scholarly journals On Rational Choice and the Representation of Decision Problems

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 86
Author(s):  
Paulo Oliva ◽  
Philipp Zahn

In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives—modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by the outside world in a structured way. Online search results are lists of items, wine menus are often lists of lists (grouped by type or country), and online shopping often involves filtering items which can be viewed as navigating a tree. Representations constrain how an agent can choose. At the same time, an agent can also leverage representations when choosing, simplifying their choice process. For instance, in the case of a list he or she can use the order in which alternatives are represented to make their choice. In this paper, we model representations and decision procedures operating on them. We show that choice procedures are related to classical choice functions by a canonical mapping. Using this mapping, we can ask whether properties of choice functions can be lifted onto the choice procedures which induce them. We focus on the obvious benchmark: rational choice. We fully characterize choice procedures which can be rationalized by a strict preference relation for general representations including lists, list of lists, trees and others. Our framework can thereby be used as the basis for new tests of rational behavior. Classical choice theory operates on very limited information, typically budgets or menus and final choices. This is in stark contrast to the vast amount of data that specifically web companies collect about their users’ choice process. Our framework offers a way to integrate such data into economic choice models.

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
Fion L. C. Man ◽  
Holly H. He ◽  
Siu Kau Cheung

Referring to rational choice theory, theory of planned behavior, situational action theory, and model of frame selection, the study examines the effects of rational choice variables, social (subjective) norms, and personal (moral) norms on a sample of 286 associate degree graduants’ intention to misrepresent information on their resumes with a view to identifying ways to curb the problem. Participants were asked to indicate their likelihood of fabricating, embellishing, and omitting information on their resumes in response to a hypothetical recruitment advertisement. Their perceived benefits/costs of resume fraud as well as the respective probabilities of occurrence, perceived social norms and personal norms were measured. Results found that only perceived benefits (but not perceived costs or the probabilities of occurrence) and personal norms (but not social norms) had direct effects on intention to commit resume fraud. The findings suggest that while job applicants are utilitarian, their rationality is bounded, and they only use limited information in making relevant decisions. Personal norms also moderated the effect of perceived benefits on resume fraud, with effect of perceived benefits much weakened among those with higher personal norms. The results cast doubt on the use of deterrence measures to curb resume fraud. On the other hand, the importance of business ethics education is highlighted.


Author(s):  
Megan Eileen Collins ◽  
Thomas A. Loughran

A growing body of research on offender decision making has focused on studying the use of heuristic biases, or cognitive shortcuts taken in certain situations, when offenders make decisions in the face of uncertainty. The idea is that when offenders (or any individuals) are contemplating uncertain decisions with limited time, information, or resources to make a rational choice calculus, heuristics enable a suitable decision to be reached quickly. However, often heuristics can lead to biases, errors, preference reversals, or suboptimal decisions. This chapter considers departures from rational behavior and heuristics and biases, specifically how the latter have been integrated into the study of offenders’ choice calculus. In particular, it reviews how biases and deviations from rationality have been routinely observed when studying offender decisions.


2004 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. A. Drakopoulos ◽  
A. D. Karayiannis

One of the basic ideas underlying the established conception of rational behavior is the unlimited substitutability of preferences. Economic agents are assumed to compare and reduce everything to a common denominator: utility. The most obvious example of such preferences can be found in standard consumer theory where complete substitutability of every good is assumed in the sense that a loss of some units of one bundle can always be compensated by gain of some units of another commodity (such preferences are sometimes called Archimedian—see Borch 1968). This conception of preferences has a long history in economic thought and forms the basis of the standard rational choice theory (Hicks and Allen 1934, Samuelson 1938, Hicks 1946, Houthakker 1950).


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 66-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santosh C. Panda

Traditional rational choice theory assumes that the weak preference relation of an agent is an ordering that is it satisfies reflexivity, completeness and transitivity. It is also well known that the ordering property is essential to build the traditional ordinal utility analysis of consumer behaviour. However, there can be many situations when the weak preference relation of an agent may violate transitivity property, and hence, is not an ordering. In such situations traditional ordinal utility analysis breaks down. This paper develops a framework and discusses all the important results of rational choice theory when preferences are intransitive. It looks at weaker rationality properties such as quasi-transitivity and acyclicity and based on that it introduces weaker concepts of rationality such as quasi-transitive rationality and acyclic rationality and characterizes them. It also brings in the congruence axioms and property of path independence, and establishes the link with rationality. Finally, it analyzes how the results will change if we bring in restricted domain assumption of the choice function. JEL Classification: D01, D10, D11


OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh

Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.


Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This chapter discusses contractualist theories of justice that, although they rely explicitly on moral assumptions in the traditional understanding of morality, employ rational choice theory for the justification of principles of justice. In particular, the chapter focuses on the dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi about the correct choice of principles of justice in the original position. The chapter shows that there is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute and, ultimately, formal methods alone cannot justify moral principles. This finding is significant for the development of the rational decision situation that serves for the derivation of the weak principle of universalization for the domain of pure instrumental morality.


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