scholarly journals The Impacts of Green Innovation Input and Channel Service in a Dual-Channel Value Chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (22) ◽  
pp. 4566 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li ◽  
Chen ◽  
Huang ◽  
Gui ◽  
Liu
Keyword(s):  
Value Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Flip Bifurcation ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Channel Service

This paper constructs a dual-channel value chain composed of one altruistic manufacturer and one altruistic retailer, where the manufacturer makes green innovation input for green products and sells its green products to its customers through both the direct channel and the traditional channel, the retailer provides channel service for customers and sells green products through the traditional channel. We consider two scenarios in which the manufacturer and the retailer make decentralized and centralized decisions, respectively. We develop two dynamic game models for the two scenarios and analyze the dynamic behaviors of the two dynamic game models using bifurcation diagram, LLE (largest Lyapunov exponent) and attraction of basin, etc. We find that the stability region in decentralized decision model is greater than that of centralized decision, and narrow with increase of service value, green innovation input. In the decentralized decision model, the stability of the system decreases with the altruistic behavior increasing. With the price adjustment speed increasing, the dual-channel green value chain system enters into chaotic state through flip bifurcation or N-S bifurcation. In the stable state, the manufacturer and the retailer can obtain the maximum utility with the appropriate value of green innovation input. In the chaotic state, the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer are greatly affected and significantly reduced. This study will provide good guidance for sustainable development decision-making of dual-channel green value chain.

Analysis of Pricing and Service Effort in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Showrooming Effect

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (16) ◽  
pp. 2050241
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yaping Li ◽  
Zongxian Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Flip Bifurcation ◽  
Stability Range ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
The Stability

Showrooming has become common practice of consumers in the context of dual-channel retailing. Under different intensities of showrooming, the manufacturer can decide whether to directly retail online (the M-R case) or resell through an e-retailer (the E-R case). Dual-channel supply chain models and dynamic game models are developed and both online selling formats are investigated. The dynamic game process of the supply chain is numerically simulated. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point is investigated by parameter basins for periodical cycles and bifurcation diagrams. The results show that the price adjustment speeds have a larger stability range in the M-R case while the service effort adjustment speed has a larger stability range in the E-R case. The stability of the systems is more sensitive to price adjustment speed than service effort adjustment speed in both supply chain structures. It is found that the systems will enter chaos through a flip bifurcation or a Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. The changes in attractors and basins of attraction indicate that both channels can reach the equilibria more easily when they choose a lower speed of retail price adjustment. The effects of showrooming on decision variables are greater in the M-R case than in the E-R case. When the showrooming effect is moderate, the manufacturer should choose the M-R case; when the showrooming effect is sufficiently large or sufficiently small, the manufacturer should choose the E-R case. We propose a wholesale price markdown strategy which can: (i) eliminate the double marginalization and coordinate the supply chain; (ii) effectively control the chaos caused by the overhigh adjustment speed of wholesale price, and restore the system to a stable state; (iii) improve the retailer’s service effort.

scholarly journals The Complexity and Entropy Analysis for Service Game Model Based on Different Expectations and Optimal Pricing

Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (11) ◽  
pp. 858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yimin Huang ◽  
Xingli Chen ◽  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Xiaogang Ma
Keyword(s):  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Feedback Parameter ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Offline Channels ◽  
Channel Service

The internet has provided a new means for manufacturers to reach consumers. On the background of the widespread multichannel sales in China, based on a literature review of the service game and multichannel supply chain, this paper builds a multichannel dynamic service game model where the retailer operates an offline channel and the manufacturer operates an online channel and offers customers the option to buy online and pick up from the retailer’s store (BOPS). The manufacturer and the retailer take maximizing the channel profits as their business objectives and make channel service game under optimal pricing. We carry on theoretical analysis of the model and perform numerical simulations from the perspective of entropy theory, game theory, and chaotic dynamics. The results show that the stability of the system will weaken with the increase in service elasticity coefficient and that it is unaffected by the feedback parameter adjustment of the retailer. The BOPS channel strengthens the cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer and moderates the conflict between the online and the offline channels. The system will go into chaotic state and cause the system’s entropy to increase when the manufacturer adjusts his/her service decision quickly. In a chaotic state, the system is sensitive to initial conditions and service input is difficult to predict; the manufacturer and retailer need more additional information to make the system clear or use the method of feedback control to delay or eliminate the occurrence of chaos.

scholarly journals The Entropy Complexity of an Asymmetric Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Probabilistic Selling

Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yimin Huang ◽  
Qiuxiang Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Flip Bifurcation ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Considering consumers’ attitudes to risks for probabilistic products and probabilistic selling, this paper develops a dynamic Stackelberg game model of the supply chain considering the asymmetric dual-channel structure. Based on entropy theory and dynamic theory, we analyze and simulate the influences of decision variables and parameters on the stability and entropy of asymmetric dual-channel supply chain systems using bifurcation, entropy diagram, the parameter plot basin, attractor, etc. The results show that decision variables and parameters have great impacts on the stability of asymmetric dual-channel supply chains; the supply chain system will enter chaos through flip bifurcation or Neimark–Sacker bifurcation with the increase of the system entropy, and thus the system is more complex and falls into a chaotic state, with its entropy increased. The stability of the system can become robust with the increase of the probability that product a becomes a probabilistic product, and it weakens with the increase of the risk preference of customers for probabilistic products and the relative bargaining power of the retailer. A manufacturer using the direct selling channel may obtain greater profit than one using traditional selling channels. Using the method of parameter adjustment and feedback control, the entropy of the supply chain system will decline, and the supply chain system will fall into a stable state. Therefore, in the actual market of probabilistic selling, the manufacturers and retailers should pay attention to the parameters and adjustment speed of prices and ensure the stability of the game process and the orderliness of the dual-channel supply chain.

scholarly journals Hopf Bifurcation and Chaos of a Delayed Finance System

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuebing Zhang ◽  
Honglan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Hopf Bifurcation ◽  
Center Manifold ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Bifurcation And Chaos ◽  
Finance System ◽  
Center Manifold Theorem ◽  
Normal Form Method ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, a finance system with delay is considered. By analyzing the corresponding characteristic equations, the local stability of equilibrium is established. The existence of Hopf bifurcations at the equilibrium is also discussed. Furthermore, formulas for determining the direction of Hopf bifurcation and the stability of the bifurcating periodic solutions are derived by applying the normal form method and center manifold theorem. Finally, numerical simulation results are presented to validate the theoretical analysis. Numerical simulation results show that delay can lead a stable system into a chaotic state.

Channel structure and differential pricing strategies in dual-channel e-retail considering e-platform business models

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-114
Author(s):  
Yufang Fu ◽  
Bojun Gu ◽  
Yuying Xie ◽  
Jun Ye ◽  
Bin Cao
Keyword(s):  
Service Quality ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
The Self ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Preference ◽  
Retail Prices

Abstract Although online business has been growing for some time, third-party e-platforms and their impact on e-channels are an under-explored area in the literature on dual-channel supply chains. Considering different combinations of open and self-support e-platform, this paper develops dynamic game models in four dual-channel e-retail structures to study pricing strategies and channel preference for manufacturers. The results provide interesting insights. First, a manufacturer’s optimal prices vary in different e-channels. Second, e-retail prices on the self-support e-platform and open e-platform are both affected by the e-platform’s service quality and commission fee. Regardless of the channel structure, a better service quality by one e-platform leads to an increase in its own e-retail prices and forces the competing e-platform to either improve its service quality or take a lower price. Lastly and more importantly, we compare the manufacturer’s pricing strategies and performances in different dual-channel e-retail structures and identify its preferences. Specifically, if the commission fee is dynamic, we find that the manufacturer always prefers to use two e-channels provided by different e-platforms, and at least one of the e-channels is the self-support model, although it is a sub-optimal strategy.

scholarly journals Complexity Analysis of Pricing in a Multichannel Supply Chain with Spillovers from Online to Offline Sales

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Fengxia Mai ◽  
Jianxiong Zhang ◽  
Rui Yang ◽  
Xiaojie Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Period Doubling ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Adjustment Strategy ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
The Stability

In recent years, many manufacturers have been selling their products to online consumers through e-tailers by adopting reselling mode and agency selling mode simultaneously. The sales from the online channels inevitably incur spillover effect to the traditional offline channels. This paper develops a dynamic pricing game model on the basis of a long-term gradient adjustment mechanism for a multichannel supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and an e-tailer and focuses on examining the impacts of spillover effect, agency fee, and adjustment speed on the stability and complexity of the dynamic game system. The results show that both a greater spillover effect and a higher agency fee can make the dynamic game system more stable, and a higher adjustment speed can destabilize the dynamic game system through period doubling bifurcation. Furthermore, it is interesting to find that the destabilization of the game system benefits the e-tailer and the supply chain while having little influence on the manufacturer, and thus the dynamic adjustment strategy may improve the supply chain efficiency.

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