Using Body Ownership to Modulate the Motor System in Stroke Patients

2021 ◽  
pp. 095679762097577
Author(s):  
Riccardo Tambone ◽  
Alberto Giachero ◽  
Melanie Calati ◽  
Maria Teresa Molo ◽  
Dalila Burin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Motor System ◽  
Motor Recovery ◽  
The Body ◽  
Motor Deficits ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Stroke Patients ◽  
Motor Functioning ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective

Recent findings suggest that body ownership can activate the motor system in the absence of movement execution. Here, we investigated whether such a process promotes motor recovery in stroke patients. A group of patients with left-hemisphere damage ( N = 12) and chronic motor deficits completed an immersive virtual reality training (three sessions of 15 min each week for 11 weeks). Patients sat still and either experienced (first-person perspective) or did not experience (third-person perspective) illusory ownership over the body of a standing virtual avatar. After the training, in which the avatar walked around a virtual environment, only patients who experienced the illusion improved gait and balance. We argue that representing the virtual body as their own allowed patients to access motor functioning and promoted motor recovery. This procedure might be integrated with rehabilitative approaches centered on motor execution. These findings also have an impact on the knowledge of the motor system in general.

scholarly journals Empathy or Ownership? Evidence from Corticospinal Excitability Modulation during Pain Observation

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 1760-1771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Bucchioni ◽  
Carlotta Fossataro ◽  
Andrea Cavallo ◽  
Harold Mouras ◽  
Marco Neppi-Modona ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Physiological Basis ◽  
Hand Model ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The One

Recent studies show that motor responses similar to those present in one's own pain (freezing effect) occur as a result of observation of pain in others. This finding has been interpreted as the physiological basis of empathy. Alternatively, it can represent the physiological counterpart of an embodiment phenomenon related to the sense of body ownership. We compared the empathy and the ownership hypotheses by manipulating the perspective of the observed hand model receiving pain so that it could be a first-person perspective, the one in which embodiment occurs, or a third-person perspective, the one in which we usually perceive the others. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) by TMS over M1 were recorded from first dorsal interosseous muscle, whereas participants observed video clips showing (a) a needle penetrating or (b) a Q-tip touching a hand model, presented either in first-person or in third-person perspective. We found that a pain-specific inhibition of MEP amplitude (a significantly greater MEP reduction in the “pain” compared with the “touch” conditions) only pertains to the first-person perspective, and it is related to the strength of the self-reported embodiment. We interpreted this corticospinal modulation according to an “affective” conception of body ownership, suggesting that the body I feel as my own is the body I care more about.

scholarly journals Top-down recognition leads to a reduced sense of body ownership in individuals with depersonalization tendencies: A focus on full body illusion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazuki Yamamoto ◽  
Takashi Nakao
Keyword(s):  
Japanese Version ◽  
The Body ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Instruction Condition ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Tactile Stimuli ◽  
Self Association ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Full Body

Sense of body ownership, i.e., the feeling that “my body belongs to me,” has been examined by both the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and full body illusion (FBI). In a study that examined the relationship between RHI and depersonalization, a symptom in which people experience a lower sense of body ownership, the degree of illusion was higher in people with a high depersonalization tendency. However, other reports have suggested that people with depersonalization disorder have difficulty feeling the sense of body ownership. Examination of depersonalization suggests that the negative body recognition in people with depersonalization may make them less likely to feel a sense of body ownership, but this has not yet been examined. In this study, by manipulating top-down recognition (e.g., instructing participants to recognize a fake body as theirs), we clarified the cause of the reduced sense of body ownership in people with a high depersonalization tendency. The FBI procedure was conducted in a virtual reality environment using an avatar as a fake body. The avatar was presented from a third-person perspective, and visual-tactile stimuli were presented to create an illusion. To examine the degree of illusion, we measured the skin conductance responses to the fear stimulus presented after the visual-tactile stimuli presentation. The degree of depersonalization was measured using the Japanese version of the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale. To manipulate the top-down recognition to the avatar, we provided self-association instructions before the presentation of the visual-tactile stimuli. The results showed that participants with a high depersonalization tendency had a lower degree of illusion (rho = -.589, p < .01) in the self-association condition, and a higher one (rho = .552, p < .01) in the non-association instruction condition. This indicates that although people with a high depersonalization tendency are more likely to feel a sense of body ownership through the integration of visual-tactile stimuli, top-down recognition of the body as one’s own leads to a decrease in the sense of body ownership.

scholarly journals First person experience of threat modulates cortical network encoding human peripersonal space

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.W. de Borst ◽  
M.V. Sanchez-Vives ◽  
M. Slater ◽  
B. de Gelder
Keyword(s):  
Brain Activity ◽  
Peripersonal Space ◽  
Brain Network ◽  
The Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Threat Detection ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective

AbstractPeripersonal space is the area directly surrounding the body, which supports object manipulation and social interaction, but is also critical for threat detection. In the monkey, ventral premotor and intraparietal cortex support initiation of defensive behavior. However, the brain network that underlies threat detection in human peripersonal space still awaits investigation. We combined fMRI measurements with a preceding virtual reality training from either first or third person perspective to manipulate whether approaching human threat was perceived as directed to oneself or another. We found that first person perspective increased body ownership and identification with the virtual victim. When threat was perceived as directed towards oneself, synchronization of brain activity in the human peripersonal brain network was enhanced and connectivity increased from premotor and intraparietal cortex towards superior parietal lobe. When this threat was nearby, synchronization also occurred in emotion-processing regions. Priming with third person perspective reduced synchronization of brain activity in the peripersonal space network and increased top-down modulation of visual areas. In conclusion, our results showed that after first person perspective training peripersonal space is remapped to the virtual victim, thereby causing the fronto-parietal network to predict intrusive actions towards the body and emotion-processing regions to signal nearby threat.

scholarly journals Neural responses to heartbeats as a mechanism for distinguishing self from other during imagination

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana Babo-Rebelo ◽  
Anne Buot ◽  
Catherine Tallon-Baudry
Keyword(s):  
Brain Activity ◽  
Cardiac Activity ◽  
The Body ◽  
Evoked Responses ◽  
Posterior Cingulate ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Neural Monitoring ◽  
External Stimuli

AbstractImagination is an internally-generated process, where one can make oneself or other people appear as protagonists of a scene. How does the brain tag the protagonist of an imagined scene, as being oneself or someone else? Crucially, neither external stimuli nor motor feedback are available during imagination to disentangle imagining oneself from imagining someone else. Here, we test the hypothesis that an internal mechanism based on the neural monitoring of heartbeats could distinguish between self and other. 23 participants imagined themselves (from a first-person perspective) or a friend (from a third-person perspective) in various scenarios, while their brain activity was recorded with magnetoencephalography and their cardiac activity was simultaneously monitored. We measured heartbeat-evoked responses, i.e. transients of neural activity occurring in response to each heartbeat, during imagination. The amplitude of heartbeat-evoked responses differed between imagining oneself and imagining a friend, in the precuneus, mid and posterior cingulate regions bilaterally. Effect size was modulated by the general daydreaming frequency of participants but not by their interoceptive abilities. These results could not be accounted for by other characteristics of imagination (e.g., the ability to adopt the perspective, valence or arousal), nor by cardiac parameters (e.g., heart rate) or arousal levels. Heartbeat-evoked responses thus appear as a neural marker distinguishing self from other during imagination.Highlights- Heartbeat-evoked responses differentiate self from other during imagination.- These effects were located in the precuneus and mid- to posterior cingulate.- The neural monitoring of the body could be a mechanism for self/other distinction.

scholarly journals Intervention Using Body Shadow to Evoke Loading Imagery in a Patient with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome in the Foot: A Case Report

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 718
Author(s):  
Yoshiyuki Hirakawa ◽  
Ryota Imai ◽  
Hayato Shigetoh ◽  
Shu Morioka
Keyword(s):  
Complex Regional Pain Syndrome ◽  
Pain Syndrome ◽  
The Body ◽  
Walking Ability ◽  
Mirror Therapy ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Foot Injury ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Right

We present the case of a female patient who developed complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) after a right-foot injury. The patient had pain from the right knee to the toes and showed severe disgust at the appearance of the affected limb. Consequently, the affected limb was not fully loaded, and the patient had difficulty walking. General interventions, such as mirror therapy, were attempted, but the effect was limited. We hypothesized that this was due to the disgust toward the affected limb, and we implemented a body-shadow intervention that we developed. This reduced the disgust for the affected limb and improved pain, but neither changed the anticipated pain of loading the affected limb nor improved the patient’s walking ability. The reason for this was considered to be that the previous interventions using the body shadow utilized the third-person perspective, denoting that the image of the load sensation on the sole of the foot during walking was insufficient; therefore, we attempted a first-person body-shadow intervention. The results showed improvement in the patient’s walking ability. In CRPS of the foot, it is important to use interventions that evoke images of loading without causing anticipatory pain, pointing to the effectiveness of body-shadow interventions.

The Body as a ‘Legitimate Naturalization of Consciousness’

2013 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 43-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Bernet
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Body ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Phenomenology Of The Body ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Bodily Sensations ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind

AbstractHusserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure consciousness and the natural sciences. A phenomenological discussion of naturalism thus cannot limit itself to the task of discrimination, it must attempt to integrate what an eidetic analysis has separated: inside and outside, here and there, first-person and third-person perspective, motivation and causality. Husserl's phenomenology of the body thus shows that dualism is at best a methodological but never an ontological option for the mind-body problem.

Causal determinism and a totally global fatalism from the third-person perspective

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
The Third Person

The human brain and the human language are precisely constructed together by evolution/genes, so that in the objective world, a human brain can tell a story to another brain in human language which describes an imagined multiplayer game; in this story, one player of the game represents the human brain itself. It’s possible that the human kind doesn’t really have a subjective world (doesn’t really have conscious experience). An individual has no control even over her choices. Her choices are controlled by the neural substrate. The neural substrate is controlled by the physical laws. So, her choices are controlled by the physical laws. So, she is powerless to do anything other than what she actually does. This is the view of fatalism. Specifically, this is the view of a totally global fatalism, where people have no control even over their choices, from the third-person perspective. And I just argued for fatalism by appeal to causal determinism. Psychologically, a third-person perspective and a new, dedicated personality state are required to bear the totally global fatalism, to avoid severe cognitive dissonance with our default first-person perspective and our original personality state.

scholarly journals Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Liang ◽  
Wen-Hsiang Lin ◽  
Tai-Yuan Chang ◽  
Chi-Hong Chen ◽  
Chen-Wei Wu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Distinct Type ◽  
Body Part ◽  
The Body ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The One ◽  
First Time ◽  
Full Body

AbstractBody ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness.

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