scholarly journals Study on the Selection Strategy of Supply Chain Financing Modes Based on the Retailer’s Trade Grade

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianjun Yu ◽  
Dan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Bankruptcy Risk ◽  
Financing Cost ◽  
Financing Mode ◽  
Supply Chain Financing ◽  
Internal Financing

In the supply chain financing (SCF) system composed of a capital-constrained retailer, a supplier and a commercial bank, we design two different limited financing modes (internal financing and external financing) based on the retailer’s collateral assets. A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order goods from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. In the presence of bankruptcy risk for the retailer, we model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and analyze the optimal decisions for each participant. Regardless of which financing mode is chosen, the capital-constrained retailer orders fewer goods if the financing cost is relatively high. In addition, when the market demand obeys the uniform distribution, if the retailer possesses more collateral assets, he will enjoy a lower loan interest rate and increase order quantity gradually. Moreover, compared with the internal financing mode, each participant obtains the larger expected profits under the external financing mode.

scholarly journals Financing and pricing strategies of construction supply chain under capital constraint

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Internal Financing ◽  
Decision Making Model

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

Discussion on how to apply the supply chain financing for construction enterprises to get out of the market

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xingyu Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Management Support ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Construction Market ◽  
Financing Mode ◽  
Mode Of Application ◽  
Supply Chain Financing ◽  
Building Market

<p class="18">This paper mainly aimed at China's construction market downturn, current situation of building construction enterprise capital turnover difficult, seek countermeasure actively, think that the biggest problem facing China's construction enterprises at this stage is the source of the problem and funding problems, the so-called Chunwangchihan, construction enterprises must like replacing business tax with value-added tax(VAT) principle, to ensure the supply chain financing management. Support for upstream enterprises, and support for their own use of the upstream and downstream enterprises, this paper first through the traditional financing mode of construction enterprise limited to application of supply chain financing mode in construction enterprises are analyzed, finally the risk prevention in order to put forward some reasonable proposals. In order to solve the main problems of China's construction enterprises in the mode of application of supply chain financing, and help the downstream enterprises to exist in the reform trend of building market surging in the construction industry for the long-term, healthy, stable development of help.</p>

An Uncertain Supply Chain Problem with Sales Effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1037-1045
Author(s):  
Lengceng Gao ◽  
◽  
Jiayu Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Uncertain Variables ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Uncertain Supply ◽  
Constrained Models ◽  
Chain Problem

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain problem that includes a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer plays a leading role in the supply chain and must make efforts to increase sales. Due to many uncertain factors in business, the market demand, manufacturing costs and retail operating costs are assumed to be uncertain variables. Expected and chance-constrained models are developed to address these uncertain variables. Stackelberg game is used to solve the proposed models. The equilibrium optimal wholesale price and unit margin are provided in order to determine the maximum profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

scholarly journals Warranty Decision Model and Remanufacturing Coordination Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: View from a Consumer Behavior Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Service

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.

Pricing supply chain option contracts: a bilevel programming approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 1567-1589
Author(s):  
Abir Trabelsi ◽  
Hiroaki Matsukawa
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy

Purpose This paper considers an option contract in a two-stage supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) when market demand is stochastic. The problem is a Stackelberg game with the supplier as a leader. This research assumes demand information sharing. The purpose of this study is to determine the optimal pricing strategy of the supplier along with the optimal order strategy of the retailer in three option contract cases. Design/methodology/approach The paper model the option contract pricing problem as a bilevel problem. The problem is then solved using bilevel programing methods. After computing, the generated outcomes are compared to a benchmark (wholesale price contract) to evaluate the contract. Findings The results reveal that only one of the contract cases can arbitrarily allocate the SC profit. In both other cases, the Stackelberg supplier manages to earn the total SC profit. Further analysis of the first contract, show that from the supplier’s perspective, the first stage forecast inaccuracy is beneficial, whereas the demand uncertainty in the second stage is detrimental. This contracting strategy guarantees both players better outcomes compared to the wholesale price contract. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research is the first that links the option contract literature to the bilevel programing literature. It also the first to solve the pricing problem of the commitment option contract with demand update where the retailer exercises the option before knowing the exact demand.

scholarly journals Coordination Mechanism of Dual-Channel Supply Chains Considering Retailer Innovation Inputs

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wensheng Yang ◽  
Yinyuan Si ◽  
Jinxing Zhang ◽  
Sen Liu ◽  
Andrea Appolloni
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Operational Efficiency ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Physical Channel ◽  
Retail Prices

In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers’ innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer’s product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains.

An Analysis of Financing Modes of Small and Medium Manufacturing Enterprises in the Environment of Supply Chain in China

2012 ◽  
Vol 235 ◽  
pp. 303-308
Author(s):  
Jin Zha ◽  
Hui Yuan Jiang ◽  
Qing Song Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Financing Mode ◽  
Supply Chain Financing ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Medium Enterprises ◽  
The Way

The supply chain financing mode became an important factor that drives the development of the small and medium enterprises, through which they can collect more money from banks and improve the competitiveness of the whole supply chain. In conclusion, the way to solve the financing problems of the small and middle enterprises is the key issues that need to be considered by the enterprises which are core parts of the supply chains.

Coordination contract for a competitive pharmaceutical supply chain considering corporate social responsibility and pricing decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 1515-1535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Johari ◽  
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Substitutable Products ◽  
Corporate Social

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and pricing decisions are proposed for a competitive two-level pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) comprising two pharma-manufacturers and one pharma-retailer. In the investigated PSC, the pharma-manufacturers competitively invest in the CSR effort to produce a new medicine and sell two substitutable products to the market through the pharma-retailer, deciding on selling prices of manufacturers’ products. The PSC under consideration is modeled in three decision-making structures, i.e., decentralized, centralized, and coordinated models. In the decentralized model, the pricing and CSR decisions are individually obtained using a pharma-manufacturers–Stackelberg game structure. In the centralized model as a benchmark, the best performance of the entire PSC system is achieved. Finally, to encourage all PSC members to agree on the coordination plan, a CSR cost-sharing contract is proposed. Our results reveal that under competitive environment, the proposed CSR cost-sharing contract is able to increase market demand by significantly decreasing selling prices and increasing level of the CSR efforts.

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