scholarly journals Managing Procurement for a Firm with Two Ordering Opportunities under Supply Disruption Risk

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Ya Xu ◽  
Lipan Feng
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Mean Value ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Disruption ◽  
Exercise Price ◽  
Procurement Price ◽  
Disruption Risk ◽  
Demand Variability ◽  
Procurement Strategies

Supply disruption is a common phenomenon in industry, which brings destructive effects to downstream firms and damages the sustainability of the supply chain. To mitigate the supply disruption risk, the authors investigate two types of procurement strategies for a firm with two ordering opportunities. Through establishing Stackelberg game models, the authors drive the supplier’s optimal production, and the firm’s optimal procurement and replenishment strategies under the option purchase (OP) strategy and the procurement commitment (PC) strategy, respectively. The findings show that, under both types of strategies, the firm’s procurement follows a “threshold” principle. Moreover, the firm’s procurement quantity can be represented by two newsvendor solutions. A lower option price or option exercise price benefits the firm, while it damages the supplier. The supplier benefits from a higher mean value (MV) of emergency procurement price and the firm benefits from a lower market demand variability. Counter-intuitively, a lower MV of the emergency procurement price is not always beneficial to the firm. A higher market demand variability could be beneficial to the supplier under the PC strategy. The firm should first choose the PC strategy and then change to the OP strategy as the disruption risk increases.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

scholarly journals Retailer’s Emergency Ordering Policy when Facing an Impending Supply Disruption

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (13) ◽  
pp. 7041
Author(s):  
Jingfu Huang ◽  
Gaoke Wu ◽  
Yiju Wang
Keyword(s):  
Optimization Model ◽  
Numerical Experiments ◽  
Closed Form Solution ◽  
Form Solution ◽  
Model Solution ◽  
Inventory Cost ◽  
Supply Disruption ◽  
Procurement Policy ◽  
Ordering Policy ◽  
Procurement Strategies

Supply disruption is a common phenomenon in business activities. For the case where the supply disruption is predictable, the retailer should make an emergency procurement beforehand to decrease the inventory cost. For the scenario such that the happening time of the supply disruption obeys a certain common probability distribution but the ending time of the supply disruption is deterministic, based on minimizing the inventory cost and under two possible procurement strategies, we establish an emergency procurement optimization model. By considering the model solution in all cases, we establish a closed-form solution to the optimization model and provide an optimal emergency procurement policy to the retailer. Some numerical experiments are made to test the validity of the model and the effect of the involved parameters on the emergency procurement policy.

scholarly journals Study on the Selection Strategy of Supply Chain Financing Modes Based on the Retailer’s Trade Grade

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianjun Yu ◽  
Dan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Bankruptcy Risk ◽  
Financing Cost ◽  
Financing Mode ◽  
Supply Chain Financing ◽  
Internal Financing

In the supply chain financing (SCF) system composed of a capital-constrained retailer, a supplier and a commercial bank, we design two different limited financing modes (internal financing and external financing) based on the retailer’s collateral assets. A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order goods from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. In the presence of bankruptcy risk for the retailer, we model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and analyze the optimal decisions for each participant. Regardless of which financing mode is chosen, the capital-constrained retailer orders fewer goods if the financing cost is relatively high. In addition, when the market demand obeys the uniform distribution, if the retailer possesses more collateral assets, he will enjoy a lower loan interest rate and increase order quantity gradually. Moreover, compared with the internal financing mode, each participant obtains the larger expected profits under the external financing mode.

scholarly journals PENENTUAN HARGA OPSI BELI TIPE ASIA DENGAN METODE MONTE CARLO-CONTROL VARIATE

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
NI NYOMAN AYU ARTANADI ◽  
KOMANG DHARMAWAN ◽  
KETUT JAYANEGARA
Keyword(s):  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Standard Error ◽  
Asset Price ◽  
Option Price ◽  
Asian Option ◽  
Underlying Asset ◽  
Average Value ◽  
Control Variate ◽  
Exercise Price ◽  
Maturity Date

Option is a contract between the writer and the holder which entitles the holder to buy or sell an underlying asset at the maturity date for a specified price known as an exercise price. Asian option is a type of financial derivatives which the payoff taking the average value over the time series of the asset price. The aim of the study is to present the Monte Carlo-Control Variate as an extension of Standard Monte Carlo applied on the calculation of the Asian option price. Standard Monte Carlo simulations 10.000.000 generate standard error 0.06 and the option price convergent at Rp.160.00 while Monte Carlo-Control Variate simulations 100.000 generate standard error 0.01 and the option price convergent at Rp.152.00. This shows the Monte Carlo-Control Variate achieve faster option price toward convergent of the Monte Carlo Standar.

An Uncertain Supply Chain Problem with Sales Effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1037-1045
Author(s):  
Lengceng Gao ◽  
◽  
Jiayu Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Uncertain Variables ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Uncertain Supply ◽  
Constrained Models ◽  
Chain Problem

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain problem that includes a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer plays a leading role in the supply chain and must make efforts to increase sales. Due to many uncertain factors in business, the market demand, manufacturing costs and retail operating costs are assumed to be uncertain variables. Expected and chance-constrained models are developed to address these uncertain variables. Stackelberg game is used to solve the proposed models. The equilibrium optimal wholesale price and unit margin are provided in order to determine the maximum profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

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