An Analysis the Relationship between Firm"s Environmental Characteristics, Probability of Window Dressing and Financial Distress, and Earnings Management, and the Different Types of Chief Executive Officer

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 609-628
Author(s):  
Jong-Ok Lim
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bahtiar Effendi

Profesional Fee, Pergantian Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Financial Distress, dan Real Earnings Management. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh profesional fee, pergantian CEO dan financial distress terhadap real earnings management pada perusahaan manufaktur yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama periode tahun 2015-2017. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah seluruh perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2015-2017. Sampel penelitian ditentukan berdasarkan metode purposive sampling yang dipilih dengan beberapa kriteria tertentu. Jenis data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah data sekunder. Analisis data menggunakan analisis regresi linier berganda dengan menggunakan SPSS versi 26 sebagai alat analisis. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa profesional fee berpengaruh negatif dan tidak signifikan terhadap real earnings management; pergantian CEO berpengaruh positif dan tidak signifikan terhadap real earnings management; dan financial distress berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap real earnings management.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Dody Hapsoro ◽  
Adrianus Billy Hartomo

<p align="center"><em>The objective of this research is to provide empirical evidence of the effect of financial distress toward earnings management and the effect of financial distress toward earnings management that moderated by corporate governance. Financial distress consists of DISTRESS1, DISTRESS2 and DISTRESS3. Earnings management was measured by discretionary accruals using Jones Model, and corporate governance consists of three variables (board of directors, independent commissioner, and audit committee). Board of directors was measured by total board of directors in the firm included chief executive officer (CEO)</em>.<em> I</em><em>ndependent commissioner was measured by the proportion of independent commissioner that is total independent commissioner divided by total board of commissioner and audit committee was measured by total member of audit committee. Control variable in this research is firm size that was measured by logarithm of asset total. The population of this research is 423 non-financial companies were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The research data were collected from non-financial companies annual report for the period of 2014. Based on purposive sampling method, there are 62 samples. The research hypothesis were tested by using multiple regression analysis. The results of this research in Model 1 show that firm size variable has significant relationship with earnings management, while DISTRESS1 variable, DISTRESS2 variable, and DISTRESS3 variable have no significant relationship with earnings management. The result of this research in Model 2 show that DISTRESS3 variable, independent commissioner variable, and interaction between financial distress with corporate governance variable have significant relationship with earnings management, while DISTRESS1 variable, DISTRESS2 variable, board of directors variable, audit committee variable, and firm size variable have no significant with relationship earnings management.</em></p><p><em><br /></em></p><p align="center"><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p align="center"><strong><em> </em></strong></p><p>Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk memberikan bukti empiris pengaruh kesulitan keuangan terhadap manajemen laba dan pengaruh kesulitan keuangan terhadap manajemen laba yang dimoderasi oleh tata kelola perusahaan. Kesulitan keuangan terdiri dari DISTRESS1, DISTRESS2 dan DISTRESS3. Manajemen laba diukur dengan menggunakan akrual diskresioner yang mengaplikasikan Model Jones, dan tata kelola perusahaan terdiri dari tiga variabel (dewan direksi, komisaris independen, dan komite audit). Direksi diukur dengan menggunakan jumlah dewan direksi di dalam perusahaan termasuk chief executive officer (CEO). Komisaris independen diukur dengan menggunakan proporsi komisaris independen dimana total komisaris independen dibagi dengan total dewan komite komisaris, dan komite audit diukur dengan menggunakan jumlah anggota komite audit. Variabel kontrol dalam penelitian ini adalah ukuran perusahaan yang diukur dengan menggunakan logaritma total aset. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah 423 perusahaan non keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI). Data penelitian dikumpulkan dari laporan tahunan perusahaan non-keuangan untuk periode 2014. Berdasarkan metode purposive sampling terdapat  62 sampel penelitian. Hipotesis dalam penelitian ini diuji dengan menggunakan analisis regresi berganda. Hasil penelitian pada Model 1 menunjukkan bahwa ukuran perusahaan memiliki hubungan yang signifikan dengan manajemen laba, sedangkan variabel DISTRESS1, variabel DISTRESS2, dan variabel DISTRESS3 tidak memiliki hubungan yang signifikan dengan manajemen laba. Hasil penelitian pada Model 2 menunjukkan bahwa variabel DISTRESS3, komisaris independen, dan interaksi antara kesulitan keuangan dengan tata kelola perusahaan memiliki hubungan yang signifikan dengan manajemen laba, sedangkan variabel DISTRESS1, variabel DISTRESS2, dewan direksi, komite audit, dan ukuran perusahaan tidak memiliki hubungan signifikan dengan manajemen laba.<em><br /></em></p>


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 128-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yash P. Gupta

Information technology (IT) has become a strategic resource for many firms today. Coordination of this resource requires strong leadership and cooperation within the firm. The relationship of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Information Officer (CIO) is crucial for the effective, successful utilization of IT for competitive advantage. This paper first explores the CIO position, giving reasons for its development, tracing its evolution, and pinpointing certain responsibilities associated with the position. The paper then highlights the CIO's concerns and identifies the future implications for the CIO. The second portion of the paper takes the CEO's perspective towards IT and the CIO's position. Special attention is directed towards describing the CEO's perspective on the CIO's qualifications, addressing the problem of overblown CEO expectations for the CIO position, and discussing ‘old-line’ CEOs’ attitudes towards IT and the CIO position. Also addressed is the exploration of the common CEO perception of the CIO as an ‘empire builder’ and an analysis of the CEO's perspective on the future need for a CIO position. Finally the paper focuses on developing this ‘strategic partnership’ between the CIO and the CEO. Suggestions are provided for the CIO and the CEO to help achieve this ideal partnership. Although these suggestions are not all conclusive, they are critical to the ‘partnership’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oheneba Assenso-Okofo ◽  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Kamran Ahmed

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effects of global financial crisis (GFC) on chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation and earnings management relationship. Specifically, the authors examine whether the recent financial crisis had moderated the relationship between CEO bonus and discretionary accruals. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data for 1,800 firm-year observations (over a period of six years from 2005 to 2010) and use univariate and multivariate tests to test their hypothesis. The authors divide the period into pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods to examine how the different financial crisis periods affect the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. Various alternative tests including endogeneity test suggest that the results are robust. Findings The authors’ multivariate results indicate that the relationship between CEO’ compensation and earnings management changes because of the GFC. Practical implications The findings, therefore, justify more monitoring and scrutiny to limit the existence of opportunistic managerial behaviour and for the appropriate designing of CEO compensation packages during abnormal economic circumstances. Originality/value So far as the authors’ knowledge goes, this is the first study which examines the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management during GFC.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Desak Nyoman Sri Juliartini ◽  
Ida Bagus Putra Astika

This research is to prove after the change of chief executive officer (CEO) of earnings management practices and market reaction. The total sample taken was using the nonprabability sampling method with a purposive sampling technique of 48 companies on the IDX which included the LQ45 index. The analysis technique used is simple linear regression and paired sample t-test on the DA and PER values of the company. Based on the results of the analysis found that there is no effect of earnings management on market reaction after one and two years of CEO turnover. These results prove that there is no important information on the announcement of CEO turnover, so it is less able to make significant stock price fluctuations. The next result is no difference in both earnings management and market reaction that occurs one and two years after CEO turnover. Keywords: Chief Executive Officer (CEO); Earning Management; Market Reaction; Price Earning Ratio (PER).


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-361
Author(s):  
Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik ◽  
Noor Afza Amran ◽  
Ayoib Che-Ahmad

Purpose This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the auditor’s client risk assessment. Consistent with literature on family businesses, the level of CEO attachment to socio-emotional wealth (SEW) varies among family businesses. Design/methodology/approach This study used a longitudinal sample of 2,063 non-financial family firm-year observations from 2005 to 2016 listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The study used the general method of moments (GMM), which controls for endogeneity concerns. Findings The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of CEO identity, the relationship between CEO career horizon and auditor’s risk assessment is positive, which suggests that the auditor’s risk perception of retiring CEOs is very high. However, the interaction of CEO identity reverses the relationship as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms. The finding suggests that the auditor’s perceived risk associated with CEO career horizon is lower in family firms with CEOs affiliated to family members or in which the CEO has an equity stake. Overall, the findings provide compelling evidence that the extent of the CEO’s attachment to the firm’s SEW affects the auditor’s client risk assessment. Practical implications The findings of the study serve as an enlightenment to policymakers such as Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission that within the family-controlled firms, differences still exist; therefore, there might be a need for future regulatory initiative to cater for the specific need of family-controlled firms. Originality/value The study contributes to prior literature by departing from the agency theory adopted in previous studies on auditor choice in family firms under the assumption that family firms are homogenous.


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