The Body as a ‘Legitimate Naturalization of Consciousness’

2013 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 43-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Bernet
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Body ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Phenomenology Of The Body ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Bodily Sensations ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind

AbstractHusserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure consciousness and the natural sciences. A phenomenological discussion of naturalism thus cannot limit itself to the task of discrimination, it must attempt to integrate what an eidetic analysis has separated: inside and outside, here and there, first-person and third-person perspective, motivation and causality. Husserl's phenomenology of the body thus shows that dualism is at best a methodological but never an ontological option for the mind-body problem.

scholarly journals First person experience of threat modulates cortical network encoding human peripersonal space

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.W. de Borst ◽  
M.V. Sanchez-Vives ◽  
M. Slater ◽  
B. de Gelder
Keyword(s):  
Brain Activity ◽  
Peripersonal Space ◽  
Brain Network ◽  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Threat Detection ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective

AbstractPeripersonal space is the area directly surrounding the body, which supports object manipulation and social interaction, but is also critical for threat detection. In the monkey, ventral premotor and intraparietal cortex support initiation of defensive behavior. However, the brain network that underlies threat detection in human peripersonal space still awaits investigation. We combined fMRI measurements with a preceding virtual reality training from either first or third person perspective to manipulate whether approaching human threat was perceived as directed to oneself or another. We found that first person perspective increased body ownership and identification with the virtual victim. When threat was perceived as directed towards oneself, synchronization of brain activity in the human peripersonal brain network was enhanced and connectivity increased from premotor and intraparietal cortex towards superior parietal lobe. When this threat was nearby, synchronization also occurred in emotion-processing regions. Priming with third person perspective reduced synchronization of brain activity in the peripersonal space network and increased top-down modulation of visual areas. In conclusion, our results showed that after first person perspective training peripersonal space is remapped to the virtual victim, thereby causing the fronto-parietal network to predict intrusive actions towards the body and emotion-processing regions to signal nearby threat.

scholarly journals Empathy or Ownership? Evidence from Corticospinal Excitability Modulation during Pain Observation

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 1760-1771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Bucchioni ◽  
Carlotta Fossataro ◽  
Andrea Cavallo ◽  
Harold Mouras ◽  
Marco Neppi-Modona ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Physiological Basis ◽  
Hand Model ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The One

Recent studies show that motor responses similar to those present in one's own pain (freezing effect) occur as a result of observation of pain in others. This finding has been interpreted as the physiological basis of empathy. Alternatively, it can represent the physiological counterpart of an embodiment phenomenon related to the sense of body ownership. We compared the empathy and the ownership hypotheses by manipulating the perspective of the observed hand model receiving pain so that it could be a first-person perspective, the one in which embodiment occurs, or a third-person perspective, the one in which we usually perceive the others. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) by TMS over M1 were recorded from first dorsal interosseous muscle, whereas participants observed video clips showing (a) a needle penetrating or (b) a Q-tip touching a hand model, presented either in first-person or in third-person perspective. We found that a pain-specific inhibition of MEP amplitude (a significantly greater MEP reduction in the “pain” compared with the “touch” conditions) only pertains to the first-person perspective, and it is related to the strength of the self-reported embodiment. We interpreted this corticospinal modulation according to an “affective” conception of body ownership, suggesting that the body I feel as my own is the body I care more about.

The Self-Awareness of the Mind: Phenomenal World and the Mind Beyond

Diogenes ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-25
Author(s):  
Ja-Kyoung Han
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Phenomenal World ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Conceptual Language

What we regard as real are the objects of the phenomenal world which we perceive. We regard those that we see objectively, as in the third person perspective, as real. What then is the mind that perceives the world? Is it possible for us to realize the very mind that perceives the world? This article discusses the existence of the world perceived by the mind in order to deal with the existence of the mind which perceives the world and the knowability of the mind. Phenomenal world is a perceptual world which is a fictitious world constructed by our conceptual language system. And the base of the fictitious phenomenal world, the object itself, is emptiness. The emptiness is the emptiness of the mind that perceives and constructs the world. Thus, the awareness of the emptiness of the world is the self-awareness of the mind. Since the emptiness of my mind is the same emptiness of all other beings, the mind is the capacity to sympathize with the whole world, the universal mind, One-mind. Every man is aware of oneself as One-mind. “Gong-juk-young-ji” or the “original enlightenment” of Buddhism is the self-awareness of the mind as emptiness.

scholarly journals Neural responses to heartbeats as a mechanism for distinguishing self from other during imagination

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana Babo-Rebelo ◽  
Anne Buot ◽  
Catherine Tallon-Baudry
Keyword(s):  
Brain Activity ◽  
Cardiac Activity ◽  
The Body ◽  
Evoked Responses ◽  
Posterior Cingulate ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Neural Monitoring ◽  
External Stimuli

AbstractImagination is an internally-generated process, where one can make oneself or other people appear as protagonists of a scene. How does the brain tag the protagonist of an imagined scene, as being oneself or someone else? Crucially, neither external stimuli nor motor feedback are available during imagination to disentangle imagining oneself from imagining someone else. Here, we test the hypothesis that an internal mechanism based on the neural monitoring of heartbeats could distinguish between self and other. 23 participants imagined themselves (from a first-person perspective) or a friend (from a third-person perspective) in various scenarios, while their brain activity was recorded with magnetoencephalography and their cardiac activity was simultaneously monitored. We measured heartbeat-evoked responses, i.e. transients of neural activity occurring in response to each heartbeat, during imagination. The amplitude of heartbeat-evoked responses differed between imagining oneself and imagining a friend, in the precuneus, mid and posterior cingulate regions bilaterally. Effect size was modulated by the general daydreaming frequency of participants but not by their interoceptive abilities. These results could not be accounted for by other characteristics of imagination (e.g., the ability to adopt the perspective, valence or arousal), nor by cardiac parameters (e.g., heart rate) or arousal levels. Heartbeat-evoked responses thus appear as a neural marker distinguishing self from other during imagination.Highlights- Heartbeat-evoked responses differentiate self from other during imagination.- These effects were located in the precuneus and mid- to posterior cingulate.- The neural monitoring of the body could be a mechanism for self/other distinction.

scholarly journals Intervention Using Body Shadow to Evoke Loading Imagery in a Patient with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome in the Foot: A Case Report

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 718
Author(s):  
Yoshiyuki Hirakawa ◽  
Ryota Imai ◽  
Hayato Shigetoh ◽  
Shu Morioka
Keyword(s):  
Complex Regional Pain Syndrome ◽  
Pain Syndrome ◽  
The Body ◽  
Walking Ability ◽  
Mirror Therapy ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Foot Injury ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Right

We present the case of a female patient who developed complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) after a right-foot injury. The patient had pain from the right knee to the toes and showed severe disgust at the appearance of the affected limb. Consequently, the affected limb was not fully loaded, and the patient had difficulty walking. General interventions, such as mirror therapy, were attempted, but the effect was limited. We hypothesized that this was due to the disgust toward the affected limb, and we implemented a body-shadow intervention that we developed. This reduced the disgust for the affected limb and improved pain, but neither changed the anticipated pain of loading the affected limb nor improved the patient’s walking ability. The reason for this was considered to be that the previous interventions using the body shadow utilized the third-person perspective, denoting that the image of the load sensation on the sole of the foot during walking was insufficient; therefore, we attempted a first-person body-shadow intervention. The results showed improvement in the patient’s walking ability. In CRPS of the foot, it is important to use interventions that evoke images of loading without causing anticipatory pain, pointing to the effectiveness of body-shadow interventions.

Reduction: The Solution to Mind Representation?

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-315
Author(s):  
Yanying Cui ◽  
Yidong Wei
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Elements ◽  
The Other ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Naturalistic Methodology ◽  
Leading Position ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Chomsky is an evolutionary figure in linguistics. His greatest contribution lies in transformational generative grammar, which put an end to the leading position structuralism had held in language for more than 30 years. His naturalistic methodology has greatly influenced the research of both linguistics and psychology, and he is also considered to be the first to study language from the cognitive perspective. He insists on a naturalistic methodology; therefore, he was even considered by some to be a physicalist. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, TGG, as a critique of the behaviorist view of language, is intertwined with a critique of physicalism. On the one hand, he thinks the mind, like chemical elements and electrons, can be approached from a third-person perspective; on the other hand, he again admits there exists consciousness, which can be merely approached in terms of a first-person authority, which, therefore, is a fatal challenge to his core theory. Now there remains a new solution to this dilemma, that is, to admit that the mind is a special natural phenomenon with two means of existence: one is involved in physical aspects with the brain, and the other is concerned with something mental, with the former approached by a third-person perspective and the latter better researched via a first-person authority.

Using Body Ownership to Modulate the Motor System in Stroke Patients

2021 ◽  
pp. 095679762097577
Author(s):  
Riccardo Tambone ◽  
Alberto Giachero ◽  
Melanie Calati ◽  
Maria Teresa Molo ◽  
Dalila Burin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Motor System ◽  
Motor Recovery ◽  
The Body ◽  
Motor Deficits ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Stroke Patients ◽  
Motor Functioning ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective

Recent findings suggest that body ownership can activate the motor system in the absence of movement execution. Here, we investigated whether such a process promotes motor recovery in stroke patients. A group of patients with left-hemisphere damage ( N = 12) and chronic motor deficits completed an immersive virtual reality training (three sessions of 15 min each week for 11 weeks). Patients sat still and either experienced (first-person perspective) or did not experience (third-person perspective) illusory ownership over the body of a standing virtual avatar. After the training, in which the avatar walked around a virtual environment, only patients who experienced the illusion improved gait and balance. We argue that representing the virtual body as their own allowed patients to access motor functioning and promoted motor recovery. This procedure might be integrated with rehabilitative approaches centered on motor execution. These findings also have an impact on the knowledge of the motor system in general.

Causal determinism and a totally global fatalism from the third-person perspective

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
The Third Person

The human brain and the human language are precisely constructed together by evolution/genes, so that in the objective world, a human brain can tell a story to another brain in human language which describes an imagined multiplayer game; in this story, one player of the game represents the human brain itself. It’s possible that the human kind doesn’t really have a subjective world (doesn’t really have conscious experience). An individual has no control even over her choices. Her choices are controlled by the neural substrate. The neural substrate is controlled by the physical laws. So, her choices are controlled by the physical laws. So, she is powerless to do anything other than what she actually does. This is the view of fatalism. Specifically, this is the view of a totally global fatalism, where people have no control even over their choices, from the third-person perspective. And I just argued for fatalism by appeal to causal determinism. Psychologically, a third-person perspective and a new, dedicated personality state are required to bear the totally global fatalism, to avoid severe cognitive dissonance with our default first-person perspective and our original personality state.

scholarly journals Agency, Responsibility, Selves, and the Mechanical Mind

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Fiorella Battaglia
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Human Machine Interaction ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
Area Of Concern ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Brain

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these three main approaches to the mind, and particularly as applied to an “extended mind”, the paper identifies a major area of transformation in philosophy of action, which is understood in terms of additional epistemic devices—including a legal perspective of regulating the human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. I argue this is a new area of concern within philosophy, which will be characterized in terms of self-objectification, which becomes “alienation” following Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technology. The paper argues that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.

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