scholarly journals Good Offies, Conciliation, and Mediation in the WTO: Challenges and Perspectives

Article 5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes lists means of pacifi settlement of disputes that can be used alongside with settlement of a particular dispute or instead of it. Good offies, conciliation and mediation are an adherence of WTO dispute settlement mechanism to the principle of pacifi settlement of disputes in international law enshrined in United Nations Charter and reminder of diplomatic approach that was dominating in the previous GATT system. Nowadays, non-litigious ways of dispute settlement in WTO have a potential to be on rise, due to crisis situation caused by US in Appellate Body and Dispute Settlement Body in general. This article looks into the reasons why means enshrined in the Article 5 were not used by Member states frequently enough since their establishment of the WTO. It looks closely into defiitions and history of the Article 5. The authors come to a conclusion that mediation has a potential and perspectives to be used more frequently in the future of the WTO dispute settlement. Mediation is treated as a unique mechanism that can be used by developing and least-developed countries to receive third-party assistance and mitigate power imbalances. Factors for successful mediation are deducted from the case analysis and interviews with representatives of permanent missions.

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malebakeng Forere

AbstractWhereas developed countries were the main players in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the era of the WTO saw a sharp increase in the developing countries’ participation in trade disputes. Thus, developing countries are active complainants and defendants in the WTO dispute settlement processes. Nevertheless, African states are still marginalised, and this situation has attracted attention of many scholars. As a result, scholars in the field have come up with many reasons to explain why African states do not appear as either complainants or respondents. The reasons for Africa’s non-participation have been argued to include cost of WTO litigation relative to the gains, low trade volumes, legal knowledge and non-integration of African countries in the WTO system. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement. The goal in this article is to confirm or dispel assumptions that African states have interests that they need to safeguard through dispute settlement but are inhibited from doing so because of the reasons mentioned above. Unlike other studies, the determination on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement will be approached from African states’ participation in intra-Africa RTA dispute settlement mechanisms. While there are six intra-Africa RTAs notified to the WTO, this work focuses on only two – East African Community and Southern Africa Development Community.


Author(s):  
Carlos Ricardo Caichiolo

The DSM, or Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in the absence of a judicial body, is the closest representation of a supreme court or judicial institution in a regional bloc or other international organisation. The search for a peaceful settlement of disputes in the international arena had led to the development of the DSM during the 20th and into the 21st century. The DSM acts as an impartial third party, wherein it intervenes in any international conflict to offer feasible solutions for both sides.O MSC, ou Mecanismo de Solução de Controvérsias, na ausência de um órgão judicial, é a representação mais próxima de uma Corte Suprema ou de instituição judiciária em um bloco regionl ou em organização internacional diversa. A busca por um meio pacífico de solução de disputas no meio internacional levou à criação do MSC ao longo dos séculos XX e XXI. O MSC age como um terceiro imparcial, na medida em que ele intervém em conflitos internacionais com o intuito de ofertar soluções possíveis para as partes envolvidas.


2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Ruwan Schunken

AbstractDeveloping countries are facing problems in their efforts to access the WTO Dispute Settlement system. This article deals with the several problems these counties are facing. The Advisory Centre on WTO Law was founded to contribute to the greater participation of developing and least developed countries in the WTO dispute settlement system and to enhance the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system. I will discuss the legal foundations and current operations of the ACWL. In addition, I will provide practical solutions in order to improve the operations of the Advisory Centre. These solutions contribute to a more fair and equal participation of developing and least developed countries in the WTO dispute settlement system.


2018 ◽  
pp. 117-133
Author(s):  
Kumar Ingnam

The World Trade Organization, a forum of multinational bargaining for trade under an international regulatory authority, has adhered compromising provisions for all member countries. The natural rule ‘stronger pie more and weaker are hanged up in the better dream of future' is indirectly refl ected in the WTO rules (the agreements, commitments and a few decisions of Ministerial Conferences) as well. While weaker countries (including independent economic territories) had shown strong reservation in opening up Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, General Agreement on Trade in Services and Agricultural market during negotiation, the richer had persuaded in inserting scattered, fl exible and concessional provisions in different Agreements of WTO; and Ministerial Conferences had made decisions and commitments to support and compensate them. The ultimate indication of trade performance is measured on their transactions and on the free movement of their goods and services. In case if the treatment is not fair or the regulatory compliance is not fulfi lled, remedy ought to be accessible. Since its commencement, just a single case was initiated by Least Developed Countries for settlement through the Dispute Settlement Body due to the doubt on the procedure and effectiveness of DSB. The article tries to analyze that why weaker (especially LDCs) countries are reluctant in joining DSB and framing way-out to resolve the problem by making convenient provisions for the weaker, LDCs as well.


2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Windu Kisworo

AbstrakThe World Trade Organization Agreement, aimed to also protect theenvironment, provides a special provision on environment under article xx.Any dispute arose between parties in respect to the article should be settledtrough the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Although environmentalprotection should be sought in trade, it is often problematic for developingcountries. They generally lack an adequate domestic environmentallegislation and its enforcement because they place greater priority oneconomic development. Indeed, there have been a number of cases foughtbetween developing countries and developed countries on this very issuewithin the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In addition, there areseveral conditions that might prevent them of using the mechanism effectivelywhich includes: lack of understanding of WTO law and its jurisprudences,lack of institutional capacity, and the fear of retaliation from developedcountries when bringing the claim against developed countries to DisputeSettlement Mechanism. Indonesia, as one of developing countries also facesthe above three problems. This paper will discuss what Indonesia need toprepare so that they can use the Dispute Settlement Mechanism effectively toresolve any dispute (if any) with other country, particularly in respect to theviolation of the article XX under the WTO Agreement


Author(s):  
Amanda Pamela Dakouré

The World Trade Organization’s primary purpose is to promote trade liberalization for the benefit of all its members. Being a self-enforcing trading system, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is its central pillar. Despite critics praising the DSM for its efficiency, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that litigation is not always an option for the WTO’s least-developed members. Through a case study of the cotton issue this article will analyze the efficiency of the WTO for its least-developed members. Part I of the article will set out why the issue of cotton is the perfect paradigm to examine how the WTO’s agriculture trade liberalization can benefit its least-developed members. Part II will examine the Brazil-US Upland Cotton Dispute and shed light on its repercussions on a group called Cotton-4. Part III will discuss how Cotton-4 has tried to resolve the cotton issue through negotiations. Finally, part IV will provide least-developed members, such as Cotton-4, with ways around the power inequalities that limit them from fully benefiting from the WTO’s agriculture trade liberalization.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 218-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhuang

On 11 December 2001, China officially became a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after years of negotiations. The paper shows how a major developing country has used the WTO dispute settlement system by examining China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from its entry through 31 December 2010. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the WTO dispute cases in which China has participated as a complainant, a respondent, or a third party.


1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debra P. Steger

For several years, there has been a tension between differing philosophies of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement. Commentators have taken different views on whether the system was fundamentally based on an arbitration or a judicial model. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Annex II to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), represents the first extensive, negotiated agreement revitalizing the dispute settlement system in the history of the General Agreement. It represents nothing less than a complete reform of the GATT dispute settlement system. What is remarkable is that it is the product of extensive multilateral negotiations. In the past, modifications were made to the system on an incremental, case-by-case basis. Since the GATT came into existence in 1948, Articles XXII and XXIII have formed the basis of the dispute settlement mecha-nism. They are very sparse provisions, and most of the procedures that have come to characterize the pre-WTO GATT system have evolved over time as a result of experience in specific cases. Some of these procedural improvements were codified in Decisions and Understandings negotiated at various points in GATT history, but none were as comprehensive as the DSU.


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