Has Germany “Fallen Out of Love” with Europe? The Eurozone Crisis and the “Normalization” of Germany's European Identity

2015 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Galpin
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
European Identity ◽  
Media Discourse ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Northern European ◽  
European Crisis ◽  
Political Speeches

The European Union has been in its biggest ever crisis since the onset of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Beyond the political and economic dimensions, the crisis has also sparked discussions about Germany's European identity. Some scholars have argued that Germany's behavior in the crisis signals a continuation of the process of “normalization” of its European identity toward a stronger articulation of national identity and interests, that it has “fallen out of love” with Europe. This article will seek to reassess these claims, drawing on detailed analysis of political and media discourse in Germany—from political speeches through to both broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. It will argue that the crisis is understood broadly as a European crisis in Germany, where the original values of European integration are at stake. Furthermore, the crisis is debated through the lens of European solidarity, albeit with a particular German flavor of solidarity that draws on the economic tradition of ordoliberalism. Rather than strengthening expressions of national identity, this has resulted in the emergence of a new northern European identity in contrast to Greece or “southern Europe.”

The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Risk Sharing: Some Lessons from the Eurozone Crisis

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaushik Basu
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Joint Liability ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Simple Theoretical Model ◽  
The Creation

AbstractAnalyzing the source of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the paper argues the need for greater risk sharing and joint liability across sovereigns. This will require amending some of the legal provisions that underlie the European Union and the creation of the Euro. Once this is done it will be possible to consider the creation of Eurobonds and other liability arrangements, which can promote investment and job creation. A simple theoretical model is presented to bolster the argument.

scholarly journals The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bond Yields ◽  
Member States ◽  
Sovereign Bond ◽  
European Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Collective Action Clauses

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.

Eurobonds: Three Lessons from China’s “Debt Centralization/Decentralization” Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
Previous Series

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.

The Eurozone crisis and Italian corporate governance: the end of blockholding?

Modern Italy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Bulfone
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Process Of Change ◽  
Business Elites ◽  
Legal Reforms ◽  
Italian Case ◽  
Behavioural Patterns

This article explains the process of change in domestic corporate governance. An actor-centred coalitional approach is applied to the Italian case to show how the main features of domestic corporate governance are a product of behavioural patterns (i.e. informal institutions), rather than formal legislation. Leveraging their superior financial means, business elites act as institutional incumbents shaping these informal institutions according to their preferences. It is argued that a change in corporate practices is more likely to be triggered by a socio-economic crisis, which weakens the domestic elite's influence, rather than a legal reform. These findings call into question the excessively formalistic approach of many corporate governance scholars, and are confirmed by the Italian trajectory. After having resisted 20 years of liberalising legal reforms aimed at eroding their power, Italian blockholders are now being forced, as a consequence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, to dismantle their cross-shareholding networks.

The building of economic governance in the European Union

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Verdun
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Social ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

This article seeks to shed light on the development over the past decades of the concept of economic governance. It asks what is understood by economic governance and what role the social dimension has played. The article offers an analysis of the problems and possible issues confronting the EU as it seeks ways to address the sovereign debt crisis by embarking on deeper economic integration. The article concludes that from the early days there have been questions about the exact interaction between economic and monetary integration and thus between ‘economic’ and ‘monetary’ union. Despite Delors’ original inclination, few were willing to establish any linkage between EMU and social matters. The crises have again brought out the need to consider the two in tandem. Moreover, with the increased role in economic governance accorded to EU-level institutions, there is a need to rethink the EU democratic model.

From embedded to uncompromising neoliberalism: Competitiveness policies and European Union interscalar relations in the case of Greece

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicos Souliotis ◽  
Georgia Alexandri
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Supranational Level ◽  
Of Greece ◽  
The Eu

This article traces the transfer of competitiveness and cohesion policies from the European Union (EU) institutions to the national and subnational authorities in Greece, both before and after the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that prior to the crisis, the flexibilities of the EU governance system allowed the Greek central government to use the competitiveness and cohesion agenda, as well as the associated funds, to build a domestic socio-political consensus focused on the idea of ‘convergence’ with Europe. The crisis-induced bailout programme deepened neoliberal policies and reorganised vertical and horizontal power relations: policy-making powers have been upscaled towards the supranational level, while the national authorities have been socially disembedded.

scholarly journals Financial and Banking Regulation and Supervision within the EU

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-37
Author(s):  
Constanze Lehleiter
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Green Paper ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has faced not only the international financial crisis, but also the European banking and the sovereign debt crisis. A lack of efficient regulations and supervision were a serious cause of recent developments. As a reaction, the EU finally implemented a framework covering both micro- and macro-prudential policies. Measures such as the new capital requirements, the deposit guarantee schemes, the green paper on shadow banking and, most importantly, the new approach for a macro-prudential supervision are headed towards crisis prevention. However, the challenge is to define regulations enhancing financial stability, which, at the same time, do not prevent institutions from generating reasonable financial risks and do not reduce growth. In that regard, the presented measures still have deficits which have to be faced. Furthermore, coordination between various authorities and the European Commission remains another challenge.

Self-defeating austerity? Assessing the impact of a fiscal consolidation on unemployment

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Carlos Lopes ◽  
João Ferreira do Amaral
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Fiscal Consolidation ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Huge Impact ◽  
Social Transfers ◽  
Balance Trade ◽  
The Impact

The great recession of 2008/2009 had a huge impact on unemployment and public finances in most advanced countries, and these impacts were magnified in the southern Euro area by the sovereign debt crisis of 2010/2011. The fiscal consolidation imposed by the European Union on highly indebted countries was based on the assumptions of so-called expansionary austerity. However, the reality so far provides proof to the contrary, and the results outlined in this article support the opposing view of a self-defeating austerity. Based on a model of the input–output relations of the productive system, an unemployment rate/budget balance trade-off equation is derived, as well as the impact of a strong fiscal consolidation based on social transfers and the notion of a neutral budget balance. An application to the Portuguese case confirms the huge costs of a strong fiscal consolidation, both in terms of unemployment and social policy regress. The conclusion is that too much consolidation in anyone year makes consolidation more difficult in the following year.

A catalytic moment: The Greek crisis in the German financial press

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 446-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amelie Kutter
Keyword(s):  
Critical Discourse Analysis ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Discursive Construction ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Greek Crisis ◽  
Political Studies ◽  
Catalytic Role ◽  
High Level ◽  
Financial Press

The Greek crisis has attracted more public-political attention than any other sovereign debt crisis within the European Union. This article investigates the argument that this is due to the symbolic-catalytic role that the Greek crisis played in forging a specific approach to state rescue and the reform of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Drawing on assumptions of interpretive-narrative political studies about the discursive construction of crisis and a Critical Discourse Analysis of editorials from the financial press, the study shows how this approach was ‘catalyzed’ by a specific construction of the ‘Greek case’. Reference to the ‘Greek case’, in particular the high level of government debt, rendered austerity a plausible option of crisis management. Reference to the contagion potential of the Greek crisis justified the application of austerity across the Eurozone. The Greek crisis was also seen to reveal the systemic flaws of the EMU and suggest deepened economic integration.

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