Reflecting on South Africa's Attempt to Withdraw from the Rome Statute in Favour of Immunities for Sitting Heads of State: An Analysis of the International Crimes Bill 2017

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-351
Author(s):  
Ntombizozuko Dyani-Mhango

This article reflects on South Africa's International Crimes Bill 2017 in relation to the customary international law immunities of sitting heads of states. It revisits the discussion on these immunities and examines their legal status in South Africa. It argues that if South Africa adopts the International Crimes Bill, subject only to the procedural prescripts of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, this will have the effect of recognising customary international law immunities for sitting heads of state in South Africa thereby resolving the legal conundrum arising from the non-recognition of immunities for sitting heads of state.

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56
Author(s):  
Fareed Mohd Hassan ◽  
Noor Dzuhaidah Osman

The United States (U.S.), a Signatory, but not a State Party to the Rome Statute, entered into various Bilateral Agreements (BIAs) with almost all State Parties to the Rome Statute prohibiting the arrest, surrender, or prosecution of the US Head of State before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Similarly, the African Union (AU) Members, being the majority State Parties to the Rome Statute have decided in the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government not to cooperate with the ICC and to grant immunity to African Heads of State after the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued two arrest warrants against the Sudanese President for allegedly committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This paper examines the tension between States’ obligations under the Rome Statute to prosecute, surrender and arrest a head of State, including when referred to by the UN Security Council on the one hand, and the AU decision, the U.S. BIAs and customary international law which grants immunity to a sitting head of State from criminal prosecution by either an international or a foreign court on the other hand. It argues that States are bound by the obligations enshrined under the Rome Statute and both the AU decision and the BIAs are inconsistent with the duty of states to uphold jus cogens norms including those proscribed under the Rome Statute


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 172-176
Author(s):  
Dapo Akande

More than any other international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has, in its early years, pursued cases against heads of state. The Court issued arrest warrants for President Omar al Bashir of Sudan and for Muammar Gaddafi while he was Libya's head of state, and it charged Uhuru Kenyatta shortly before he became head of state of Kenya. These attempts to prosecute heads of states have not only led to tensions between the Court and the African Union,1 but also pit the desire to hold senior leaders accountable for grave international crimes against the customary international law principle that certain senior state officials—especially heads of state—have immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction by virtue of their status, including immunity from arrest and their inviolability when abroad.2


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guénaël Mettraux ◽  
John Dugard ◽  
Max du Plessis

The relationship between international crimes and sovereign immunities has bedevilled judicial practice and legal scholarship and created an apparently irreconcilable tension between the two notions. Part of the difficulty in addressing this tension derives from the approach to resolving it. This paper proposes a novel approach, viewing the relationship specifically from the perspective of international criminal law and looking at the three core functions of immunities in that context. The authors conclude that customary international law excludes immunities as defence or bar to jurisdiction for core international crimes regardless of the nature of the jurisdiction concerned, the position of the accused, or the capacity in which the accused acted. When interpreted within that framework, the ICC Statute provides for clear limitations to the role of immunities in ICC proceedings and avoids the pitfalls that have thus far marred the ICC’s approach to the law of immunities.


Author(s):  
Hermanus J Van der Merwe

The inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide was first recognised under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). The creation of the crime was a direct result of the horrific effects of acts of incitement before and during the Second World War. Today the crime is firmly established under international law and is also criminalised in many domestic legal systems. History shows that incitement to crime and violence against a specific group is a precursor to and catalyst for acts of genocide. Consequently, the goal of prevention lies at the core of the prohibition of direct and public incitement to genocide. However, it may be said that this preventative objective has thus far been undermined by a general lack of prosecutions of the crime, especially at the domestic level. This prosecutorial void is rather conspicuous in the light of the new vision of international criminal justice under which domestic legal systems (including that of South Africa) bear the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the law of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), which in Article 25(3)(e) includes the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. This article provides a brief historical and teleological overview of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under international law, as well as the definitional elements thereof as interpreted and applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Thereafter it examines the criminalisation of incitement to genocide in contemporary South African law in order to assess South Africa’s capacity to prosecute incitement to genocide at the domestic level. In this regard there are, in theory, various 'legal avenues' for the prosecution of incitement to commit genocide in South Africa, namely: as a crime under the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956; as a crime under the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (the ICC Act); or as a crime under customary international law pursuant to section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The article reflects critically on the viability of prosecuting incitement to genocide in terms of each of these alternatives. The article highlights a number of practical and legal problems as regards the prosecution of incitement to commit genocide under the Riotous Assemblies Act as well as under customary international law. It is argued that the prosecution of incitement to genocide in terms of the ICC Act is preferable, as this would respond directly to an international consensus as regards the unique and egregious nature of genocide by providing for a limited form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Prosecution under the ICC Act would also reflect the objectives of the Rome Statute pursuant to which South Africa has certain international legal obligations. However, it is submitted that legislative amendment of the ICC Act is needed, since the crime is not explicitly provided for thereby at present. It is submitted that the legislative amendment must provide for the distinct crime of direct and public incitement to genocide in terms of South African criminal law. Such an amendment will remove the existing legal obstacles to the domestic prosecution of incitement to genocide and enable effective prosecution thereof at the domestic level. The proposed amendment will have the effect of strengthening the alignment between South African law and the objectives of the Rome Statute and may have preventative benefits in the long run.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mbuzeni Mathenjwa

The history of local government in South Africa dates back to a time during the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. With regard to the status of local government, the Union of South Africa Act placed local government under the jurisdiction of the provinces. The status of local government was not changed by the formation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961 because local government was placed under the further jurisdiction of the provinces. Local government was enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa arguably for the first time in 1993. Under the interim Constitution local government was rendered autonomous and empowered to regulate its affairs. Local government was further enshrined in the final Constitution of 1996, which commenced on 4 February 1997. The Constitution refers to local government together with the national and provincial governments as spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. This article discusses the autonomy of local government under the 1996 Constitution. This it does by analysing case law on the evolution of the status of local government. The discussion on the powers and functions of local government explains the scheme by which government powers are allocated, where the 1996 Constitution distributes powers to the different spheres of government. Finally, a conclusion is drawn on the legal status of local government within the new constitutional dispensation.


Author(s):  
Neels Jan L

This chapter provides the reader with comments on the Hague Principles from the perspective of South African private international law of contract.Private international law in the Republic of South Africa is historically based on Roman–Dutch and English law, but is today influenced by domestic constitutional values, especially in the fields of international family and succession law. In the realm of the international law of obligations, the impact of the English common law is particularly strong. The notion of ‘the proper law of the contract’ is therefore widely used to indicate the law applicable to contractual obligations. The sources of private international law of contract are almost exclusively case law and the opinions of academic authors. The South African courts have always followed a comparative approach in respect of private international law, initially under the influence of an internationalist understanding of the conflict of laws. The courts would therefore certainly be entitled to refer to the Hague Principles as persuasive authority in the interpretation, supplementation, and development of the rules and principles of South African private international law.


Author(s):  
Longobardo Marco ◽  
Fleck Dieter

This chapter provides an overview of treaty and customary international law rules applicable to means of combat. Belligerents do not need an authorization from international humanitarian law in relation to a specific means of combat. Rather, they are free to develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, or use any particular weapon, except for those cases in which a prohibitive rule of international humanitarian law dictates to the contrary. In order to guarantee effective implementation of the prohibition of certain means and methods of warfare, it is necessary to provide for an efficient procedure to ensure the legality of new weapons. This procedure is preventive in nature and aims at providing the belligerents with means of combat that do not violate international law prohibitions. The chapter discusses the prohibition of certain conventional weapons and then looks at weapons of mass destruction, which are simply defined as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons and biological weapons is prohibited under treaty law, the legal status of nuclear weapons is more complex.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
David H. Moore

Transnational human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been plagued by the overarching question of the domestic legal status of customary international law (CIL). Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. is the Supreme Court's second installment on the ATS. Like Sosa v. Alvarez-Machainbefore it, Kiobel does not expressly address the domestic legal status of CIL, but it does provide clues. Those clues suggest two insights: the Court views CIL as external to U.S. law, rather than as part of federal common law, and the role of CIL in future cases may be affected less by arguments about CIL's status as federal common law than by arguments about congressional intent.


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