scholarly journals Proactive control of emotional distraction: Evidence from alpha suppression

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Murphy ◽  
Christel Devue ◽  
Paul Michael Corballis ◽  
Gina M. Grimshaw

Biased attention towards emotional stimuli is adaptive, as it facilitates responses to important threats and rewards. An unfortunate consequence is that emotional stimuli can become potent distractors when they are irrelevant to current goals. How can this distraction be overcome despite the bias to attend to emotional stimuli? Recent studies show that distraction by irrelevant flankers is reduced when distractor frequency is high, even if they are emotional. A parsimonious explanation is that the expectation of frequent distractors promotes the use of proactive control, whereby attentional control settings can be altered to minimise distraction before it occurs. It is difficult, however, to infer proactive control on the basis of behavioural data alone. We therefore measured neural indices of proactive control while participants performed a target-detection task in which irrelevant peripheral distractors (either emotional or neutral) could appear either frequently (on 75% of trials) or rarely (on 25% of trials). We measured alpha power during the pre-stimulus period to assess proactive control; and during the post-stimulus period to determine the consequences of control for subsequent processing. Pre-stimulus alpha power was tonically suppressed in the high, compared to low, distractor-frequency condition, regardless of expected valence, indicating sustained use of proactive control. In contrast, there was less post-stimulus alpha suppression in the high frequency condition, suggesting that proactive control reduced the need for post-stimulus adjustments. Our findings indicate that a sustained proactive control strategy accounts for the reduction in both emotional and non-emotional distraction when distractors are expected to appear frequently.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Justin Murphy

<p>Recent behavioural studies using an emotional flanker task have found that task-irrelevent emotional images are more distracting than neutral images under infrequent, but not frequent, distractor conditions.It has been proposed the effective control of distraction in the high distractor frequency condition may be due to a shift to a proactive control strategy, whereby a potential distraction is anticipated and minimised in advance. However, although it is well established that proactive control is effective at reducingneutral distraction, it is not yet clear whether emotional distraction can be effectively proactively controlled. In this thesis, I used EEG to measure pre-stimulus indices of proactive control in order to determine whether proactive control is responsible for the effective control of emotional and neutral distraction in the high distractor frequency condition, as well asto examine whether proactive control differs according whether a neutral or emotional distraction is anticipated.In addition to replicating the previous behavioural findings, posterior EEG alpha was found to be tonically suppressed in the high compared to low distractor frequency condition, strongly supporting the hypothesis that proactive control was engaged in the high distractor frequency condition. By contrast, there was no difference in phasic alpha suppression (i.e., the drop in alpha in response to fixation onset) between conditions, indicating that the more effective control of distraction in the high frequency distractor conditions was due to a sustained proactive control strategy, rather than greater trial-by-trial preparation to attend to the target. In addition, no alpha lateralisation was found, indicating the mechanisms by which distraction was proactively controlled did not include the preparatory suppression of expected distractor locations. Finally, tonic alpha did not differ according to the expected distractor valence, but phasic alpha suppression was more pronounced when negative, compared to neutral or positive, distractors were expected, independent of distractor frequency condition. This suggests proactive control was also used to some extent in the low distractor frequency condition, but more importantly also provides initial evidence that the proactive control of negative distraction may be unique. Taken together, my findings provide compelling evidence that emotional distraction can be effectively proactively controlled. Future research is needed to determine the mechanisms by which this occurs, and whether the proactive control of emotional distraction is particularly effortful.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Justin Murphy

<p>Recent behavioural studies using an emotional flanker task have found that task-irrelevent emotional images are more distracting than neutral images under infrequent, but not frequent, distractor conditions.It has been proposed the effective control of distraction in the high distractor frequency condition may be due to a shift to a proactive control strategy, whereby a potential distraction is anticipated and minimised in advance. However, although it is well established that proactive control is effective at reducingneutral distraction, it is not yet clear whether emotional distraction can be effectively proactively controlled. In this thesis, I used EEG to measure pre-stimulus indices of proactive control in order to determine whether proactive control is responsible for the effective control of emotional and neutral distraction in the high distractor frequency condition, as well asto examine whether proactive control differs according whether a neutral or emotional distraction is anticipated.In addition to replicating the previous behavioural findings, posterior EEG alpha was found to be tonically suppressed in the high compared to low distractor frequency condition, strongly supporting the hypothesis that proactive control was engaged in the high distractor frequency condition. By contrast, there was no difference in phasic alpha suppression (i.e., the drop in alpha in response to fixation onset) between conditions, indicating that the more effective control of distraction in the high frequency distractor conditions was due to a sustained proactive control strategy, rather than greater trial-by-trial preparation to attend to the target. In addition, no alpha lateralisation was found, indicating the mechanisms by which distraction was proactively controlled did not include the preparatory suppression of expected distractor locations. Finally, tonic alpha did not differ according to the expected distractor valence, but phasic alpha suppression was more pronounced when negative, compared to neutral or positive, distractors were expected, independent of distractor frequency condition. This suggests proactive control was also used to some extent in the low distractor frequency condition, but more importantly also provides initial evidence that the proactive control of negative distraction may be unique. Taken together, my findings provide compelling evidence that emotional distraction can be effectively proactively controlled. Future research is needed to determine the mechanisms by which this occurs, and whether the proactive control of emotional distraction is particularly effortful.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gina M. Grimshaw ◽  
Laura Kranz ◽  
David Carmel ◽  
Rosie Moody ◽  
Christel Devue

Attending to emotional stimuli is often beneficial, because they provide important social and environmental cues. Sometimes, however, current goals require that we ignore them. To what extent can we control emotional distraction? Here we show that the ability to ignore emotional distractions depends on the type of cognitive control that is engaged. Participants completed a simple perceptual task at fixation while irrelevant images appeared peripherally. In two experiments, we manipulated the proportion of trials in which images appeared, in order to encourage use of either reactive control (rare distractors) or proactive control (frequent distractors). Under reactive control, both negative and positive images were more distracting than neutral images, even though they were irrelevant and appeared in unattended locations. However, under proactive control, distraction by both emotional and neutral images was eliminated. Proactive control was triggered by the meaning, and not the location, of distracting images. Our findings argue against simple bottom-up or top-down explanations of emotional distraction, and instead show how the flexible use of cognitive control supports adaptive processing of emotional distractors.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles L. Folk ◽  
Deborah Kendzierski ◽  
Brad Wyble

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