajnal Király
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
The Body ◽  
Iconic Representation ◽  
Visual Detail ◽  
Cultural Taboos ◽  
Tableau Vivant ◽  
As If

Abstract In the case of Oliveira’s Doomed Love (Amor de Perdição, 1978) (an adaptation of the homonymous classic Portuguese novel), Bresson’s model theory provides an adequate theoretical model for a melodrama in which characters, ‘hit by fate,’ are following their destinies as if ‘under hypnosis.’ Besides a typically frontal, iconic representation of bodies thoroughly framed by windows, doors, and mirrors, in this and many other films by Oliveira, the intermedial figure of tableau vivant also reveals the movement-stillness mechanisms of the medium of film by turning, under our eyes, the body into a picture. His Abraham’s Valley (Vale Abraão, 1993) is also relevant for a fetishistic representation of (female) feet and legs. This visual detail, somewhat reminding of Buñuel’s similar obsession, is not only subversive in terms of representation of socio-cultural taboos, but is also providing a compelling sensual experience of both the body and the medium.

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