scholarly journals Oscillatory mechanisms related to (pre-)reflective decision-making

Author(s):  
Wokke Martijn ◽  
Ridderinkhof K. Richard
2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (S1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela CE Onslow ◽  
Matthew W Jones ◽  
Rafal Bogacz

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 2832-2843 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhijit Rajan ◽  
Scott N Siegel ◽  
Yuelu Liu ◽  
Jesse Bengson ◽  
George R Mangun ◽  
...  

Abstract Attention can be attracted reflexively by sensory signals, biased by learning or reward, or focused voluntarily based on momentary goals. When voluntary attention is focused by purely internal decision processes (will), rather than instructions via external cues, we call this “willed attention.” In prior work, we reported ERP and fMRI correlates of willed spatial attention in trial-by-trial cuing tasks. Here we further investigated the oscillatory mechanisms of willed attention by contrasting the event-related EEG spectrogram between instructional and choice cues. Two experiments were conducted at 2 different sites using the same visuospatial attention paradigm. Consistent between the 2 experiments, we found increases in frontal theta power (starting at ~500 ms post cue) for willed attention relative to instructed attention. This frontal theta increase was accompanied by increased frontal–parietal theta-band coherence and bidirectional Granger causality. Additionally, the onset of attention-related posterior alpha power lateralization was delayed in willed attention relative to instructed attention, and the amount of delay was related to the timing of frontal theta increase. These results, replicated across 2 experiments, suggest that theta oscillations are the neuronal signals indexing decision-making in the frontal cortex, and mediating reciprocal communications between the frontal executive and parietal attentional control regions during willed attention.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Simen ◽  
Fuat Balcı

AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Danks

AbstractThe target article uses a mathematical framework derived from Bayesian decision making to demonstrate suboptimal decision making but then attributes psychological reality to the framework components. Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) positive proposal thus risks ignoring plausible psychological theories that could implement complex perceptual decision making. We must be careful not to slide from success with an analytical tool to the reality of the tool components.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
David R. Shanks ◽  
Ben R. Newell

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
David R. Shanks ◽  
Ben R. Newell

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie F. Reyna ◽  
David A. Broniatowski

Abstract Gilead et al. offer a thoughtful and much-needed treatment of abstraction. However, it fails to build on an extensive literature on abstraction, representational diversity, neurocognition, and psychopathology that provides important constraints and alternative evidence-based conceptions. We draw on conceptions in software engineering, socio-technical systems engineering, and a neurocognitive theory with abstract representations of gist at its core, fuzzy-trace theory.


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