Legal Change in a Codified System: Recent Developments in Germany Suretyship Law

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Habersack ◽  
Reinhard Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Commutative Justice ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Civil Courts ◽  
Federal Supreme

Until recently, the German courts did not regard the contract of suretyship as subject to the precepts of commutative justice. This attitude prevailed even when the contract was unduly burdensome for the surety. A startling decision of the Federal Constitutional Court from October 1993 has changed the legal position. It enjoined the civil courts, when applying the general provisions of the BGB (such as the “contra bonos mores” clause), to pay due attention to the guarantee of the autonomy of private individuals, as enshrined in art 2 I of the Basic Law. Such autonomy is not always consistent with unrestricted freedom of contract. The civil courts are thus bound to intervene in unusually burdensome contracts where there is inequality of bargaining power. The present article analyses the general background and the consequences of this decision. It examines the way in which the Federal Supreme Court now deals with contracts of suretyship by close family members. Moreover, it draws attention to significant changes in judicial attitude concerning two related problems which have also resulted in increased protection of the surety: the tightening up of the judicial control of so-called declarations of purpose; and the stricter attitude adopted by the Federal Supreme Court towards the form requirement for suretyship contracts prescribed by the BGB.

The Karlsruhe Phenomenon

2020 ◽  
pp. 32-69
Author(s):  
Matthias Jestaedt
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional History ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
New Creation ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication ◽  
The U.S

This chapter stresses that nothing in the Federal Constitutional Court’s growth was preordained. It depicts the Court’s initially fraught relations with political actors, ordinary judges, and legal academics, scrutinizing the institutional peculiarities that have made the Court what it is. The manner and direction in which the Court developed was recognizable merely in outline in the fundamental decision by the constitution’s founders for an institutionally independent constitutional adjudication, which according to the size and extent of its jurisdiction would be powerful. This was due to the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court in its totality was unprecedented both in terms of constitutional history and comparative constitutional development: during the deliberations on the Basic Law and Federal Constitutional Court Act, there were repeated specific references to the Staatsgerichtshof in Weimar and the U.S. Supreme Court. But both in its numerous distinctive details and even in the overall concept, the constitutional court of the Basic Law represents a new creation.

The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the “Southwest Case”

1952 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Leibholz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Republic

The new German Constitution, the Basic Law for the German Federal Republic of May 23, 1949, provides in Article 92 that the highest judicial power shall be vested in a Federal Constitutional Court. Although the Bonn Basic Law thus created a new institution, it is an institution with a precedent in the former Weımar Constitution of 1919. In accordance with the latter, the Constitutional Tribunal (Staatsgerichtshof) had jurisdiction over constitutional controversies within any Land which had no tribunal of its own for the adjustment of such controversies, as well as over controversies, other than civil law matters, among the various Laender or between the Reich and one of the Laender. And the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), as the highest authority, could establish finally whether disputed Land statutes were compatible with the federal Constitution.The Basic Law, however, grants the new Federal Constitutional Court considerably wider jurisdiction than that accorded either to the Constitutional Tribunal or to the Supreme Court under the Weimar Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court must, above all, arbitrate both disputes which may arise among the constitutional organs of the Republic, the so-called “federal constitutional” cases, and the so-called “conflicting rules” (Normenkollisionen) cases—the latter designating disputes involving the compatibility of the written federal law or Land law with the Basic Law, as well as the compatibility of the Land law with the federal law.

Germany

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Bobek
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
National Origin ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Federal Supreme ◽  
Domestic Case

The chapter deals with Germany. Although the German legal tradition is relatively open to non-mandatory legal inspiration, the sources of such inspiration are nonetheless generally limited to sources of national origin. The practice of three of the supreme federal jurisdictions, the Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Supreme Court, and the Federal Administrative Court, discloses only sporadic passing references to foreign inspiration, typically within a larger block of citations of domestic case law or scholarship. References to foreign solutions serve as an additional supportive argument. In the German context, however, the limited quantity of direct uses of foreign law by courts should be weighed against the relatively rich comparative law scholarship.

International Treaties and The German Constitution

2019 ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Stefan Kadelbach
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Status ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional

This chapter deals with the making, status, and interpretation of international treaties under the German Constitution. It describes the interrelationship of the different institutions in treaty-making and shows how a comparatively old provision of the German Basic Law has been adapted slowly to new circumstances over the past decades. Thus, even though foreign affairs has remained a domain of the executive, several developments have contributed to an enhanced role of Parliament over time. These developments are partly due to the role of special sectors of law such as EU law and the law governing the use of force and partly due to changes in constitutional practice. As for the status of treaties in German law, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a stance according to which treaties generally share the rank of the legal act that implements them into domestic law. A notable exception is the European Convention of Human Rights, which has assumed a quasi-constitutional rank by means of consistent interpretation. Some reference is made to other continental systems to assess how far different constitutions bring about certain features; various systems appear similar in many respects at first sight, whereas features in which they differ may be a source of inspiration for future constitutional practice.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Celebrating the Milk Maid: What Federal Constitutional Court President Limbach Doesn't Tell Us About the Court Says It All

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Winkler
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Limited Size ◽  
Small Stature ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Law Student

It's a small book. Actually, it is a very small book. Only one hundred and twenty-eight pages, it's a format so thin it could fit into a pocket. As a matter of fact, it is smaller than a copy of the Grundgesetz (German Basic Law) that a German law student would carry along to class. The book's title, however, is considerably more intrepid than the book's small stature. At the same time breathtakingly pithy and slightly immodest, the book is simply called Das Bundesverfassungsgericht (The Federal Constitutional Court). And at the top of the cover, just to make sure, the word “WISSEN” (KNOWLEDGE) appears in big letters. While one wonders how a publication of such limited size could deign to comprehensively present the important “knowledge” of the Federal Constitutional Court, the other words on the cover provide some assurance. Those words are the name of the book's author who obviously could not be more adequate for the task. The author, Jutta Limbach, is the current President of the Federal Constitutional Court presiding in her seventh year.

scholarly journals The Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat: A Special Institution of German Constitutional Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Current Case ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
German Constitutional Law

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.

The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich K. Preuss
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effects ◽  
Hierarchical Model ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Alternative Understanding ◽  
Conceptual Possibility

This paper explores the conceptual possibility and implications of the concept of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. In the first section, the author argues that unconstitutional constitutional norms are conceptually impossible within the conventional hierarchical model of norms. In the second section, the author discusses the normative particularity of the amending power and concludes that an unlimited power may endanger the constitution. In sections III and IV, the author explains why so-called “eternity clauses,” in order to fend off such a danger, have been designed to place certain immutable elements of the constitution beyond the limits of the amending power. The paradigmatic case is the German Basic Law and a recent decision by the Federal Constitutional Court that discusses the implications of the “eternity clause” with reference to the distinction between constituent power and the constituted amending power. The author develops an alternative understanding of that distinction and its consequences for the amending power. The possible adverse effects of “eternity clauses” on the normality of the constitution are briefly considered in the final section.

Sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit: Verfassungstheoretische Bedeutung, verfassungsrechtliche Reaktionen

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-210
Author(s):  
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Minimum Requirements ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Der Beitrag behandelt sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit als verfassungsrelevante Herausforderung unter dem Grundgesetz. Theoretisch sind unterschiedliche Wirkzusammenhänge zwischen Verfassung und sozio-ökonomischer Ungleichheit möglich. Insbesondere kann sozio-ökonomische Gleichheit als faktische Legitimitätsressource und als demokratische Funktionsbedingung wirken. Empirisch deutet die ökonomische Ungleichheitsforschung auf eine wachsende Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland hin. Verfassungstheorie und empirische Zustandsbeschreibung treffen sich in der Auslegung des geltenden Verfassungsrechts, das im Hinblick auf das Soziale nur schwach determiniert ist. Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts formuliert Mindestanforderungen, überlässt die Konkretisierung des Sozialen aber weitgehend der Politik. Die Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft sollte diesen Prozess konstruktiv begleiten, dabei aber zwischen Recht und Theorie unterscheiden. The article addresses socio-economic inequality as a constitutional challenge under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Theoretically, several causal relationships between the constitution and socio-economic inequality are possible and plausible. In particular, socio-economic equality can be a resource of de facto legitimacy and a condition of democracy. Empirically, current economic research indicates growing wealth inequality in Germany. Constitutional theory and empirical description meet in the interpretation and application of actual constitutional law, whose social dimension is only weakly determined. The Federal Constitutional Court formulates minimum requirements, but leaves the concretization of the social dimension essentially to the political branches of government. Constitutional law scholarship should analyse this process constructively, while distinguishing between law and theory.

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