Mirror Neurons in Older Participants

Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (35) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis C. Staskon
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (S 02) ◽  
Author(s):  
M Hören ◽  
MS Vry ◽  
D Saur ◽  
V Glauche ◽  
I Mader ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 124-138
Author(s):  
Alexandra V. Shiller

The article analyzes the role of theories of embodied cognition for the development of emotion research. The role and position of emotions changed as philosophy developed. In classical and modern European philosophy, the idea of the “primacy of reason” prevailed over emotions and physicality, emotions and affective life were described as low-ranking phenomena regarding cognitive processes or were completely eliminated as an unknown quantity. In postmodern philosophy, attention focuses on physicality and sensuality, which are rated higher than rational principle, mind and intelligence. Within the framework of this approach, there is a recently emerged theory of embodied cognition, which allows to take a fresh look at the place of emotions in the architecture of mental processes – thinking, perception, memory, imagination, speech. The article describes and analyzes a number of empirical studies showing the impossibility of excluding emotional processes and the significance of their research for understanding the architecture of embodied cognition. However, the features of the architecture of embodied cognition remain unclear, and some of the discoveries of recent years (mirror neurons or neurons of simulation) rather raise new questions and require further research. The rigorously described and clear architecture of the embodied cognition can grow the theoretical basis that will allow to advance the studies of learning processes, language understanding, psychotherapy techniques, social attitudes and stereotypes, highlight the riddle of consciousness and create new theories of consciousness or even create an anthropomorphic artificial intelligence that is close to “strong artificial intelligence.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Md Moin Uddin Atique ◽  
Joseph Thachil Francis

AbstractMirror Neurons (MNs) respond similarly when primates make or observe grasping movements. Recent work indicates that reward expectation influences rostral M1 (rM1) during manual, observational, and Brain Machine Interface (BMI) reaching movements. Previous work showed MNs are modulated by subjective value. Here we expand on the above work utilizing two non-human primates (NHPs), one male Macaca Radiata (NHP S) and one female Macaca Mulatta (NHP P), that were trained to perform a cued reward level isometric grip-force task, where the NHPs had to apply visually cued grip-force to move and transport a virtual object. We found a population of (S1 area 1–2, rM1, PMd, PMv) units that significantly represented grip-force during manual and observational trials. We found the neural representation of visually cued force was similar during observational trials and manual trials for the same units; however, the representation was weaker during observational trials. Comparing changes in neural time lags between manual and observational tasks indicated that a subpopulation fit the standard MN definition of observational neural activity lagging the visual information. Neural activity in (S1 areas 1–2, rM1, PMd, PMv) significantly represented force and reward expectation. In summary, we present results indicating that sensorimotor cortices have MNs for visually cued force and value.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162199063
Author(s):  
Cecilia Heyes ◽  
Caroline Catmur

Ten years ago, Perspectives in Psychological Science published the Mirror Neuron Forum, in which authors debated the role of mirror neurons in action understanding, speech, imitation, and autism and asked whether mirror neurons are acquired through visual-motor learning. Subsequent research on these themes has made significant advances, which should encourage further, more systematic research. For action understanding, multivoxel pattern analysis, patient studies, and brain stimulation suggest that mirror-neuron brain areas contribute to low-level processing of observed actions (e.g., distinguishing types of grip) but not to high-level action interpretation (e.g., inferring actors’ intentions). In the area of speech perception, although it remains unclear whether mirror neurons play a specific, causal role in speech perception, there is compelling evidence for the involvement of the motor system in the discrimination of speech in perceptually noisy conditions. For imitation, there is strong evidence from patient, brain-stimulation, and brain-imaging studies that mirror-neuron brain areas play a causal role in copying of body movement topography. In the area of autism, studies using behavioral and neurological measures have tried and failed to find evidence supporting the “broken-mirror theory” of autism. Furthermore, research on the origin of mirror neurons has confirmed the importance of domain-general visual-motor associative learning rather than canalized visual-motor learning, or motor learning alone.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 2113-2113 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.M. Borghi ◽  
F. Binkofski

The ability to understand intentions of actions performed by others is one of the prerequisites for social interaction. This ability has been attributed to our capacity to mentalize others’ behaviour, by simulating or predicting their mental states that would cause that behaviour and make it comprehensible. Brain imaging studies revealed the so called “mentalizng network” including the pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex. This network gets constantly activated anytime we try to take the perspective of others or try to simulate their state of mind. On the other hand the discovery of mirror neurons has provided an additional explanation for understanding of the content of actions. The functional properties of these neurons point out that action understanding is primarily based on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of perceived actions with one's own motor representation of the same actions. We provide evidence that both systems interact closely during the processing of intentionality of actions. Thus mentalizing is not the only form of intentional understanding and motor and intentional components of action are closely interwoven. Both systems play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.


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