scholarly journals Application of Theory of Quantum Instruments to Psychology: Combination of Question Order Effect with Response Replicability Effect

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masanao Ozawa ◽  
Andrei Khrennikov

Recently, quantum formalism started to be actively used outside of quantum physics: in psychology, decision-making, economics, finances, and social science. Human psychological behavior is characterized by a few basic effects; one of them is the question order effect (QOE). This effect was successfully modeled (Busemeyer–Wang) by representing questions A and B by Hermitian observables and mental-state transformations (back action of answering) by orthogonal projectors. However, then it was demonstrated that such representation cannot be combined with another psychological effect, known as the response replicability effect (RRE). Later, this no-go result was generalized to representation of questions and state transformations by quantum instruments of the atomic type. In light of these results, the possibility of using quantum formalism in psychology was questioned. In this paper, we show that, nevertheless, the combination of the QOE and RRE can be modeled within quantum formalism, in the framework of theory of non-atomic quantum instruments.

Author(s):  
Masanao Ozawa ◽  
Andrei Khrennikov

We continue to analyze basic constraints on human's decision making from the viewpoint of quantum measurement theory (QMT). As has been found, the conventional QMT based on the projection postulate cannot account for combination of the question order effect (QOE) and the response replicability effect (RRE). This was an alarm signal for quantum-like modeling of decision making. Recently, it was shown that this objection to quantum-like modeling can be removed on the basis of the general QMT based on quantum instruments. In the present paper we analyse the problem of combination of QOE, RRE, and the famous QQ-equality (QQE). This equality was derived by Busemeyer and Wang and it was shown (in the joint paper with Solloway and Shiffrin) that statistical data from many social opinion polls satisfies it. Now, we construct quantum instruments satisfying QOE, RRE, and QQE. The general features of our approach are formalized with postulates which generalize {\it Wang-Busemeyer} postulates for quantum-like modeling of decision making. Moreover, we show that our model closely reproduces the statistics of the famous Clinton-Gore Poll data with a prior belief state independent of the question order. This model successfully removes the order effect from the data to determine the genuine distribution of the opinions in the Poll. The paper also provides a psychologist-friendly introduction to the theory of quantum instruments - the most general mathematical framework for quantum measurements. We hope that this theory will attract attention of psychologists and will stimulate further applications.


Symmetry ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liang Wang ◽  
Álvaro Labella ◽  
Rosa M. Rodríguez ◽  
Ying-Ming Wang ◽  
Luis Martínez

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bloom ◽  
Laurie Paul

Some decision-making processes are uncomfortable. Many of us do not like to make significant decisions, such as whether to have a child, solely based on social science research. We do not like to choose randomly, even in cases where flipping a coin is plainly the wisest choice. We are often reluctant to defer to another person, even if we believe that the other person is wiser, and have similar reservations about appealing to powerful algorithms. And, while we are comfortable with considering and weighing different options, there is something strange about deciding solely on a purely algorithmic process, even one that takes place in our own heads.What is the source of our discomfort? We do not present a decisive theory here—and, indeed, the authors have clashing views over some of these issues—but we lay out the arguments for two (consistent) explanations. The first is that such impersonal decision-making processes are felt to be a threat to our autonomy. In all of the examples above, it is not you who is making the decision, it is someone or something else. This is to be contrasted with personal decision-making, where, to put it colloquially, you “own” your decision, though of course you may be informed by social science data, recommendations of others, and so on. A second possibility is that such impersonal decision-making processes are not seen as authentic, where authentic decision making is one in which you intentionally and knowledgably choose an option in a way that is “true to yourself.” Such decision making can be particularly important in contexts where one is making a life-changing decision of great import, such as the choice to emigrate, start a family, or embark on a major career change.


Author(s):  
Peter J. Taylor ◽  
Geoff O’Brien ◽  
Phil O’Keefe

This chapter takes the failure of current climate change policy as a given and seeks explanations and ways forward. Policy-making should be firmly grounded in the essential nature of anthropogenic climate change – a complex problem and an existential threat. It is found wanting in three fundamental aspects. International relations with its competitive preposition is found to be not fit for purpose as decision-making arena. The scientific input for decision-making underplays the ‘anthropo’ bit of climate change and therefore is found unfit for purpose. And social science contributions are found not fit for purpose because of their innate state-centric bias. To overcome the resulting impasse requires critical unthinking. The work of Jane Jacobs is chosen as guide to unthinking thereby foregrounding cities. An invitation is issued for others to provide alternate unthinking.


Derrida Today ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin McQuillan

How might we begin to think about deconstruction in relation to the formulation of political policy? Once we begin to ask this question the whole idea of policy as such is put in question and conversely the limitations of philosophy as the basis for political decision making quickly become apparent. Through a consideration of this problem and by reference to a number of key tropes in Derrida's later writings, this essay begins the task of thinking about the deconstruction of policy and of asking what the future role of deconstructive thought might be.


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