scholarly journals Recent Marginal Labor Income Tax Rate Changes by Skill and Marital Status

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Mulligan
Keyword(s):  
Marital Status ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Tax Rate

scholarly journals Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Conesa ◽  
Sagiri Kitao ◽  
Dirk Krueger
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Income Shocks ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Cycle Structure ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Average Household Income ◽  
Optimal Capital

We quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity differences of households. The optimal capital income tax rate is significantly positive at 36 percent. The optimal progressive labor income tax is, roughly, a flat tax of 23 percent with a deduction of $7,200 (relative to average household income of $42,000). The high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life-cycle structure of the model, whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system. (JEL E13, H21, H24, H25)

TWO COMPUTATIONS TO FUND SOCIAL SECURITY

1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
HE HUANG ◽  
SELAHATTIN İMROHOROGˇLU ◽  
THOMAS J. SARGENT
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Physical Capital ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Income Volatility ◽  
Public Provision ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Output Ratio ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

We use a general equilibrium model to study the impact of fully funding social security on the distribution of consumption across cohorts and over time. In an initial stationary equilibrium with an unfunded social security system, the capital/output ratio, debt/output ratio, and rate of return to capital are 3.2, 0.6, and 6.8%, respectively. In our first experiment, we suddenly terminate social security payments but compensate entitled generations by a massive one-time increase in government debt. Eventually, the aggregate physical capital stock rises by 40%, the return on capital falls to 4.4%, and the labor income tax rate falls from 33.9 to 14%. We estimate the size of the entitlement debt to be 2.7 times real GDP, which is paid off by levying a 38% labor income tax rate during the first 40 years of the transition. In our second experiment, we leave social security benefits untouched but force the government temporarily to increase the tax on labor income so as gradually to accumulate private physical capital, from the proceeds of which it eventually finances social security payments. This particular government-run funding scheme delivers larger efficiency gains (in both the exogenous and endogenous price cases) than privatization, an outcome stemming from the scheme's public provision of insurance both against life-span risk and labor income volatility.

CREDIT FRICTIONS AND OPTIMAL LABOR-INCOME TAXATION

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 2845-2891
Author(s):  
Salem Abo-Zaid
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Credit Constraint ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
The Business Cycle ◽  
Credit Frictions ◽  
Labor Income Taxation

This paper studies optimal labor-income taxation in a simple model with credit constraints on firms. The labor-income tax rate and the shadow value on the credit constraint induce a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. It is found that optimal policy prescribes a volatile path for the labor-income tax rate even in the presence of state-contingent debt and capital. In this respect, credit frictions are akin to a form of market incompleteness. Credit frictions break the equivalence between tax smoothing and wedge smoothing; therefore, as the tightness of the credit constraint varies over the business cycle, tax volatility is needed in order to counter this variation and, as a result, allow for wedge smoothing.

Poverty and Savings: Optimal Taxes with Endogenous Discount Factors

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 828-863
Author(s):  
Pier-André Bouchard St-Amant ◽  
Louis Perrault
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
Present Bias ◽  
Lower Weight ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Optimal Linear ◽  
Future Consumption ◽  
Optimal Taxes

Following recent developments linking poverty to present-bias behavior, we conduct an optimal linear taxation analysis where some individuals (called “behaviorals”) have a discount factor that is a function of their disposable income. In the model, endogenous discount factors imply (1) that taxing labor decreases the valuation of savings and (2) that subsidies on savings mitigate for a lower weight being given to future consumption. We perform simulations where the number of behavioral individuals increases and find that resources raised through labor taxation are used to finance saving subsidies rather than an increase of transfers. The prevalence of behaviorals leads to an increase in the labor income tax rate.

scholarly journals The Inequality Effects of a Dual Income Tax System

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Lambert ◽  
Thor O. Thoresen
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
Tax System ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Dual Income Tax ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Dual Income ◽  
Tax Payers

Abstract A dual income tax system, combining progressive taxation of labor income with proportional taxation of income from capital, may or may not be unambiguously inequality reducing. Examples show that the degree of correlation between the distributions of wage and capital income, the degree of tax rate differentiation in the DIT, and reranking of tax-payers can be expected to complicate a clear-cut analysis. We trace out what can be said definitively, obtaining sufficient conditions for unambiguous inequality reduction in certain cases, and more generally identifying the nature of the implicit redistribution between labor and capital income components which is sufficient to ensure overall inequality reduction.

Taxation in a mixed economy: the case of China

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davidson Sinclair ◽  
Larry Li
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Corporate Income Tax ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Effective Tax Rate ◽  
Effective Tax Rates ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
For Profit

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Chinese firms’ ownership structure is related to their effective tax rate. The People’s Republic of China provides an interesting environment to examine the corporate income tax. Government has significant ownership stakes in the for-profit economy and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are liable to the corporate income tax. This is very different to most other economies where SOE tends to dominate the not-for-profit economy and pays no corporate income tax. Government ownership also varies between the central government and local government in addition to state asset management bureaus. This provides a rich institutional background to examining the corporate income tax. Design/methodology/approach A panel data analysis approach is used to examine relationship between ownership structure and effective tax rates of all public firms in China from 1999 to 2009. Findings The authors report that effective tax rates do appear to vary across the ownership types, but that SOEs pay a statistically higher effective tax rate than to non-state-owned. In addition, local government owned SOE pay higher effective tax rates than central government and SAMB owned SOE. The authors also investigate Zimmerman’s (1983) political cost hypothesis. Unfortunately, these results are econometrically fragile with the statistical significance of those results varying by empirical technique. Originality/value This paper provides insight into government ownership and taxation in China.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document