scholarly journals Children’s evaluations of third-party responses to unfairness: Children prefer helping over punishment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young-eun Lee ◽  
Felix Warneken
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Developmental Continuity

Third-party punishment of selfish individuals is an important mechanism to intervene against unfairness. However, there is another way in which third parties can intervene. Rather than focusing on the unfair individual, third parties can choose to help those who were treated unfairly by reducing inequality. Such third-party helping as an alternative to third-party punishment has received little attention in studies with children. Across four studies, we examined the evaluations of third-party punishment versus third-party helping in N = 322 5- to 9-year-old children. Study 1, 3 and 4 showed that when asked about the agents directly, children evaluated both helpers and punishers positively, but they preferred helpers over punishers overall. When asked about the type of intervention itself, children preferred helping over punishment, suggesting that their preference for the type of intervention corresponds to how children think about the agents performing these interventions. Study 2 showed that children’s preference for third-party helping is driven by distributive justice concerns and not a mere preference for giving or resource maximization as children consider which type of third-party intervention decreases inequality. Together, this series of studies demonstrate that children between 5 and 9 years of age develop a sophisticated understanding of punishment and helping as two adequate forms of intervention but also display a preference for third-party helping. We discuss how these findings and prior work with adults supports the hypothesis of developmental continuity, showing that a preference for helping over punishment is deeply rooted in ontogeny.

scholarly journals A psychological approach to third-party side-taking in interpersonal conflicts

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 174-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huadong Yang ◽  
Evert van de Vliert ◽  
Karen Jehn
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Related Factors ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Conflict Processes ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Psychological Mechanism ◽  
Theoretical Paper ◽  
Status Differences ◽  
Different Levels

Third parties often react to an interpersonal conflict by taking sides. However, under the assumption that third parties are to help disputants resolve their problems, the topic of side-taking has been overlooked in the literature of conflict management. In this theoretical paper, we propose self-interest, moral, and relationship motives to explain the psychological mechanism of side-taking. We then discuss how disputant-related factors (in terms of the effects of status differences between third parties and disputants), dispute-related factors (in terms of conflict types), and contextual factors (in terms of individualism/collectivism) have an influence on the three types of side-taking motives to gain a deeper and broader understanding of side-taking. By focusing on side-taking and analyzing its motives, our theoretical framework connects and extends the literatures on third-party intervention and coalition formation. It also bridges the gap between individuals, dyads, groups, and organizations at different levels of conflict processes.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARMING ANIMALS

Think ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (22) ◽  
pp. 51-55
Author(s):  
John Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Innocent Victim ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Defense Theory

Third-party intervention has been the focus of recent debate in self-defense theory. When is it permissible for third-parties to intervene on behalf of an innocent victim facing an unjustified attack or threat? In line with recent self-defense theory, if an attacker is morally responsible for their actions and does not have an acceptable excuse then it is permissible for third-parties to use proportionate violence against them.

3 Third Party Intervention

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brealey Mark ◽  
George Kyla
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
European Union Commission ◽  
Compensation Claims

This chapter focuses on the rights of third parties to intervene in competition proceedings in the High Court (and appellate courts) and in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). It first considers intervention by third parties in the High Court under Rule 19.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), intervention in judicial review proceedings, and intervention in appeal proceedings. It then discusses intervention in CAT, placing emphasis on appeals and reviews (applying for permission to intervene, the time limit for making an application to intervene, the role played by intervener at the hearing). It also explains how compensation claims are made under CAT rule 16 before concluding with an analysis of intervention by competition authorities, namely the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the European Union Commission.

scholarly journals Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation

2015 ◽  
Vol 112 (22) ◽  
pp. 6937-6942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nir Halevy ◽  
Eliran Halali
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Experimental Paradigm ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Conflict Intervention ◽  
Intergroup Conflicts

The tremendous costs of conflict have made humans resourceful not only at warfare but also at peacemaking. Although third parties have acted as peacemakers since the dawn of history, little is known about voluntary, informal third-party intervention in conflict. Here we introduce the Peacemaker Game, a novel experimental paradigm, to model and study the interdependence between disputants and third parties in conflict. In the game, two disputants choose whether to cooperate or compete and a third party chooses whether or not to intervene in the conflict. Intervention introduces side payments that transform the game disputants are playing; it also introduces risk for the third party by making it vulnerable to disputants’ choices. Six experiments revealed three robust effects: (i) The mere possibility of third-party intervention significantly increases cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup conflicts; (ii) reducing the risk to third parties dramatically increases intervention rates, to everyone’s benefit; and (iii) disputants’ cooperation rates are consistently higher than third parties’ intervention rates. These findings explain why, how, and when self-interested third parties facilitate peaceful conflict resolution.

scholarly journals Issues in third-party intervention research and the role of destruction in conflict

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Potter ◽  
John L. Scott
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Statistical Modeling ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Recent Theory ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Choice Variable ◽  
Theoretical Side

Research on third-party intervention into conflict has accelerated in recent years. Although some studies have explicitly assumed that third parties only value peace, recent theory has modeled parties to a conflict more flexibly. In addition, empirical results provide evidence that third-party motives are more complex than straightforward peacemaking. In particular, although the United Nations attempts peacemaking missions, evidence suggests that United Nations interventions prolong conflict. We sample the literature on interventions and offer directions for further research. On the empirical side, we suggest that third-party research should exploit recent applications of statistical modeling that unravel the complexity created by the fact that the decision to intervene in a conflict may depend on the same factors that contribute to the duration of the conflict. On the theoretical side, in contrast to previous studies, we suggest modeling the destruction that armed conflict causes as a choice variable.

Toward a holistic networks approach to strategic third-party intervention: A literature review

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Hannigan
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
External Actors ◽  
Conflict Outcomes

How do third parties decide to intervene in civil conflicts? The study of intervention has focused primarily on the conflict characteristics and dyadic linkages that make intervention more likely, or the conflict outcomes that interventions generate, while holding all else equal. To paint a more complete picture of what goes into the intervention decision, I advocate a shift in the way we conceive of interventions toward network analysis, which grants due agency to the multiple external actors and internal combatants that influence the decision to intervene. This review critically examines and synthesizes the recent literature on third-party interventions in civil conflict and, in so doing, identifies some areas for future research.

Cláusulas de franquicia o deducible en seguros de responsabilidad civil en el Derecho español: Naturaleza y efectos respecto de terceros perjudicados

2018 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Rafael Lara González
Keyword(s):  
Civil Liability ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Insurance Contracts ◽  
Spanish Law ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Legal Nature

ResumenPese a su ubicuidad en la práctica contractual, las cláusulas de franquicia han recibido tratamiento incidental en la doctrina. La discusión sobre ellas se ha enfocado en los contratos de seguros de responsabilidad civil, y en la interpretación del artículo 76 de la Ley española de Contrato de Seguro. En este contexto se ha tratado de establecer si el asegurador puede o no oponer la cláusula de franquicia al tercero perjudicado. El presente trabajo analiza la cláusula de franquicia en la obligación principal del asegurador, su naturaleza jurídica, y examina su relación con los terceros perjudicados. La consideración principal a este respecto estará en si nos encontramos ante un seguro obligatorio o ante un seguro voluntario de responsabilidad civil. Palabras clave: Contrato de seguro; Cláusula de franquicia; Terceroperjudicado; Responsabilidad civil.AbstractDespite their ubiquity in contractual praxis, deductible clauses have received only incidental treatment in legal doctrine. Discussion on them has focused on civil liability insurance contracts, and the interpretation of article 76 of the Spanish Law of Insurance Contracts. In this context it has been attempted to establish whether the insurer can invoke the clause to oppose the injured third party's claim. This article examines the deductible clause included in the insurer's main obligation, its legal nature, and its relation to injured third parties. The main consideration in this regard will be whether the insurance contract is of a mandatory or voluntary nature.Keywords: Insurance contract; Deductible clause; Injured third party; Civil liability.

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