The Frei Administration

Author(s):  
James Lockhart

This chapter assesses the Frei administration's national and international response to the energy the Cuban Revolution unleashed in Latin America in the 1960s. It presents President Eduardo Frei as an independent actor with his own agenda, which included the backing and accelerating of Chileans' developmental project in nuclear science and technology. It also reconstructs and reevaluates the United States, particularly the CIA's, relationship with Frei.

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bharvi Dutt ◽  
K. C. Garg

News items on science and technology in English-language newspapers published in different parts of India during January-December 1996 were analyzed. Results indicate that the greatest proportion of newspaper space was devoted to nuclear science and technology, followed by defense, space research, and astronomy. The Pioneer, The Hindu, and The Times of India were the newspapers that together devoted about 23 percent of the total space to items on science and technology. The sources for most of the articles (97 percent) on policy issues originated from within India, while for other stories foreign sources, including those from the United States and the United Kingdom, also contributed. Many of the items were supported by illustrations such as photographs and diagrams. The study indicates that, on average, Indian newspapers devoted far less than one percent of the total printed space to articles and stories related to science and technology.


1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret E. Crahan

Unlike churches in the rest of Latin America, those in Cuba did not embark at the outset of the 1960s on a period of liberalization and innovation in theology, pastoral forms, lay participation and political strategies. Rather, the coming to power in 1959 of a revolutionary government and the initiation of substantial societal restructuring reinforced conservatism within the churches. Strong challenges to the legitimacy of the government by the churches from 1959 through 1961 were not effective due largely to institutional limitations and their identification as bulwarks of prerevolutionary structures. Hence, in spite of a marked increase in participation and contributions, the churches' counterrevolutionary stance had limited impact. Contributing to this was the exodus of many religious activists to the United States and Spain, and a turning in upon themselves by the churches which came to serve as refuges from change.


Protest ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-176
Author(s):  
Manuel Salgado Tamayo

Abstract The article analyzes the protests in Cuba in the context of the economic blockade and the health crisis as a consequence of the covid 19 pandemic. The current policy of the United States with President Joe Biden and the distances with the diplomacy of Barack Obama and the events after the more than two hundred measures adopted by Donald Trump, who adopted more than 240 additional measures to deepen the blockade. Additionally, the policy of the United States is detailed historically with Cuba and the milestones of the influence of the Cuban Revolution in Latin America are detailed.


PMLA ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 131 (3) ◽  
pp. 701-710
Author(s):  
Arturo Arias

The Cuban Revolution Generated a New Communist Paranoia in the United States. Interest in Latin America Grew Dramatically after Castro's rise to power in 1959 and was partly responsible for the explosive growth in the number of scholars specializing in hemispheric issues during the 1960s. Latin Americans, in turn, saw this phase of the Cold War as a furthering of imperial aggression by the United States. The Eisenhower administration's authoritarian diplomatic maneuvers to isolate Guatemala by accusing the country's democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz (1950-54), of being a communist and by pressuring members of the Organization of American States to do likewise had already alarmed intellectuals and artists in Latin America five years before. On 17 June 1954, Carlos Castillo Armas and a band of a few hundred mercenaries invaded the country from Honduras with logistical support from the Central Intelligence Agency in an operation code-named PBSUCCESS, authorized by President Eisenhower in August 1953. By 1 July 1954 the so-called Movement of National Liberation had taken over Guatemala. Angela Fillingim's research evidences how the United States officially viewed Guatemala as “Pre-Western,” according to “pre-established criteria,” because the Latin American country had failed to eliminate its indigenous population (5-6). Implicitly, the model was that of the nineteenth-century American West. As a solution, the State Department proposed “finishing the Conquest.”


Author(s):  
Kirk Hawkins

Donald Trump’s victory in the US 2016 presidential election awakened many US scholars to the existence of populism. However, the study of populism is old news for political scientists in Latin America and other regions. Since at least the 1960s, scholars in these regions have dealt with key conceptual, methodological, and theoretical issues in the study of populism, covering instances of populism that have appeared since the inception of liberal, representative democracy in the late 18th century. This wealth of scholarship is an aid to mainstream scholars in the United States and other wealthy democracies as they grapple with the impact of populist forces, providing them with tools for measuring populism and for studying its causes and consequences. However, there are also lessons for scholars in regions that have studied populism much longer. This is especially true for Latin America. Senior Latin Americanists who engage with populism have a tendency to rely on older approaches and methods that have not withstood empirical tests in other regions. Some researchers are unaware that comparative, cross-regional scholarship has arrived at a rough consensus about the nature of populist ideas, and that the cross-regional study of populist discourse has moved beyond the anti-positivist bent of some early work. Thus, this bibliography walks a fine line between highlighting the foundational work of earlier scholars, particularly those studying Latin America, while introducing current Latin Americanists to the work being done outside the region. A concluding section highlights the unique scholarly contributions to the study of populism in the United States, contributions that provide an important touchstone to Latin Americanists, not to mention mainstream scholars in the United States.


Freedom Roots ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 281-318
Author(s):  
Laurent Dubois ◽  
Richard Lee Turits

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the Caribbean saw multiple and dramatic political efforts to transform state and society. New governments sought to embrace popular classes as equal members of society as almost never before and to create unprecedented forms of equality, both economically and culturally. This chapter explores three such attempts at transformation: Jamaica under Michael Manley, Maurice Bishop and the Grenada Revolution, and Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s first government in Haiti. Unlike the Cuban Revolution, these leaders excited expectations for change within still mostly capitalist economies. Manley and Aristide led democratic governments, while Grenada sustained one-party rule. The outcomes of reform efforts in these three nations varied from enduring progress to poignant tragedy. The chapter explores the powerful challenges these new Caribbean governments faced, domestic and foreign, economic and political. It shows how after the English-speaking Caribbean gained independence in the 1960s and 1970s, their trajectories began to overlap with that of the older independent Caribbean, as national sovereignty made them suddenly more vulnerable to the region’s predominant twentieth-century empire, the United States.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morris H. Morley

AbstractThe aim of this study is to provide an empirical basis for theories about political coalitions formed to apply economic sanctions against a target country. An excellent example is the economic blockade of Cuba by the United States, during which successive Republican and Democratic administrations have pursued economic measures to achieve a political objective. This study investigates the degree of cooperation and cleavage among Washington's capitalist-bloc allies with this effort to establish multilateral economic pressures against the Cuban Revolution. The analysis suggests that, despite the growth of economic competition during the 1960s and 1970s, such strains were not reflected at the level of political relationships.


Author(s):  
Stephen G. Rabe

On March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, an economic assistance program to promote political democracy, economic growth, and social justice in Latin America. The United States and Latin American nations formally agreed to the alliance at a conference held in August 1961, at Punta del Este, Uruguay. U.S. delegates promised that Latin America would receive over twenty billion dollars in public and private capital from the United States and international lending authorities during the 1960s. The money would arrive in the form of grants, loans, and direct private investments. When combined with an expected eighty billion dollars in internal investment, this new money was projected to stimulate an economic growth rate of not less than 2.5 percent a year. This economic growth would facilitate significant improvements in employment, and in rates of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates. In agreeing to the alliance, Latin American leaders pledged to work for equality and social justice by promoting agrarian reform and progressive income taxes. The Kennedy administration developed this so-called Marshall Plan for Latin America because it judged the region susceptible to social revolution and communism. Fidel Castro had transformed the Cuban Revolution into a strident anti-American movement and had allied his nation with the Soviet Union. U.S. officials feared that the lower classes of Latin America, mired in poverty and injustice, might follow similarly radical leaders. Alliance programs delivered outside capital to the region, but the Alliance for Progress failed to transform Latin America. During the 1960s, Latin American economies performed poorly, usually falling below the 2.5 percent target. The region witnessed few improvements in health, education, or welfare. Latin American societies remained unfair and authoritarian. Sixteen extra-constitutional changes of government repeatedly unsettled the region. The Alliance for Progress fell short of its goals for several reasons. Latin America had formidable obstacles to change: elites resisted land reform, equitable tax systems, and social programs; new credits often brought greater indebtedness rather than growth; and the Marshall Plan experience served as a poor guide to solving the problems of a region that was far different from Western Europe. The United States also acted ambiguously, calling for democratic progress and social justice, but worried that Communists would take advantage of the instability caused by progressive change. Further, Washington provided wholehearted support only to those Latin American governments and organizations that pursued fervent anticommunist policies.


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