Has Islam Missed Its Enlightenment?

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Murad Wilfried Hofmann

Reinforced by 9/ I I, Muslims find themselves increasingly accused of having failed their Enlightenment. The implication is that Islam, being a pre-Enlightenment religion, is archaically a-rational. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment was a partially unrepeatable European phenomenon (an overdue emancipation from stifling church domination). Part of its import was of a general nature. Its overall rule of rationality promoted a supreme confidence in human reasoning (humanity as the mea­sure of all things), rejection of revelatory religion and meta­physics, separation of Church and State (secularism), belief in a noninterventionjst Deity and the law of nature, extreme "scien­tific" materialism, and the expectation of unlimited "progress."While some of its fruits were positive (e.g., the rule of law, lib­eral democracy, and market economy), other elements led to dis­aster after Deism gave way to a pervasive agnosticism and athe­ism in the runeteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g., colonialism, two world wars, the use of chemical and nuclear weapons, and fascism. !slam may be pre-Enlightenment, but it is an enlightened religion. Muslims never conceived of a categorical conflict between science and religion or religion and philosophy.

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-141
Author(s):  
Tomasz Stępniewski

The present paper discusses the following research questions: to what extent did errors made by the previous presidents of Ukraine result in the country’s failure to introduce systemic reforms (e.g. combating corruption, the development of a foundation for a stable state under the rule of law and free-market economy)?; can it be ventured that the lack of radical reforms along with errors in the internal politics of Ukraine under Petro Poroshenko resulted in the president’s failure?; will the strong vote of confidence given to Volodymyr Zelensky and the Servant of the People party exact systemic reforms in Ukraine?; or will Volodymyr Zelensky merely become an element of the oligarchic political system in Ukraine?


2019 ◽  
Vol 139 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 305-324
Author(s):  
Lars Peder Nordbakken

This paper suggests that the challenge to renew liberalism today may be seen to share some similarities with the first attempt to renew liberalism at the Colloque Walter Lippmann in 1938. Besides sharing intellectual, political and institutional dimensions, liberalism is once again under severe attack on many fronts, and it is once again seen by many to suffer a combined legitimacy and effectiveness crisis, reminding us of the main topic discussed in 1938. The first central argument of the paper is to show why a realistic and inclusive conception of liberty needs to be grounded in an extended institutional infrastructure of freedom, based on the interdependent and balanced relations between its four major institutional pillars: the rule of law, democracy, the market economy and civil society. Following this discussion, the paper challenges Friedrich Hayek’s attempt to rebuild liberalism based on a narrower conception of liberty and its institutional preconditions. The paper concludes by underpinning the need to move beyond Hayek in the renewal of liberalism in our time.


2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Petrow

In eighteenth-century England the rule of law was “the central legitimizing ideology, displacing the religious authority and sanctions of previous centuries.” Arising out of struggles between the monarchy, Parliament, and the courts, the rule of law sought to protect individual liberty and private property by placing constraints on arbitrary authority. The ruling class used the rule of law ideology to enhance their power, but it also acted as a check on that power. All citizens from the monarch to the poorest citizen became bound by the rule of law and could settle their disputes in the courts presided over by judges, who were independent of manipulation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Głowacki ◽  
Christopher Andrew Hartwell ◽  
Kateryna Karunska ◽  
Jacek Kurczewski ◽  
Elisabeth Botsch ◽  
...  

Abstract The rule of law is not just a necessary condition for a modern liberal society but also an important prerequisite for a stable, effective and sustainable market economy. However, relevant legal norms may be more or less successful depending on their social reception within a particular country. This study explores the connection between the rule of law, especially in terms of how it is viewed socially, and the functioning of market economy in the examples of two geographically contiguous yet often-diverging countries, namely Germany and Poland. We utilise two approaches to examine this issue, first studying societal perceptions of the various dimensions of the rule of law by way of standardized surveys and in-depth interviews conducted in both countries to determine the de facto state of the rule of law in the economic context. Secondly, we measure the effect of the de jure and de facto rule of law on economic outcomes using a multivariate panel analysis. Combining new institutional economics and sociology of law, our analysis finds that Polish firms perceive the rule of law and its execution by the state in a restrictive perspective, contributing to insecurity. German interviewees, however, showcase the supportive and transaction cost-reducing properties of the rule of law, displaying higher trust in the state. These findings are supported by an econometric analysis of the drivers of rule of law in both Poland and Germany, which shows the importance of rule of law in terms of a level playing field contributing to higher levels of investment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (Special Issue 2) ◽  
pp. 13-28
Author(s):  
Francisco L. Lisi

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Luebke

What did it mean when an teenth-century monarch intervened in a legal struggle between social unequals, and decided on behalf of the weaker party? How do historians interpret such an event? In the example under examination here—the cause célèbre of the millers Christian and Rosine Arnold in Brandenburg-Prussia (1770–1779)—the dominant opinion of two centuries has been that King Frederick II's intervention violated justice and the rule of law. Explaining this remarkable continuity of historical attention is easy, for the affair's effects on state-formation in Prussia were far–reaching. On the very day that Frederick ruled in the millers' favor, the king also sacked his chancellor (Grosskanzler), Carl Joseph von Fürst, as well as three members of Brandenburg's supreme tribunal, the Chamber Court (Kammergericht), all for ruling against the millers. In Fürst's place as chancellor, Frederick installed Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, under whom began the process of legal reforms that resulted in the provisional Corpus Juris Fridericianum (1781) and ultimately the General Prussian Code (Allgemeines Preussisches Landrecht, or ALR) of 1794. To some extent, then, Frederick's intervention was the founding act of codification. But it is more difficult to explain the unanimity: with few exceptions, historians and biographers have pronounced the intervention a “judicial catastrophe” (Justizkatastrophe) and declared the millers mere “troublemakers.” This essay will argue that such conclusions are misguided: by framing their questions within the parameters of legal and administrative history, most historians have focused on the legal merits of the Arnolds' suit. In so doing, they have operated on the assumption that a unitary definition of justice prevailed in eighteenth-century Prussia; as a result, most historical appraisals reflect highly partisan contemporary interpretations of the case. But there were at least three distinct “discourses” on justice at work as the case unfolded, each of them corresponding to one of the principal sets of actors in the drama.


2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-378
Author(s):  
ERIK-JAN ZÜRCHER

Turkey is about to start accession negotiations with the European Union. The question of whether Turkey qualified as a European country in terms of history and culture, was put on the European agenda by conservative European politicians in the mid-1990s and seemed to have been solved in Turkey's favour at the Helsinki summit of 1999, but it was hotly debated again throughout 2004. At the same time, a parallel debate developed among those who accepted Turkey's European credentials in principle (or felt they had to accept them). This was the debate about Turkey's state of preparedness and the degree to which the country fulfilled the so-called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’, which stipulated that candidates for membership of the EU should have a stable democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a functioning market economy. In the end, as we know, the attempts of the ‘fundamentalist’ opposition to Turkey's candidature on the part of people like former Eurocommissioner Bolkestein, German CDU/CSU leaders Merkel and Stoiber or ex-president Giscard d'Estaing failed. Turkey's progress towards fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria was deemed sufficient by the European Commission, and on 17 December 2004 the momentous decision to start the accession process was taken unanimously at the summit in The Hague.Interest in the question of Turkey's candidature has meant that an extraordinary number of studies, reports, papers have appeared, analysing the current situation and drawing scenarios for the future. The authors of this Focus have not intended to add to this, or to investigate the chequered history of Turkish-European relations since the signing of the accession treaty in 1963.


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