An Uncertain Supply Chain Problem with Sales Effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1037-1045
Author(s):  
Lengceng Gao ◽  
◽  
Jiayu Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Uncertain Variables ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Uncertain Supply ◽  
Constrained Models ◽  
Chain Problem

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain problem that includes a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer plays a leading role in the supply chain and must make efforts to increase sales. Due to many uncertain factors in business, the market demand, manufacturing costs and retail operating costs are assumed to be uncertain variables. Expected and chance-constrained models are developed to address these uncertain variables. Stackelberg game is used to solve the proposed models. The equilibrium optimal wholesale price and unit margin are provided in order to determine the maximum profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

Pricing supply chain option contracts: a bilevel programming approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 1567-1589
Author(s):  
Abir Trabelsi ◽  
Hiroaki Matsukawa
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy

Purpose This paper considers an option contract in a two-stage supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) when market demand is stochastic. The problem is a Stackelberg game with the supplier as a leader. This research assumes demand information sharing. The purpose of this study is to determine the optimal pricing strategy of the supplier along with the optimal order strategy of the retailer in three option contract cases. Design/methodology/approach The paper model the option contract pricing problem as a bilevel problem. The problem is then solved using bilevel programing methods. After computing, the generated outcomes are compared to a benchmark (wholesale price contract) to evaluate the contract. Findings The results reveal that only one of the contract cases can arbitrarily allocate the SC profit. In both other cases, the Stackelberg supplier manages to earn the total SC profit. Further analysis of the first contract, show that from the supplier’s perspective, the first stage forecast inaccuracy is beneficial, whereas the demand uncertainty in the second stage is detrimental. This contracting strategy guarantees both players better outcomes compared to the wholesale price contract. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research is the first that links the option contract literature to the bilevel programing literature. It also the first to solve the pricing problem of the commitment option contract with demand update where the retailer exercises the option before knowing the exact demand.

scholarly journals Myopic versus Far-Sighted Behaviors in Dynamic Supply Chain Coordination through Advertising with Reference Price Effect

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yafei Zu ◽  
Lianghua Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Price Effect ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Behavior Choice

To better understand the different effects of the myopic and far-sighted behaviors on the advertising coordination in dynamic supply chain, this paper takes the reference price effect into consideration and formulates four differential game models for the two-level supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer in the situation of Stackelberg game. In our models, the market demand is assumed to be affected by the goodwill, reference price, and the advertising investment, in which the advertising investment can promote the construction of goodwill and such goodwill can further enhance the reference price. The results show that the participating members in the supply chain should invest more in advertisement to improve the goodwill and the relative reference price reflected in the minds of consumers. A far-sighted manufacturer will invest more in the advertisement and charge a higher wholesale price regardless of the behavior choice of the retailer. However, such kind of ignorance leads to different results on the retail pricing strategies of the retailer. The numerical analyses are given in the end to verify the effectiveness of the conclusions which provide the theoretical support to the dynamic supply chain coordination in practice.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

Procedural fairness concerns in supply chain with retailer promotional effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tengfei Nie ◽  
Hualin Liu ◽  
Yilun Dong ◽  
Shaofu Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Fair Process ◽  
Slotting Allowances ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Distributional Fairness

Purpose The existing literature has a lack of modeling of procedural fairness concerns in the supply chain level. This paper aims to investigate how procedural fairness concerns affect channel decisions, performance and coordination. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer who have procedural fairness concerns in a classic Stackelberg game setting. The model is set in sales promotional environment. According to the existing literature, engagement is used to depict fair process. Some findings are made through analyzing respective decisions of the supplier and the retailer under the influence of procedural fairness concerns. Findings The results show that the channel efficiency can be improved when the retailer exhibits procedural fairness concerns, but if the aversion to unfair process exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer cannot benefit from it. Besides, the retailer profits more when he cares about distributional fairness, although the whole channel surplus can be improved by procedural fairness concerns. Originality/value This is the first paper to study the influences of procedural fairness concerns on supply chain decisions and channel performance. Finally, a mechanism combining a wholesale price contract with slotting allowances is proposed to coordinate the supply chain.

scholarly journals Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xinhui Wang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Zihan Zhou ◽  
Yiling Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Market Outlook

This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respectively. They commit an initial agreement on an initial wholesale price, minimum order quantity, and information sharing as well as the transfer payment and decisions adjustment when information is updated. We find that due to the joint impact of production cost variation and market variation, the manufacturer may not decrease (increase) her wholesale price when the updated production cost is lower (higher) than expected. The retailer places an additional order even if the wholesale price rises when the market outlook is good, but places an order with the minimum order quantity even if the wholesale price falls when the market outlook is bad. Secondly, for a certain level of information accuracy of the production cost and market demand, the retailer is always better off with information updating, but the manufacturer may be worse off with information updating when facing a bad market outlook. Thirdly, when information accuracy of the production cost and market demand varies, the manufacturer only benefits from a high accuracy of production cost. Profits of the retailer and the supply chain are increasing (decreasing) with accuracy of production cost if the updated production cost is larger (smaller) than expected.

Retailer’s decision selection with dual supply uncertainties under different reliability levels of serving the market

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 883-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhibing Liu ◽  
Geni Xu ◽  
Chi Zhou ◽  
Huiru Chen
Keyword(s):  
Demand Management ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Uncertainty ◽  
Reliability Level ◽  
Adjustment Strategy ◽  
Uncertain Supply ◽  
Selection Of

The main reason why supply uncertainty reduces supply chain performance is that it is difficult to estimate whether uncertain supply matches demand. Seldom do papers study retailers’ decision-selection problems according to the reliability of uncertain supply in satisfying demand. This paper considers the optimal decision selection of a retailer working with a main supplier facing supply uncertainty and a backup supplier whose yield is infinite or uncertain. The retailer can enforce demand management by adjusting prices, seeking the backup supplier to make up for the lack of products or mixing the two decisions. We provide the definition called the reliability level of serving the market (RLSM) to characterize the reliability of uncertain supply in satisfying market demand. Under different RLSMs, the participants maximize their profits based on a confidence level in three scenarios: benchmark, infinite backup supply and uncertain backup supply. Whether the main supplier determines the wholesale price or not, we find that in the benchmark, the retailer orders from the main supplier if the RLSM is low; otherwise, the retailer gives up purchasing the product. In the latter two scenarios, our results show that the particular order strategy chosen by the retailer depends on the values of the RLSM and that the retailer’s order quantity follows threshold rules. It is interesting that for different RLSMs, the retailer chooses either a price adjustment strategy, a backup supply strategy or neither of them but does not choose the mixed one, which is counterintuitive. We also derive the particular scenario that is good for the retailer by comparing the results in the three scenarios. Finally, a proper RLSM is suggested for the retailer to balance the reliability of serving the market and her profit.

scholarly journals Study on the Selection Strategy of Supply Chain Financing Modes Based on the Retailer’s Trade Grade

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianjun Yu ◽  
Dan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Bankruptcy Risk ◽  
Financing Cost ◽  
Financing Mode ◽  
Supply Chain Financing ◽  
Internal Financing

In the supply chain financing (SCF) system composed of a capital-constrained retailer, a supplier and a commercial bank, we design two different limited financing modes (internal financing and external financing) based on the retailer’s collateral assets. A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order goods from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. In the presence of bankruptcy risk for the retailer, we model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and analyze the optimal decisions for each participant. Regardless of which financing mode is chosen, the capital-constrained retailer orders fewer goods if the financing cost is relatively high. In addition, when the market demand obeys the uniform distribution, if the retailer possesses more collateral assets, he will enjoy a lower loan interest rate and increase order quantity gradually. Moreover, compared with the internal financing mode, each participant obtains the larger expected profits under the external financing mode.

scholarly journals Incentive Mechanism for Sustainable Improvement in a Supply Chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (13) ◽  
pp. 3508 ◽  
Author(s):  
EuiBeom Jeong ◽  
GeunWan Park ◽  
Seung Ho Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Quality ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Sustainable Improvement ◽  
Profit Performance

In this study, we consider the issue of sustainable development in the supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM). We investigate how to facilitate the CM’s investment in the environmental quality of a product so as to properly respond to climate change. We introduce a quantity incentive contract, and obtain the optimal solution based on a Stackelberg game. The OEM, as the focal company, determines the level of the incentive, and the CM, responsible for product design and production, determines its level of environmental quality given the OEM’s incentive offer. To investigate the effectiveness of the quantity incentive contract and provide important implications, we analytically compare the quantity incentive contract with the basic wholesale price contract without any incentives and conduct numerical experiments. Our results reveal that the quantity incentive contract facilitates the CM’s investment in environmental quality, and enhances the environmental, market, and profit performance of not only the CM but also the OEM which pays the incentive. We also show that the quantity incentive contract is suitable to develop a long-term relationship between the OEM and the CM.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document