In Defense of Platonic Essentialism About Numbers
2021 ◽
Vol 14
(1)
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pp. 103-113
In defense of anti-essentialism, pragmatist Richard Rorty holds that we may think of all objects as if they were numbers. I find that Rorty’s metaphysics hinges on two rather weak arguments against the essences of numbers. In contrast, Plato’s metaphysics offers a plausible definition of essentiality by which numbers do have essential properties. Further, I argue that Rorty’s argumentative mistake is mischaracterizing Plato’s definition. I conclude that Plato’s definition of “essential” is a robust one which implies that many properties, beyond those we might intuitively think of, can count as essential properties of objects.
2021 ◽
Vol 14
◽
pp. 102-112
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2020 ◽
Vol 26
(4)
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pp. 232-246
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2018 ◽
Vol 3
(2)
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pp. 198-215
2009 ◽
Vol 35
(1)
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pp. 219-245
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1937 ◽
Vol 31
(1)
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pp. 100-113
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