"Rosy" Mistakes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Georgia

2009 ◽  
pp. 143-152
Author(s):  
V. Papava

The paper is devoted to the analysis of failures, characteristic of the activities of Bretton-Woods institutions in Georgia after 2004. Their experts systematically overlooked the existence of non-budgetary accounts, violation of property rights, restriction of competition, manipulations with statistical data, weakening of the National Bank of Georgia, unnecessary issue of Eurobonds, poor tax policy etc. The case of Georgia may prove the necessity of reforming international financial institutions.

Author(s):  
Ngaire Woods

This article discusses the Bretton Woods Institutions, which are often described as the ‘sister institutions’ of the United Nations. It explains how the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) generated heated debate and criticism, most especially over the past twenty years. It shows what the institutions do and determines why they have become controversial. The article also identifies the two key factors that limit the effectiveness of the institutions.


Author(s):  
Jacques Fomerand ◽  
Dennis Dijkzeul

This article explores the historical and current intricacies of cooperation across the various specialized agencies. The article also examines the special programs and funds of the UN's extended development system. These identify several structural difficulties that are mixed with conventional bureaucratic politics and turf-consciousness. The article highlights the autonomy of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that make the Bretton Woods institutions distinct from the UN system, despite being shown as linked components in the organizational chart.


1995 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 51-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fikret Şenses

One of the main objectives of the Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program (SSAP) introduced in Turkey in January 1980 was to transform the industrial trade strategy from archetypal import-substitution to export-orientation and to attain a higher level of integration with the international economy through market-based policies. International financial institutions like the IMF and, in particular, the World Bank have been closely involved in this process. Apart from a number of stand-by agreements with the IMF, Turkey received five successive structural adjustment loans from the World Bank during 1980-84 with their conditionality extending into a wide range of spheres like import liberalization, export promotion, and financial liberalization. Not only was Turkey one of the first to conclude such agreements with the World Bank, it was also identified as one of the countries complying with their provisions with “low slippage”.3 Even when there were no formal agreements, successive governments since 1980 have had very close and amicable relations with both of these Bretton Woods institutions.


2013 ◽  
pp. 116-128
Author(s):  
Nidhi Modani

This paper is a study of the possible human right obligations of international financial institutions. As financial institutions have not been looked upon as agencies influencing or influenced by human rights, this study becomes significant. The study is limited to international financial institutions, with a special focus on the World Bank (hereinafter ‘Bank’) and the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter ‘Fund’ or ‘IMF’). 2 Further, there is a special focus on developing nations.3


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 406-426
Author(s):  
Jackson Ribeiro ◽  
Gilberto Maringoni

Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar os documentos da cúpula dos BRICS de Fortaleza, ocorrida em julho de 2014 que criou duas instituições financeiras, o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento - NBD - e o Arranjo Contingencial de Reservas - ACR. São iniciativas importantes para estreitar os laços do grupo que reúne Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul, além de servirem para alargar a ordem monetária e financeira internacional. O NBD e o ACR são complementares às instituições multilaterais tradicionais de Bretton Woods: Banco Mundial e FMI. Complementares, pois foi adotada uma orientação cautelosa na criação desses arranjos protagonizados pelos BRICS. Tais arranjos alternativos incorporaram muitas prerrogativas e princípios do Banco Mundial e FMI, como a necessidade de acordo de cada país membro para acessar parte relevante de recursos no ACR. Mesmo incorporando prerrogativas e os princípios dominantes nessas organizações tradicionais NBD e ACR criam ambientes institucionais com potencial para possibilitar novos desdobramentos.     Abstract: This article aims to analyse the documents of the BRICS Fortaleza summit held in July 2014 that created two financial institutions, the New Development Bank – NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement – CRA. They are important initiatives to strengthen the ties of the group that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as serve to broaden the international monetary and financial order. NDB and CRA are complementary to traditional multilateral Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and the IMF. Complementary, because a cautious orientation was adopted in the creation of these BRICS arrangements. Such alternative arrangements have incorporated many prerogatives and principles of the World Bank and IMF, such as the need for each member country to agree to access a relevant part of the resources in the CRA. Even incorporating prerogatives and the dominant principles in these traditional NDB and CRA organisations create institutional environments with the potential to enable further unfoldings. Keywords: BRICS; NDB; ACR; ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE.     Recebido em: fevereiro/2019. Aprovado em: setembro/2019.


2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 234-236

Richard N. Cooper of Harvard University reviews, “The Bretton Woods Transcripts” by Kurt Schuler and Andrew Rosenberg. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents the verbatim record of meetings of the Bretton Woods Conference, which established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Transcripts focus on Commission I—the International Monetary Fund; the committees of Commission I; and Commissions II and III—the World Bank and other means of cooperation. Schuler is an economist in the Office of International Affairs at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Senior Fellow in Financial History at the Center for Financial Stability. Rosenberg is a research associate at the Center for Financial Stability.”


2013 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-184
Author(s):  
Pero Petrovic ◽  
Zeljko Jovic

The emergence and deepening of the global economic crisis is reflected in large part on the functioning of international financial institutions and their current structure. The long-term financial crisis has placed demands for decisive reform moves in the functioning and structure of the IMF, the World Bank Group and other global and regional financial institutions. This means that so far, the results of their policies have been inadequate and that their role is subject to critical observation finding an efficient performance of financial markets. The crisis has imposed the need to reform international financial institutions and the new global financial architecture. Changes in structure and their functioning should lead to the global economic stability. Members of the Euro zone are faced with a new attitude towards the international financial institutions and the International Monetary Fund, in particular. The proclaimed missions of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are clearly separated in theory, but with the passing of time, their activities have become increasingly intertwined, so that they often include a name - international financial institutions.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Horst Brand

The debt crisis into which heavy borrowing, steeply rising interest rates, and a worldwide recession had plunged a number of developing countries in the late 1970s and 1980s was alleviated largely by policies and conditionalities imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These policies and conditions were meant to strengthen the export and financial markets of those countries, stabilize their currencies, and reduce the reach of their governments in their economies. However, they contributed to deepening poverty and structural crises, as the reports and data published by the international financial institutions themselves attest.


Author(s):  
Adeoye O. Akinola

The activities of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (together comprising the Bretton Woods Institutions) in Africa have continued to generate questions about the impact of economic reforms on democratization and economic growth. The Bretton Woods Institutions strongly believe that economic growth contributes significantly to poverty alleviation efforts and hence generates improvements in living standards, particularly in developing countries, including those in Africa. In the mid-1980s, as many African countries struggled to service their external debts and qualify for additional credit to provide services to their citizens and promote economic growth and development, the World Bank and the IMF offered to help them. However, the Bretton Woods Institutions conditioned their assistance on the willingness of each African country to undertake necessary structural reforms, which included a reduction in the public sector, devaluation of the national currency, deregulation of the foreign trade sector, and more reliance on markets for the allocation of resources. These aid programs, which came to be known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) consisted of conditional lending to African countries in economic crisis. At this time, the World Bank felt that the effectiveness of its development programs in Africa and other regions of the world was being undermined by bloated and dysfunctional bureaucratic structures and governmental systems that were hostile to the market generally and entrepreneurship in particular. The World Bank’s desire to condition the extension of credit to African countries on institutional reforms was supposedly to improve bureaucratic efficiency, as well as economic performance, and enhance the effectiveness of the World Bank’s projects in these countries. Thus, the IMF and the World Bank emerged in the 1990s as major players in efforts to improve economic growth and development in Africa. The SAPs were expected to improve macroeconomic performance, produce rapid economic growth, achieve economic diversification, and provide each African country with the resources that it needed to confront poverty and improve national living standards. In fact, in 1994, the World Bank expressed a lot of optimism about the impact of SAPs on African economies. However, many critics have argued that SAPs had virtually no positive impact on the macroeconomic performance of African economies and, instead, created a series of internal political and economic contradictions that have continued to haunt the continent to this day. As a result, critics say, many countries that implemented SAPs continue to suffer from high levels of poverty and became more dependent on external financial resources (such as loans, development aid, and food aid) than before they got involved with the Bretton Woods Institutions and their adjustment programs.


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