scholarly journals Anarchy, Status Updates, and Utopia

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Grimmelmann

Social software has a power problem.1 Actually, it has two. The first is technical. Unlike the rule of law, the rule of software is simple and brutal: whoever controls the software makes the rules. And if power corrupts, then automatic power corrupts automatically. Facebook can drop you down the memory hole; Pay-Pal can garnish your pay. These sovereigns of software have absolute and dictatorial control over their domains. Is it possible to create online spaces without technical power? It is not, because of social software’s second power problem. Behind technical power, there is also social power. When-ever people come together through software, they must agree which software they will use. That agreement vests technical power in whoever controls the software. Social software cannot be completely free of coercion—not without ceasing to be social, or ceasing to be software. Rule-of-law values are worth defending in the age of soft-ware empires, but they cannot be fully embedded in software it-self. Any technical design can always be changed through an exercise of social power. Software can help by making this coercion more obvious, or by requiring more people to join together in it, but software alone cannot fully protect users. Whatever limits make social software humane, free, and fair will have to come from somewhere else—they will have to come from We the Users.Published: 35 Pace Law Review 135 (2105)

1996 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-446
Author(s):  
Gérard Raulet

In the present social and political context, there is an urgent need to reexamine attentively the theories that have founded the modern conception of citizenship and, in particular, to scrutinize the relation they have established between otherness and modern national identity. I intend to do this by resorting to Kant's writings on the philosophy of history, and particularly his political Project for a Perpetual Peace, in which he attempts to come to grips with the consequences of the breakdown of the ancien régime and of the pre-modern conception of the nation in order to outline the modern principles governing the three levels of right: of the Rechtsstaat (a state based on the rule of law); of the Völkerrecht (the people's right); and of the so-called Weltbürgerrecht (the “cosmopolitical right”). The decisive and perhaps disturbing idea that has to be demonstrated is that, in Kant's modern political thought, there is no contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitism. Any interpretation of his thought that neglects this point would lead to a misunderstanding of Kant's philosophical revolution and fall back into the political as well as the metaphysical ancien régime. We have to show: (1) that Kant's critique of Reason aims to establish a legislation in the sphere of knowledge itself and that it must therefore accomplish in this sphere a “revolution” that distinguishes - in opposition to metaphysical universalism - different territories with their own constitution and legislation; (2) that the relation between this theoretical “revolution” and the political one is not only a metaphor, and that Kant's rejection of the political ancien régime cannot be correctly understood if it is not related to the theoretical model of the legitimacy of the different territories of Reason.


Author(s):  
Alice Donald ◽  
Anne-Katrin Speck

Abstract The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has limited tools to respond to rule of law backsliding by member states. Sanctions have never been used for this purpose, and the Assembly’s monitoring procedure—the most significant tool of scrutiny—presents a mixed picture. This article focuses on four states exhibiting severe rule of law backsliding: Hungary, which has evaded the procedure; Poland, which was placed under monitoring in 2020; Turkey, which in 2017 became the first state to have monitoring reopened; and Azerbaijan, which has been under monitoring since 2001. Through a first-ever analysis of debates, voting patterns, and tactics used in the Assembly, the article elucidates how proponents and opponents of monitoring have framed their arguments in the battleground of ideas about democracy and the rule of law in Europe. It concludes that the Assembly should fundamentally reappraise monitoring—and the possible use of sanctions—to meet the severity of the challenge.


1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Orren

The law of standing—rules by which judges find whether a party may bring suit—has been liberalized in the federal courts to permit interest group disputes not ordinarily possible. Following an historical pattern of conflict containment within judicial-style processes, consumer and environmental groups contest corporate business decisions by challenging the legality of their regulatory or legislative authorization. The vagueness and substantive emphasis of the new rules give groups more influence in determining when courts will intervene in the affairs of the other branches; and the doctrine's recognition of noneconomic injuries logically forces judges to consider whether they may find standing for some “public interest” beyond a specific plaintiff. Changes in standing equalize social power; but the entanglement of courts in the puzzles of interest representation may restrict protections for strictly private litigants, and may further remove the political system from the Rule of Law.


Author(s):  
Mesias J.P Sagala

Indonesia is a legal state where all aspects of people's lives in nation have norms that must be obeyed. These norms aim to prevent criminal acts. Criminal act is an act that is prohibited by the rule of law, and the prohibition is accompanied by threats and sanctions in the form of criminal violations of such prohibitions, such as gambling which is an act of betting deliberately carried out to benefit from a match, game or event that is uncertain about the result. For example, jackpot gambling games that use machine technology are played by inserting coins in the form of chips of money that have been exchanged for a certain value of money and inserted into the machine and then pulled by the player, then waiting for the combination image to come out simultaneously on the jackpot machine and if the image is the same, then it is considered to win a different cash prize depending on the interest or image that the player gets. This game is a chancy game that can be said as gambling because of bets between players. Keyword: Criminal Act, Gambling, Jackpot Gampling


Author(s):  
Antonie Klopper

The purpose of this article is not to come to the defence of the individual academics that Gravett has decided to criticise, for they can surely defend themselves. I wish only to make clear the importance of the work they are doing as a way to point critics of the current system away from their colleagues and onto the legal education system at large, which is the real obstacle standing in the way of Trial Advocacy. This article superficially only argues that the there is no real threat to a destruction of the antithesis between theory and practice and that few oppose this position. Subsequent articles will hopefully answer to the underlying concerns Gravett poses to the critical thinking, constitutionalism and transformative constitutionalism are possibly breaking down the rule of law etc; WH Gravett ‘Pericles should learn to fix a leaky pipe — Why trial advocacy should become part of the LLB curriculum (Part 1)’ (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (PER/PELJ) at 4.


2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 680-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Ingber

As we contemplate the incoming presidential administration, we stare ahead into uncharted space. It may seem as though recent history leaves us unprepared for what lies ahead. What can a discussion of the Obama war powers legacy, and the transition from the Bush to Obama administration, tell us about a transition from Barack Obama to the next president, and beyond?Yet there are lessons here. Noone can predict precisely how the president-elect and the team that is installed will confront the rule of law or grapple with the bureaucratic norms that I discuss in this paper. But systemic forces exist inside the executive branch that influence presidential decision-making in each modern administration and, barring a total reimagining of the executive branch, will operate on administrations to come. These internal forces include mechanisms and norms that fall within two broad categories: (1) those that favor continuity and hinder presidents from effecting change, and (2) those that incrementally help ratchet up claims to executive power.


1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin B. Ferencz

It is seemingly easier to evoke aggression than to dispel it, and easier to commit aggression than to define it. What has been universally condemned as “the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world ” has yet to be consensually particularized. On the eve of its hundredth meeting, the U.N. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, the fourth United Nations body to deal with the topic since 1952, adjourned without having carried out its instructions. It did conclude by irresolute acclamation that progress had been made and that it should continue its work in 1973. Despite the semblance of unanimity, both points were not free from doubt. Defining aggression has perplexed legal scholars for nearly half a century. Those who are dedicated to the rule of law and to a rational system of conflict management may wish to consider some of the current disputations aS well as the expectations and requirements of the days or years to come.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 5-10
Author(s):  
Pamela K. Bookman ◽  
Matthew S. Erie

In this essay, we describe the overlapping phenomena of new legal hubs (NLHs), international commercial courts, and arbitral courts. We survey their impact on the law and geopolitics of international commercial dispute resolution, identifying key issues these new dispute resolution institutions raise. While the rise of international commercial courts spans authoritarian and liberal states, Western and Asian states, common law and civil law traditions, it also highlights and builds upon regional differences. We question the assumption that the establishment of new courts is always consistent with an increase in the rule of law, particularly in non-democratic states. We close with thoughts about the potential influence and future role of these institutions. Some of the procedural innovations discussed here may lead to shifts in international commercial dispute resolution for years to come, but the question of whether there is sufficient demand for these new institutions lingers.


2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-710
Author(s):  
Sonia Pratte

The rule of law is one of the foundations of our society. In England where it first developed, it symbolized the subjection of royal power to new parliamentary supremacy. Towards the end of the 19th century, A.V. Dicey provided the concept with a description expressed in three well-known premisses. As a component of unwritten law in Canada, the rule of law was to experience many interpretations until finally it was enshrined in the preambule of the Canadian Charter. Henceforth a part of the Constitution, it would now acquire a more formal meaning in its applications to parliaments, administrative acts in general and even to royal prerogatives. Furthermore, the rule also carries with it a content that will be more precisely defined by the courts in years to come. The rule of law now is a dynamic concept that can be placed in the service of protecting and promoting human rights.


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