scholarly journals Financially Qualified Members in an Upper Echelon and Their Relationship with Corporate Sustainability: Evidence from an Emerging Economy

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashfaque Banbhan ◽  
Xinsheng Cheng ◽  
Nizam Ud Din
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Corporate Sustainability ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Top Management Teams ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Upper Echelon ◽  
Board Diversity

Non-observable board diversity is an important organizational strategy for improving the long-term growth and survivability of firms. The involvement of corporate sustainability (CS) in top management teams has led to effective boards. By using agency theory, we stress how financially qualified directors (FQD) in audit committees (ACs) may positively or negatively affect the practice of earnings management (EM). We also use various theories to explain how a powerful chief executive officer (CEO) complicates the effectiveness of AC and reduces their ability to detect EM practices. Using a sample of 1020 firm-year observations representing 204 non-financial listed Pakistani firms during 2013–2017, we find that the presence of FQD on the AC is associated with lower levels of EM. Our analysis shows that this effect is driven by the level of FQDs’ accounting knowledge.

scholarly journals Praktik Manajemen Laba dan Reaksi Pasar Setelah Event Pergantian Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Desak Nyoman Sri Juliartini ◽  
Ida Bagus Putra Astika
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Total Sample ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Analysis Technique

This research is to prove after the change of chief executive officer (CEO) of earnings management practices and market reaction. The total sample taken was using the nonprabability sampling method with a purposive sampling technique of 48 companies on the IDX which included the LQ45 index. The analysis technique used is simple linear regression and paired sample t-test on the DA and PER values of the company. Based on the results of the analysis found that there is no effect of earnings management on market reaction after one and two years of CEO turnover. These results prove that there is no important information on the announcement of CEO turnover, so it is less able to make significant stock price fluctuations. The next result is no difference in both earnings management and market reaction that occurs one and two years after CEO turnover. Keywords: Chief Executive Officer (CEO); Earning Management; Market Reaction; Price Earning Ratio (PER).

The Exploratory Mindset and Corporate Innovation

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Zhaozhao He ◽  
David Hirshleifer
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Market Reactions ◽  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
Long Run

Abstract We propose that chief executive officer (CEO) exploratory mindset (inherent desire to search for novel ideas and long-term orientation) promotes innovation. Firms with CEOs with PhD degrees (PhD CEOs) produce more exploratory patents with greater novelty, generality, and originality. PhD CEOs engage less in managing earnings and stock prices, invest more in research and development (R&D) and alliances, generate higher long-term value of patents, and experience more positive market reactions to R&D alliances. Their firms achieve superior long-run operating performance. They tend to be hired by research-intensive firms with poor financial performance. Evidence from managerial incentive shocks and turnovers suggests that these effects do not derive solely from CEO–firm matching.

scholarly journals Co-opted boards and earnings management: Evidence of reduced short-termist behavior

2021 ◽  
pp. 234094442098757
Author(s):  
Oneil Harris ◽  
Asligul Erkan
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Job Security ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Short Termism ◽  
Robust Evidence

This study contributes to the emerging literature on board co-option by examining how and to what extent co-opted directors influence managers’ attitudes about earnings management. We find robust evidence that co-option mitigates both real activities and accrual-based earnings management. Our findings support the view that higher co-option reduces managerial short-termism because it enhances managers’ job security as co-opted directors are known to be less likely to remove managers from office. Our results are robust to different measures of both co-option and earnings management, and they continue to hold after accounting for endogeneity and selection concerns. Finally, we provide additional evidence showing that a higher degree of co-option lowers the likelihood of the chief executive officer (CEO) being forcefully removed from the office for managing earnings in the previous year. JEL CLASSIFICATION G30; G34; G39

scholarly journals Female executive dan manajemen laba: Riset pada perusahaan manufaktur di Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-27
Author(s):  
Anindya Setya Suciani ◽  
Hari Purnama
Keyword(s):  
Linear Regression ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Chief Financial Officer ◽  
Female Executives ◽  
Regression Test ◽  
Independent Variable

This study aims to test the effect of female executives on earnings management. The research was conducted at the manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2015-2017 period. The purposive sampling was used 75 companies as data sample. Multiple linear regression test is used to see the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The result of the analysis shows that the Female Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Female Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Female Board of Commissioner does not influence earnings management. Whereas, the growth variable affects earnings management

scholarly journals PROFESIONAL FEE, PERGANTIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO), FINANCIAL DISTRESS DAN REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bahtiar Effendi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Purposive Sampling

Profesional Fee, Pergantian Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Financial Distress, dan Real Earnings Management. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh profesional fee, pergantian CEO dan financial distress terhadap real earnings management pada perusahaan manufaktur yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama periode tahun 2015-2017. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah seluruh perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2015-2017. Sampel penelitian ditentukan berdasarkan metode purposive sampling yang dipilih dengan beberapa kriteria tertentu. Jenis data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah data sekunder. Analisis data menggunakan analisis regresi linier berganda dengan menggunakan SPSS versi 26 sebagai alat analisis. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa profesional fee berpengaruh negatif dan tidak signifikan terhadap real earnings management; pergantian CEO berpengaruh positif dan tidak signifikan terhadap real earnings management; dan financial distress berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap real earnings management.

CEO Overconfidence and International Merger and Acquisition Activity

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Ferris ◽  
Narayanan Jayaraman ◽  
Sanjiv Sabherwal
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Sample Period ◽  
National Cultures ◽  
Merger Activity ◽  
International Mergers ◽  
International Phenomenon ◽  
Critical Aspects

AbstractThis study examines the role that chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence plays in an explanation of international mergers and acquisitions during the period 2000–2006. Using a sample of CEOs of Fortune Global 500 firms over our sample period, we find that CEO overconfidence is related to a number of critical aspects of international merger activity. Overconfidence helps to explain the number of offers made by a CEO, the frequencies of nondiversifying and diversifying acquisitions, and the use of cash to finance a merger deal. Although overconfidence is an international phenomenon, it is most extensively observed in individuals heading firms headquartered in Christian countries that encourage individualism while de-emphasizing long-term orientation in their national cultures.

scholarly journals Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Board Monitoring

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (5) ◽  
pp. 929-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
Fei Xie ◽  
Min Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Industry Expertise

AbstractWe examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness. We find that the presence of independent directors with industry experience on a firm’s audit committee significantly curtails firms’ earnings management. In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm’s compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence of such directors on the full board increases the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and improves acquirer returns from diversifying acquisitions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that having relevant industry expertise enhances independent directors’ ability to perform their monitoring function.

scholarly journals Reasons for and implications of the presence of institutional investors in the ownership structure of Brazilian companies

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 598-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lélis Pedro de Andrade ◽  
Aureliano Angel Bressan ◽  
Robert Aldo Iquiapaza ◽  
Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Equity Funding

Using 3,057 observations from 2000 to 2012, we found the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is positively associated with participation of institutional investors in equity funding. There is no evidence that these investors increase the likelihood of substituting the chief executive officer or increase the company’s value or its financial performance. However, the presence of institutional investors is associated with higher company debt. This study suggests that institutional investors assume a function not fully explained by agency theory, such as enabling greater access to debt markets, but accentuate the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. The main results show that the presence of institutional investors mitigates agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, but increases the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders.

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