scholarly journals Intervention Using Body Shadow to Evoke Loading Imagery in a Patient with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome in the Foot: A Case Report

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 718
Author(s):  
Yoshiyuki Hirakawa ◽  
Ryota Imai ◽  
Hayato Shigetoh ◽  
Shu Morioka

We present the case of a female patient who developed complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) after a right-foot injury. The patient had pain from the right knee to the toes and showed severe disgust at the appearance of the affected limb. Consequently, the affected limb was not fully loaded, and the patient had difficulty walking. General interventions, such as mirror therapy, were attempted, but the effect was limited. We hypothesized that this was due to the disgust toward the affected limb, and we implemented a body-shadow intervention that we developed. This reduced the disgust for the affected limb and improved pain, but neither changed the anticipated pain of loading the affected limb nor improved the patient’s walking ability. The reason for this was considered to be that the previous interventions using the body shadow utilized the third-person perspective, denoting that the image of the load sensation on the sole of the foot during walking was insufficient; therefore, we attempted a first-person body-shadow intervention. The results showed improvement in the patient’s walking ability. In CRPS of the foot, it is important to use interventions that evoke images of loading without causing anticipatory pain, pointing to the effectiveness of body-shadow interventions.

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
V. N Merkulov ◽  
A. I Dorokhin ◽  
A. I Krupatkin ◽  
M. V Merkulov ◽  
M. A Avakova

Case report on 14 years old girl with type 1 complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) is presented. At first admission in 5.5 months after right hand injury and development of type 1 CRPS, paravasal sympathectomy on the right upper extremity was performed. Complete elimination of pain syndrome and restoration of the extremity function was achieved. Five and a half months after discharge the left foot and in 3 weeks later the right hand were injured. In both cases injuries were accompanied by pronounced CRPS clinical picture. At second admission in 6 weeks after foot injury interventional treatment with placement of catheters next to nerve trunks and bolus administration of antibiotics was performed for 1 week and enabled to achieve remission of the disease. It was noted that not only hypersymphaticotony but also psychological status of a patient were important for the disease development.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.W. de Borst ◽  
M.V. Sanchez-Vives ◽  
M. Slater ◽  
B. de Gelder

AbstractPeripersonal space is the area directly surrounding the body, which supports object manipulation and social interaction, but is also critical for threat detection. In the monkey, ventral premotor and intraparietal cortex support initiation of defensive behavior. However, the brain network that underlies threat detection in human peripersonal space still awaits investigation. We combined fMRI measurements with a preceding virtual reality training from either first or third person perspective to manipulate whether approaching human threat was perceived as directed to oneself or another. We found that first person perspective increased body ownership and identification with the virtual victim. When threat was perceived as directed towards oneself, synchronization of brain activity in the human peripersonal brain network was enhanced and connectivity increased from premotor and intraparietal cortex towards superior parietal lobe. When this threat was nearby, synchronization also occurred in emotion-processing regions. Priming with third person perspective reduced synchronization of brain activity in the peripersonal space network and increased top-down modulation of visual areas. In conclusion, our results showed that after first person perspective training peripersonal space is remapped to the virtual victim, thereby causing the fronto-parietal network to predict intrusive actions towards the body and emotion-processing regions to signal nearby threat.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 1760-1771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Bucchioni ◽  
Carlotta Fossataro ◽  
Andrea Cavallo ◽  
Harold Mouras ◽  
Marco Neppi-Modona ◽  
...  

Recent studies show that motor responses similar to those present in one's own pain (freezing effect) occur as a result of observation of pain in others. This finding has been interpreted as the physiological basis of empathy. Alternatively, it can represent the physiological counterpart of an embodiment phenomenon related to the sense of body ownership. We compared the empathy and the ownership hypotheses by manipulating the perspective of the observed hand model receiving pain so that it could be a first-person perspective, the one in which embodiment occurs, or a third-person perspective, the one in which we usually perceive the others. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) by TMS over M1 were recorded from first dorsal interosseous muscle, whereas participants observed video clips showing (a) a needle penetrating or (b) a Q-tip touching a hand model, presented either in first-person or in third-person perspective. We found that a pain-specific inhibition of MEP amplitude (a significantly greater MEP reduction in the “pain” compared with the “touch” conditions) only pertains to the first-person perspective, and it is related to the strength of the self-reported embodiment. We interpreted this corticospinal modulation according to an “affective” conception of body ownership, suggesting that the body I feel as my own is the body I care more about.


Author(s):  
Janet Brenya ◽  
Katherine Chavarria ◽  
Elizabeth Murray ◽  
Karen Kelly ◽  
Anjel Friest ◽  
...  

Only by understanding the ability to take third-person perspective can we begin to elucidate the neural processes responsible for one’s inimitable conscious experience. The current study examined differences in hemispheric laterality during a first-person perspective (1PP) and third-person perspective (3PP) taking task, when using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Participants were asked to take either the 1PP or 3PP when identifying the number of spheres in a virtual scene. During this task, single-pulse TMS was delivered to the motor cortex of both the left and right hemispheres of 10 healthy volunteers. Measures of TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of the contralateral abductor pollicis brevis (APB) were employed as an indicator of lateralized cortical activation. The data suggest that the right hemisphere is more important in discriminating between 1PP and 3PP. These data add a novel method for determining perspective taking and add to the literature supporting the role of the right hemisphere in meta representation.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana Babo-Rebelo ◽  
Anne Buot ◽  
Catherine Tallon-Baudry

AbstractImagination is an internally-generated process, where one can make oneself or other people appear as protagonists of a scene. How does the brain tag the protagonist of an imagined scene, as being oneself or someone else? Crucially, neither external stimuli nor motor feedback are available during imagination to disentangle imagining oneself from imagining someone else. Here, we test the hypothesis that an internal mechanism based on the neural monitoring of heartbeats could distinguish between self and other. 23 participants imagined themselves (from a first-person perspective) or a friend (from a third-person perspective) in various scenarios, while their brain activity was recorded with magnetoencephalography and their cardiac activity was simultaneously monitored. We measured heartbeat-evoked responses, i.e. transients of neural activity occurring in response to each heartbeat, during imagination. The amplitude of heartbeat-evoked responses differed between imagining oneself and imagining a friend, in the precuneus, mid and posterior cingulate regions bilaterally. Effect size was modulated by the general daydreaming frequency of participants but not by their interoceptive abilities. These results could not be accounted for by other characteristics of imagination (e.g., the ability to adopt the perspective, valence or arousal), nor by cardiac parameters (e.g., heart rate) or arousal levels. Heartbeat-evoked responses thus appear as a neural marker distinguishing self from other during imagination.Highlights- Heartbeat-evoked responses differentiate self from other during imagination.- These effects were located in the precuneus and mid- to posterior cingulate.- The neural monitoring of the body could be a mechanism for self/other distinction.


Author(s):  
V. N. Merkulov ◽  
A. I. Dorokhin ◽  
A. I. Krupatkin ◽  
M. V. Merkulov ◽  
M. A. Avakova

Case report on 14 years old girl with type 1 complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) is presented. At first admission in 5.5 months after right hand injury and development of type 1 CRPS, paravasal sympathectomy on the right upper extremity was performed. Complete elimination of pain syndrome and restoration of the extremity function was achieved. Five and a half months after discharge the left foot and in 3 weeks later the right hand were injured. In both cases injuries were accompanied by pronounced CRPS clinical picture. At second admission in 6 weeks after foot injury interventional treatment with placement of catheters next to nerve trunks and bolus administration of antibiotics was performed for 1 week and enabled to achieve remission of the disease. It was noted that not only hypersymphaticotony but also psychological status of a patient were important for the disease development.


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 43-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Bernet

AbstractHusserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure consciousness and the natural sciences. A phenomenological discussion of naturalism thus cannot limit itself to the task of discrimination, it must attempt to integrate what an eidetic analysis has separated: inside and outside, here and there, first-person and third-person perspective, motivation and causality. Husserl's phenomenology of the body thus shows that dualism is at best a methodological but never an ontological option for the mind-body problem.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 513
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Murray ◽  
Janet Brenya ◽  
Katherine Chavarria ◽  
Karen J. Kelly ◽  
Anjel Fierst ◽  
...  

Only by understanding the ability to take a third-person perspective can we begin to elucidate the neural processes responsible for one’s inimitable conscious experience. The current study examined differences in hemispheric laterality during a first-person perspective (1PP) and third-person perspective (3PP) taking task, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Participants were asked to take either the 1PP or 3PP when identifying the number of spheres in a virtual scene. During this task, single-pulse TMS was delivered to the motor cortex of both the left and right hemispheres of 10 healthy volunteers. Measures of TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of the contralateral abductor pollicis brevis (APB) were employed as an indicator of lateralized cortical activation. The data suggest that the right hemisphere is more important in discriminating between 1PP and 3PP. These data add a novel method for determining perspective taking and add to the literature supporting the role of the right hemisphere in meta representation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095679762097577
Author(s):  
Riccardo Tambone ◽  
Alberto Giachero ◽  
Melanie Calati ◽  
Maria Teresa Molo ◽  
Dalila Burin ◽  
...  

Recent findings suggest that body ownership can activate the motor system in the absence of movement execution. Here, we investigated whether such a process promotes motor recovery in stroke patients. A group of patients with left-hemisphere damage ( N = 12) and chronic motor deficits completed an immersive virtual reality training (three sessions of 15 min each week for 11 weeks). Patients sat still and either experienced (first-person perspective) or did not experience (third-person perspective) illusory ownership over the body of a standing virtual avatar. After the training, in which the avatar walked around a virtual environment, only patients who experienced the illusion improved gait and balance. We argue that representing the virtual body as their own allowed patients to access motor functioning and promoted motor recovery. This procedure might be integrated with rehabilitative approaches centered on motor execution. These findings also have an impact on the knowledge of the motor system in general.


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