scholarly journals God’s Divinely Justified Knowledge is Incompatible with Human Free Will

1970 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-159
Author(s):  
John Shook
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
Soft Fact

A new version of the incompatibilist argument is developed. Knowledge is (at least) justified true belief. If God’s divine knowledge must be justified knowledge, then humans cannot have the “alternative possibilities” type of free will. This incompatibilist argument is immunized against the application of the hard-soft fact distinction. If divine knowledge is justified, then the only kind of facts that God can know are hard facts, permitting this incompatibilist argument to succeed.

Compatibilist Alternatives

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keim Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Source Theory

This paper is a defense of traditional compatibilism. Traditional compatibilism is, roughly, the view that (a) free will is essential to moral responsibility, (b) free will requires alternative possibilities of action, or alternatives for short, and (c) moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Traditional compatibilism is a version of the traditional theory of free will. According to the traditional theory, a person S performed an action a freely only if S could have done otherwise, that is, only if S had alternatives. The traditional theory is often contrasted with the source theory: S performed a freely only if S was the source of a (McKenna 2001; Pereboom 2003). One may adopt a combined view of free will that sanctions both the traditional and source theories (Kane 1996, 72-3; van Inwagen 1983). As I use the terms ‘source theorist’ and ‘traditional theorist,’ the former refers to folks who accept the source theory and reject the traditional theory; the latter refers to folks who accept the traditional theory whether or not they accept the source theory.

scholarly journals To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Nadine Elzein ◽  
Tuomas K. Pernu
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Libertarian Free Will

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.

Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Paul Bernier
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Buddhist Philosophy ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Early Buddhism

Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.

Free Will and Open Alternatives

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
History Of ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.

scholarly journals Conditional analysis of free will and consequence argument

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 61-65
Author(s):  
M. A. Sekatskaya ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Conditional Analysis ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
Counterfactual Conditional ◽  
The Relationship

The conditional analysis of the meaning of the phrase “free will” is a classical compatibilist strategy, first introduced by David Hume and still widely used by compatibilists. The consequence argument is an influential argument against compatibilism. If the consequence argument is sound, then physical determinism is incompatible with alternative possibilities for any agent. In this article, I consider the relationship between the consequence argument and classical compatibilism. I demonstrate that the consequence argument uses premises that should be rejected by proponents of the counterfactual conditional analysis of free will

scholarly journals Descartes and the formulations of free will

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-102
Author(s):  
Sava Ristic
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities

Based on certain places in Descartes? writings, regarding the notion of ?free will?, it seems that Descartes may be interpreted as both a compatibilist and libertarian. Firstly, we claim that it is impossible to describe Descartes as a compatibilist, and the consequence of that proposition is that that it is impossible for him to be both a compatibilist and libertarian. By referring to Meditations, Passions of the Soul, Principles and Letters, we will show that Descartes is not a compatibilist, rather that he is a libertarian, since he places free will in an incompatible relation with determinism by allowing free will not to be restrained by anything, which leaves the ?alternative possibilities? open. Afterwards we will respond to possible objections, out of which the main one will be related to determinism.

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

2005 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
The Past ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.

Two Kinds of Soft Facts

2018 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro De Florio ◽  
Aldo Frigerio
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Future Contingents ◽  
The Past ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
Soft Fact ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

The concept of soft facts is crucial for the Ockhamistic analysis of the divine knowledge of future contingents; moreover, this notion is important in itself because it concerns the structure of the facts that depend—in some sense—on other future facts. However, the debate on soft facts is often flawed by the unaware use of two different notions of soft facts. The facts of the first kind are supervenient on temporal facts: By bringing about a temporal fact, the agent can bring about these facts. However, on the one hand, the determination of the existence of these facts does not affect the past; on the other hand, assimilating divine knowledge into this kind of facts does not help the Ockhamist. The authors will argue that, to vindicate Ockhamism, another definition of “soft fact” is necessary, which turns out to be much more demanding from a metaphysical point of view.

scholarly journals Bergson's Theory of Free Will

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Dolbeault
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Original Form ◽  
The Future

Bergson argues that there is an incompatibility between free will and determinism: while free will has a dimension of creation, of invention, determinism corresponds to the idea that the future is fixed in advance by laws. In addition, he rejects determinism. According to him, the singularity of our deep-seated psychic states makes that their evolution cannot be governed by laws. However, Bergson does not defend classical indeterminism (of which contemporary indeterminism is only an extension) because it reduces free will to a choice between alternative possibilities, that is to say between pre-fixed futures. Such a conception does not take into account the creative dimension of free will. In fact, Bergson develops an original form of indeterminism based on a certain conception of causation. For determinism and classical indeterminism, causation is always the actualization of a pre-fixed virtual reality (single or multiple). For Bergson, causation can also be a creation, that is, the formation of something which is not pre-fixed.

scholarly journals Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 131-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Rychter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.

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