Germany

Author(s):  
Michal Bobek

The chapter deals with Germany. Although the German legal tradition is relatively open to non-mandatory legal inspiration, the sources of such inspiration are nonetheless generally limited to sources of national origin. The practice of three of the supreme federal jurisdictions, the Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Supreme Court, and the Federal Administrative Court, discloses only sporadic passing references to foreign inspiration, typically within a larger block of citations of domestic case law or scholarship. References to foreign solutions serve as an additional supportive argument. In the German context, however, the limited quantity of direct uses of foreign law by courts should be weighed against the relatively rich comparative law scholarship.

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Habersack ◽  
Reinhard Zimmermann

Until recently, the German courts did not regard the contract of suretyship as subject to the precepts of commutative justice. This attitude prevailed even when the contract was unduly burdensome for the surety. A startling decision of the Federal Constitutional Court from October 1993 has changed the legal position. It enjoined the civil courts, when applying the general provisions of the BGB (such as the “contra bonos mores” clause), to pay due attention to the guarantee of the autonomy of private individuals, as enshrined in art 2 I of the Basic Law. Such autonomy is not always consistent with unrestricted freedom of contract. The civil courts are thus bound to intervene in unusually burdensome contracts where there is inequality of bargaining power. The present article analyses the general background and the consequences of this decision. It examines the way in which the Federal Supreme Court now deals with contracts of suretyship by close family members. Moreover, it draws attention to significant changes in judicial attitude concerning two related problems which have also resulted in increased protection of the surety: the tightening up of the judicial control of so-called declarations of purpose; and the stricter attitude adopted by the Federal Supreme Court towards the form requirement for suretyship contracts prescribed by the BGB.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (66) ◽  
pp. 85-129
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan ◽  
Jacopo Paffarini ◽  
Márcio Ricardo Staffen

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degree of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Can the foreign law be a parameter for judicial review of legislation? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.


Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Matthias Jestaedt

This chapter stresses that nothing in the Federal Constitutional Court’s growth was preordained. It depicts the Court’s initially fraught relations with political actors, ordinary judges, and legal academics, scrutinizing the institutional peculiarities that have made the Court what it is. The manner and direction in which the Court developed was recognizable merely in outline in the fundamental decision by the constitution’s founders for an institutionally independent constitutional adjudication, which according to the size and extent of its jurisdiction would be powerful. This was due to the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court in its totality was unprecedented both in terms of constitutional history and comparative constitutional development: during the deliberations on the Basic Law and Federal Constitutional Court Act, there were repeated specific references to the Staatsgerichtshof in Weimar and the U.S. Supreme Court. But both in its numerous distinctive details and even in the overall concept, the constitutional court of the Basic Law represents a new creation.


Author(s):  
Michael Wrase

Drawing on the socio-legal concept of legal culture, this chapter tries to explain the initial objections by many traditionalist legal scholars, politicians, and legal practitioners alike against comprehensive anti-discrimination regulation in Germany. It contrasts the rather weak culture of non-discrimination with a broadly shared appreciation for civil rights fostered by a long-established and extensive adjudication of the Federal Constitutional Court (‘FCC’). It can be shown that the missing national support for the new regulation has led to a very restricted transposition of the EU anti-discrimination directives. The Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz more or less confines itself to implementing the provisions stipulated in the directives, and even contains several shortcomings and potential breaches of EU law, especially with regard the provision of public goods and services. Consequently, mobilization of non-discrimination rights has been rather weak in practice so far. However, there is good reason to conclude that anti-discrimination law has been gaining ground in Germany in recent years, and that it will be even more relevant in future. The ECJ adjudication has exerted considerable influence on the case law of the German labour courts. This might in the longer run also impact on the adjudication of the FCC with regard to the clause on non-discrimination in Article 3 Basic Law.


Author(s):  
Martins Pedro Batista

This chapter explores the difference between international and national awards. The Superior Tribunal of Justice (STJ) is, strictly speaking, the last judicial body competent to deal with matters of an infra-constitutional nature. Hence, it is the Court that harmonizes the case law related to arbitration in Brazil. In 2004, the competence to recognize and enforce foreign judicial and arbitral awards was transferred from the Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Court) to the STJ. Immediately after being granted such competence, the STJ introduced very contemporaneous rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards by issuing on May 4, 2005 the Resolution Number 9. It is possible to issue provisional relief during the recognition proceeding; it is also possible to issue partial recognition of foreign arbitral awards; and allowed to enforce provisional relief granted abroad through rogatory letter. The chapter then highlights the main arbitration concepts and addresses the STJ's arbitration case law.


1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friedmann

It is not always easy to decide when we must turn to English law. And once it has been determined that reference to English law is appropriate, there is the further question of the substance and application of principles drawn from English law. In such case, English law forms part of the local law, and need not be ascertained as required by the rules of private international law in respect of foreign law.This makes the local law directly dependent upon English case-law, which itself is constantly being renewed and developed. Such dependence may seem to impair the independence of the Israeli legal system. The question could not, of course, be raised during the Mandatory period at a time when there existed a possibility of appeal from the Mandatory Supreme Court to the Privy Council in Westminster. But after the establishment of the State Cheshin J. said:It is unthinkable that a sovereign nation with its own laws and its own legal system would continue to be subject to the authority of a foreign nation's legal system and to changes in rulings which are likely to be introduced in her courts, only because in the past, when there was a strong tie between the two nations, the former drew from the legal system of the latter.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document