scholarly journals Finding the NCCs will not solve all our problems

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morten S. Overgaard ◽  
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Keyword(s):  
Brain Region ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
The Other ◽  
Neural Activation ◽  
Conceptual Frameworks ◽  
Central Object ◽  
Neural Correlates Of Consciousness ◽  
The Mind

Subjective experience has often taken center stage in debates between competing conceptual theories of the mind. This is also a central object of concern in the empirical domain, and especially in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). By now, most of the competing conceptual theories of consciousness have become aligned with distinct hypotheses about the NCCs. These hypotheses are usually distinguished by reference to their proposed location of the NCCs. This difference in hypothesized location of the NCCs has tempted participants in these debates to infer that evidence indicating the location of the NCCs in one or the other brain region can be taken as direct evidence for or against a given conceptual theory of consciousness. We argue that this is an overestimation of the work finding the NCCs can do for us, and that there are principled reasons to resist this kind of inference. To show this we point out the lack of both an isomorphism and a homomorphism between the conceptual frameworks in which most theories are cached, and the kind of data we can get from neuroimaging. The upshot is that neural activation profiles are insufficient to distinguish between competing theories in the conceptual domain. We suggest two ways to go about ameliorating this issue.

Sensory cortex and the mind-brain problem

1978 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Puccetti ◽  
Robert W. Dykes
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Physical Structure ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Rule Out

AbstractOne of the implicit, and sometimes explicit, objectives of modern neuroscience is to find neural correlates of subjective experience so that different qualities of that experience might be explained in detail by reference to the physical structure and processes of the brain. It is generally assumed that such explanations will make unnecessary or rule out any reference to conscious mental agents. This is the classic mind-brain reductivist program. We have chosen to challenge the optimism underlying such an approach in the context of sensory neurophysiology and sensory experience. Specifically, we ask if it is possible to explain the subjective differences among seeing, hearing, and feeling something by inspecting the structure and function of primary visual, auditory, and somesthetic cortex.After reviewing the progress in localization of sensory functions over the past two centuries and examining some aspects of the structure and function of somesthetic, auditory, and visual cortex, we infer that one cannot explain the subjective differences between sensory modalities in terms of present day neuroscientific knowledge. Nor do present trends in research provide grounds for optimism.At this point we turn to three philosophical theories to see what promise they hold of explaining these differences. A brief discussion of each – identity theory, functionalism, and eliminative materialism – suggests that none adequately accounts for the facts of the situation, and we tentatively conclude that some form of dualism is still a tenable hypothesis.

scholarly journals You can't always get what you want

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Schlicht ◽  
Krzysztof Dolega
Keyword(s):  
Computational Models ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Philosophical Investigation ◽  
Neural Correlates Of Consciousness ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Processing Framework

The predictive processing framework has gained significant popularity across disciplines investigating the mind and brain. In this article we critically examine two of the recently made claims about the kind of headway that the framework can make in the neuroscientific and philosophical investigation of consciousness. Firstly, we argue that predictive processing is unlikely to yield significant breakthroughs in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness as it is still too vague to individuate neural mechanisms at a fine enough scale. Despite its unifying ambitions, the framework harbors a diverse family of competing computational models which rely on different assumptions and are under-constrained by neurological data. Secondly, we argue that the framework is also ill suited to provide a unifying theory of consciousness. Here, we focus on the tension between the claim that predictive processing is compatible with all of the leading neuroscientific models of consciousness with the fact that most attempts explaining consciousness within the framework rely heavily on external assumptions.

scholarly journals A structural constraint on neural correlates of consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sascha Benjamin Fink ◽  
Holger Lyre ◽  
Lukas Kob
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Structural Similarity ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Neural Activation ◽  
Complex Structures ◽  
Structural Constraint ◽  
Neural Correlates Of Consciousness

Researchers on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) need to distinguish mere statisticalNCCs from NCCs proper. Some neural events may be co-occurrent, probabilistically coupled,or coincidental with a type of conscious experience but lack any deeper connection to it, whilein other cases, the relation between neural states and a type of experience hints at a strongmetaphysical relation, which distinguishes such NCCs proper from mere statistical NCCs. In orderto address this issue of how to distinguish NCCs proper from mere statistical NCCs, we proposea position we call neurophenomenal structuralism. The position hinges on the uncontroversialidea that phenomenal experiences relate to each other in degrees of similarity and difference.These complex structures are used to identify and individuate experiences in the methods ofneuroscience, psychophysics, and phenomenology. Such individuation by structure leads to phenomenalholism, which has implications for how to investigate consciousness neuroscientificallyand generates a constraint by which we can distinguish NCCs proper from mere statistical NCCs:the structural similarity constraint. Neural activation must preserve the structure governing thedomain of experiences it is associated with in order to count as that domain’s NCC proper. Anyactivation that fails to preserve phenomenal structure fails to be an NCC proper. We illustratehow this constraint works with a study by Brouwer & Heeger (2009) as an example.

scholarly journals Empathy: The Role of Expectations

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-166
Author(s):  
Sabrina Trapp ◽  
Simone Schütz-Bosbach ◽  
Moshe Bar
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Input ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
The Other ◽  
Neural Activation ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Neural Signal ◽  
Accurate Representation ◽  
Simulation Process ◽  
Affective Information

To what extent can we feel what someone else feels? Data from neuroscience suggest that empathy is supported by a simulation process, namely the neural activation of the same or similar regions that subserve the representation of specific states in the observer. However, expectations significantly modulate sensory input, including affective information. For example, expecting painful stimulation can decrease the neural signal and the subjective experience thereof. For an accurate representation of the other person’s state, such top-down processes would have to be simulated as well. However, this is only partly possible, because expectations are usually acquired by learning. Therefore, it is important to be aware of possible misleading simulations that lead to misinterpretations of someone’s state.

scholarly journals I. The Croonian Lecture.—On the theory of the vertebrate skull

1859 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 381-457 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Biological Science ◽  
The Other ◽  
Small Space ◽  
Half Century ◽  
Organic Structure ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Articles Of Faith ◽  
The Mind

The necessity of discussing so great a subject as the Theory of the Vertebrate Skull in the small space of time allotted by custom to a lecture, has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. As, on the present occasion, I shall suffer greatly from the disadvantages of the limitation, I will, with your permission, avail myself to the uttermost of its benefits. It will be necessary for me to assume much that I would rather demonstrate, to suppose known much that I would rather set forth and explain at length; but on the other hand, I may consider myself excused from entering largely either into the history of the subject, or into lengthy and controversial criticisms upon the views which are, or have been, held by others. The biological science of the last half-century is honourably distinguished from that of preceding epochs, by the constantly increasing prominence of the idea, that a community of plan is discernible amidst the manifold diversities of organic structure. That there is nothing really aberrant in nature; that the most widely different organisms are connected by a hidden bond; that an apparently new and isolated structure will prove, when its characters are thoroughly sifted, to be only a modification of something which existed before,—are propositions which are gradually assuming the position of articles of faith in the mind of the investigators of animated nature, and are directly, or by implication, admitted among the axioms of natural history.

Hume on Necessary Causal Connections

Philosophy ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 66 (258) ◽  
pp. 517-521
Author(s):  
Katherin A. Rogers
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cause And Effect ◽  
Causal Connections ◽  
Repeated Observation ◽  
The Mind

According to David Hume our idea of a necessary connection between what we call cause and effect is produced when repeated observation of the conjunction of two events determines the mind to consider one upon the appearance of the other. No matter how we interpret Hume's theory of causation this explanation of the genesis of the idea of necessity is fraught with difficulty. I hope to show, looking at the three major interpretations of Hume's causal theory, that his account is contradictory, plainly wrong, or (at best) inherently impossible to verify.

The Origins of Domestic Sheep and Goats: a Reconsideration in the Light of the Fossil Evidence

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 368-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Payne
Keyword(s):  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Present Situation ◽  
Wild Relatives ◽  
The Other ◽  
Domestic Sheep ◽  
Sheep And Goats ◽  
Animal Domestication ◽  
The Past ◽  
The One ◽  
And Control

In recent discussions of the origins and process of animal domestication (Reed, 1961, Zeuner, 1963), both authors rely on two kinds of evidence: on the one hand, the present distributions and characteristics of the different breeds of whatever animal is being discussed, together with its feral and wild relatives, and, on the other hand, the past record, given by literary and pictorial sources and the bones from archaeological and geological sites. Increased recognition of the limitations of the past record, whether in the accuracy of the information it appears to give (as in the case of pictorial sources), or in the certainty of the deductions we are at present capable of drawing from it (this applies especially to the osteological record), has led these authors to argue mainly from the present situation, using the past record to confirm or amplify the existing picture.Arguing from the present, many hypotheses about the origins and process of domestication are available. The only test we have, when attempting to choose between these, lies in the direct evidence of the past record. The past record, it is freely admitted, is very fragmentary: the information provided by the present situation is more exact, ranges over a much wider field, and is more open to test and control. Nevertheless, the past record, however imperfect it is, is the only direct evidence we have about the process of domestication.

“Time is the Mind of Space”

Philosophy ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 25 (94) ◽  
pp. 225-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothy Emmet
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
The Mind

It is a sobering experience to be giving my first Sir Samuel Hall Oration in the line of succession of Samuel Alexander. Some of his Sir Samuel Hall Orations have been published in his book on Beauty and the Other Forms of Value and the Philosophical and Literary Pieces, and they must indeed have been a joy to his audiences. I think it is fitting that I should devote this first lecture to Samuel Alexander, taking one of the central ideas of his philosophy and considering it. If some of what I have to say is critical, I think he would have thought that was all in order. “Pitch into me,” he used to say. After all, the best tribute one can pay to a philosopher is to try to go on with one's own thinking helped by the stimulus of his ideas, and often not least helped by finding oneself impelled to criticize them.

scholarly journals Can binocular rivalry reveal neural correlates of consciousness?

2014 ◽  
Vol 369 (1641) ◽  
pp. 20130211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randolph Blake ◽  
Jan Brascamp ◽  
David J. Heeger
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Binocular Rivalry ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Neural Dynamics ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Neural Correlate ◽  
Neural Correlates Of Consciousness ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

This essay critically examines the extent to which binocular rivalry can provide important clues about the neural correlates of conscious visual perception. Our ideas are presented within the framework of four questions about the use of rivalry for this purpose: (i) what constitutes an adequate comparison condition for gauging rivalry's impact on awareness, (ii) how can one distinguish abolished awareness from inattention, (iii) when one obtains unequivocal evidence for a causal link between a fluctuating measure of neural activity and fluctuating perceptual states during rivalry, will it generalize to other stimulus conditions and perceptual phenomena and (iv) does such evidence necessarily indicate that this neural activity constitutes a neural correlate of consciousness? While arriving at sceptical answers to these four questions, the essay nonetheless offers some ideas about how a more nuanced utilization of binocular rivalry may still provide fundamental insights about neural dynamics, and glimpses of at least some of the ingredients comprising neural correlates of consciousness, including those involved in perceptual decision-making.

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