scholarly journals Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 715-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantin Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
The Rich

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

Konsep Distribusi Pendapatan Dalam Islam

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Moh. Ah. Subhan ZA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The main problem of social life in the community is about how to make the allocation and distribution of income well. Inequality and poverty basically arise not because of the difference of anyone’s strength and weakness in getting livelihood, but because of inappropriate distribution mechanism. With the result that wealth treasure just turns on the rich wealthy, which is in turn, results in the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.Therefore, a discussion on distribution becomes main focus of theory of Islamic economics. Moreover, the discussion of the distribution is not only related to economic issues, but also social and political aspects. On the other side, the economic vision of Islam gives priority to the guarantee of the fulfillment of a better life. Islam emphasizes distributive justice and encloses, in its system, a program for the redistribution of wealth and prosperity, so that each individual is guaranteed with a respectable and friendly standard of living. Islam recognizes private property rights, but the private property rights must be properly distributed. The personal property is used for self and family livelihood, for investment of the working capital, so that it can provide job opportunities for others, for help of the others through zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh. In this way, the wealth not only rotates on the rich, bringing on gap in social life.The problem of wealth distribution is closely related to the welfare of society. Therefore, the state has a duty to regulate the distribution of income in order that the distribution can be fair and reaches appropriate target. The state could at least attempt it by optimizing the role of BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat) and LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakat) which has all this time been slack. If BAZ and LAZ can be optimized, author believes that inequality and poverty over time will vanish. This is because the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim.

Intergenerational Wealth Transfer and the Need to Revive and Metamorphose the Israeli Estate Tax

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daphna Hacker
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Wealth Transfer ◽  
Estate Tax ◽  
Inheritance Tax ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Needy

Abstract This article suggests enacting an accession tax instead of the estate duty – which was repealed in Israel in 1981. This suggestion evolves from historical and normative explorations of the tension between perceptions of familial intergenerational property rights and justifications for the “death tax,” as termed by its opponents, i.e., estate and inheritance tax. First, the Article explores this tension as expressed in the history of the Israeli Estate Duty Law. This chronological survey reveals a move from the State’s taken-for-granted interest in revenue justifying the Law’s enactment in 1949; moving on to the “needy widow” and “poor orphan” in whose name the tax was attacked during the years 1959–1964, continuing to the abolition of the tax in 1981 in the name of efficiency and the right of the testator to transfer his wealth to his family, and finally cumulating with the targeting of tycoon dynasties that characterizes the recent calls for reintroducing the tax. Next, based on the rich literature on the subject, the Article maps the arguments for and against intergenerational wealth transfer taxation, placing the Israeli case in larger philosophical, political, and pragmatic contexts. Lastly, it associates the ideas of accession tax and “social inheritance” with inspirational sources for rethinking a realistic wealth transfer taxation to bridge the gap between notions of intergenerational familial rights and intergenerational social justice.

scholarly journals Coasian and modern property rights economics

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIRSTEN FOSS ◽  
NICOLAI FOSS
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Institutional Research ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Rich ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Ownership Rights ◽  
Governance Arrangements

Abstract:Laying the foundations of property rights economics stands out among Ronald Coase's many seminal contributions. This approach had an impact on a number of fields in economics in, particularly, the 1960s and 1970s. The modern body of property rights economics mainly originates in the work Oliver Hart and is quite different in style, scope, and implications from the original property rights economics of Coase, Demsetz, Alchian, Cheung, Umbeck, Barzel, etc. Based on our earlier work on the subject (Foss and Foss, 2001), we argue that the change from Mark I to Mark II property rights economics led to a substantial narrowing of the scope of property rights economics, somewhat akin to a Kuhnian loss of content. In particular, Mark II property rights economics make strong assumptions concerning the definition and enforcement of ownership rights made which lead to many real life institutions and governance arrangements being excluded from consideration, and a much more narrow focus than that of the rich institutional research program initiated by Coase and his followers.

The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 530-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey F. Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Services ◽  
State Autonomy ◽  
The Poor ◽  
State Capture ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Taxes ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Fiscal Contract

Using data from approximately ninety countries, the author shows that the more a state taxes the rich as a percentage of GDP, the more it protects property rights; and the more it taxes the poor, the more it provides basic public services. There is no evidence that states gouge the rich to benefit the poor or vice versa, contrary to state-capture theories. Nor is there any evidence that taxes and spending are unrelated, contrary to state-autonomy models. Instead, states operate much like fiscal contracts, with groups getting what they pay for.

scholarly journals Konsep Distribusi Pendapatan Dalam Islam

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moh. Ah. Subhan ZA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The main problem of social life in the community is about how to make the allocation and distribution of income well. Inequality and poverty basically arise not because of the difference of anyone’s strength and weakness in getting livelihood, but because of inappropriate distribution mechanism. With the result that wealth treasure just turns on the rich wealthy, which is in turn, results in the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.Therefore, a discussion on distribution becomes main focus of theory of Islamic economics. Moreover, the discussion of the distribution is not only related to economic issues, but also social and political aspects. On the other side, the economic vision of Islam gives priority to the guarantee of the fulfillment of a better life. Islam emphasizes distributive justice and encloses, in its system, a program for the redistribution of wealth and prosperity, so that each individual is guaranteed with a respectable and friendly standard of living. Islam recognizes private property rights, but the private property rights must be properly distributed. The personal property is used for self and family livelihood, for investment of the working capital, so that it can provide job opportunities for others, for help of the others through zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh. In this way, the wealth not only rotates on the rich, bringing on gap in social life.The problem of wealth distribution is closely related to the welfare of society. Therefore, the state has a duty to regulate the distribution of income in order that the distribution can be fair and reaches appropriate target. The state could at least attempt it by optimizing the role of BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat) and LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakat) which has all this time been slack. If BAZ and LAZ can be optimized, author believes that inequality and poverty over time will vanish. This is because the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim. Keywords: distribution of income, State’ role, Islamic economics

Foundations in China

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wang Ming ◽  
Xu Yushan
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Analytic Framework ◽  
The West ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Rich

AbstractFoundations are rooted in public interest; they are built from wealth; they are a form of involvement in the public interest for the wealthy; they represent a systemic arrangement in which society may, through organizing, compel the rich to express their concern for society through public-interest donations to the poor; and they are a legal form in which, in the name of the public interest, wealth can be redistributed and perpetuated. After defining foundations, offering a classification, and discussing foundations’ properties, this article endeavors to examine the historical development of foundations in the West and in China, and analyze the unique characteristics of Chinese foundations and their opportunities going forward. It will proceed to analyze the systemic characteristics of foundations’ property rights, introduce the concept of public-interest property rights, discuss foundation governance structures, analyze the basic principles behind foundation legislation, discuss preferential tax policies and innovations in foundation governance, and, finally, raise several policy recommendations for the expansion and strengthening of China’s foundations. This article represents the author’s effort at a general analytic framework for and basic research theory of foundations, based on empirical research, for the reference of his esteemed colleagues.

Our Anti-Intellectual Property Rights System

2021 ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
Dan Breznitz
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Slowing Down ◽  
System P ◽  
Sustained Innovation ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Many ◽  
Elegant Solution

The chapter explains why, properly used, intellectual property rights (IPR) are an elegant solution to the real problems of the inappropriability and indivisibility of innovation. Under free market conditions, these factors lead to a situation in which it is just not worth it to innovate, since even if successful, the innovator will not be able to enjoy high enough profits to recoup the initial investment. The theory behind IPR is that by granting them we can diminish the problems of inappropriability and indivisibility, and thus stimulate innovation. However, the positive welfare outcomes of innovation happen only when it is widely diffused and produces a lot of spillovers, which by definition do not generate profits. Accordingly, solutions that give too strong and full property rights risk slowing down innovation. As such, those solutions can become a cure that is worse than the disease. Sadly, we have come to a point where our patent, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets systems favor the incumbent and the rich and stifle innovation. For locales, existing IPR act as a punitive restriction on their companies and entrepreneurs’ freedom to operate. Accordingly, communities that wish to enjoy sustained innovation-based growth must game the system to protect their innovators’ freedom to operate. The chapter concludes with a few promising venues by which communities can transform weaknesses into strength. These examples aim to highlight the many ways to go forward even under the current conditions of a broken and dysfunctional global IPR system.

scholarly journals Die Globalisierung von Rechten an geistigem Eigentum und der Nord-Süd-Konflikt

2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (126) ◽  
pp. 103-125
Author(s):  
Michael Frein
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
Access To Medicines ◽  
Trips Agreement ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich

The article discusses the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as an instrument for the globalisation of intellectual property rights. It focuses on the provisions of TRIPs Art 27.3 (b), which contains global rules for the patenting of life, and the question of access to medicines for the poor in developing countries. By analysing the underlying economic and political interests of the industrial countries and multinational corporations, which have formed the provisions of the TRIPs- Agreement, it is argued that higher standards in intellectual property rights, especially patents, advantage the rich and disadvantage the poor. Therefore there is an urgent need to change the TRIPs-Agreement in line with the interests and in favour of developing countries. The article shows that there are several suggestions for the current negotiations made not only by NGOs, but also by governments of developing countries.

Commons Sense: Common Property Rights, Efficiency, and Institutional Change

1998 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Clark
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Relative Prices ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Land Owners ◽  
The Rich

Common property rights were widespread in English agriculture for at least 600 years. Since privatizing common fields allegedly produced huge profits in the eighteenth century, common land owners seemingly squandered 15 percent of potential income for generations. Ingenious explanations have been produced for this market failure. This article argues for a simple, brutal resolution. Common fields survived because enclosure was generally unprofitable before 1750, when changing relative prices made private property rights marginally more efficient. Then people responded quickly to modest profits. The rich gains from enclosure existed only in the imaginings of wild-eyed eighteenth century agrarian reformers.

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