A Dog’s Life: Thought, Symbols and Concepts
Recent work in the philosophy of language has emphasized the importance of ‘stimulus-independent’ representational abilities in understanding both the nature of concepts and the extent to which concepts play a role in the thoughts of non-humans. This recent work dovetails in significant and interesting ways with Terrence Deacon’s work on symbols and with more recent work in continental philosophy on symbolism, language, actor-network theory, and analytic work in the philosophy of skill. It is in light of this work that this chapter revisit Whitehead’s book Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect. In particular, it argues that the claim of many commentators, both early and late, that Whitehead is a panpsychist is a mistake, and relies upon an understanding of experience and subjectivity that Whitehead seeks to account for rather than presuppose. In his account of experience and subjectivity, it is rather a non-subjective, pre-individual process of individuation that allows for the possibility of an identifiable subjective experience, and hence for the claims of panpsychism. Whitehead’s understanding and account of these processes is able to account for an indeterminate variety of types and degrees of experience, and in a way that avoids both a reductive materialism and a reductive panpsychism.