scholarly journals EPISTEMOLOGIA SOCIAL E CRITÉRIOS DA ARGUMENTAÇÃO MONOLÓGICA

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (23) ◽  
pp. 24-41
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Freitas Costa CANAL (UFPA/UFPR)
Keyword(s):  
Alvin Goldman

Neste trabalho, argumento que uma parte do projeto de Alvin Goldman, em teoria da argumentação, lógica informal e epistemologia analítica contemporânea, pode ser entendido como uma epistemologia social veritista da argumentação monológica, e que este projeto procura responder, em parte, ao problema do propósito e da função da argumentação, defendendo por isso uma tese sobre o objetivo que a argumentação deve ter para funcionar adequadamente. Para isso, 1) apresento como esse programa trata especificamente a noção de argumentação monológica, 2) bem como os critérios necessários dessa modalidade de argumentação, procurando demonstrar a ideia do filósofo da forma pela qual a argumentação deve funcionar parapermitir que cumpra uma função veritativa. Além disso, sobre o ponto 1) argumento também que o projeto de Goldman faz parte de um projeto que tem sido chamado de abordagem epistemológica a argumentação. De forma a consubstanciar o ponto 2), discutiremos um conjunto de oito normas da boa argumentação monológica.

Why Should a Knower Care?

Hypatia ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vrinda Dalmiya
Keyword(s):  
General Framework ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Dyadic Relation

This paper argues that the concept of care is significant not only for ethics, but for epistemology as well. After elucidating caring as a five-step dyadic relation, I go on to show its epistemic significance within the general framework of virtue epistemology as developed by Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, and Linda Zagzebski. The notions of “care-knowing” and “care-based epistemology” emerge from construing caring (respectively) as a reliabilist and responsibilist virtue.

4. The analysis of knowledge

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Nagel
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Classical Analysis ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge

‘The analysis of knowledge’ begins with Edmund Gettier who challenged the ‘classical analysis of knowledge’ that equates knowledge with justified true belief. His no-false-belief proposal had some flaws. Alvin Goldman then proposed the causal theory of knowledge: experience-based knowledge that requires the knower to be appropriately causally connected to a fact. Goldman went on to launch a fresh analysis of knowledge, focused on reliability. Reliabilism is when knowledge is true belief that is produced by a mechanism likely to produce true belief. But can knowing be analysed at all? The relationship between knowing and believing is considered in the knowledge-first and belief-first movements of epistemology.

Apistemology and Cognition by Alvin Goldman

1988 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 265-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Dretske ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Alvin Goldman

Truth, Thinking, Testimony, and Trust

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Instrumental Value

In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in overemphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. This chapter takes issue with these claims and argues that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic.

Ways and Means

1972 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annetie C. Baier
Keyword(s):  
States Of Mind ◽  
Recursive Definition ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Basic Action ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Interesting Class ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Bodily Movements

In this paper I shall give reasons for rejecting one type of analysis of the basic constituents of action, and reasons for preferring an alternative approach. I shall discuss the concept of basic action recently presented by Alvin Goldman, who gives an interesting version of the sort of analysis I wish to reject. Goldman agrees with Danto that bodily movements are basic actions, and his definition of ‘basic’ resembles Danto's fairly closely. What is new is a useful concept of level-generation between actions, which Goldman uses both in his recursive definition of action (45) and in his definition of a basic action (67, 72), as one whose performance does not depend on level-generational knowledge. In brief, an action is an event which is level-generated by or capable of level-generating another action, and a basic action is one which is not level-generated by any other action. I shall examine this concept of level-generation, and point out incoherences I think endemic to views of this sort. In the last part of the paper I shall indicate the direction in which a more satisfactory account of basic action is to be sought. The criterion of basicness I shall sketch will select as basic actions not bodily movements, but a more interesting class of actions, and one whose demarcation can help us see the relation between actions and intentions, and the differences between intentions and other states of mind.

RELIABILISM: HOLISTIC OR SIMPLE?

Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
High Threshold ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Simple Version ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Epistemic Systems

AbstractSimple versions of Reliabilism about justification say that S's believing that p is justified if and only if the belief was produced by a belief-forming process that is reliable above some high threshold. Alvin Goldman, in Epistemology and Cognition, argues for a more complex version of the view according to which it is total epistemic systems that are assessed for reliability, rather than individual processes. Why prefer this more complex version of Reliabilism? Two reasons suggest themselves. First, it seems that the interaction of various processes of belief formation is often important. The more complex version appears to account for the interaction of processes. Second, one might doubt whether individual processes will have determinate truth-ratios. If not, the simple version of Reliabilism is a nonstarter. In this paper I argue that, despite these two apparent advantages, the complex version of Reliabilism is untenable. I conclude by arguing that the simple version is actually fine as it is.

scholarly journals J. L. Austin e Alvin Goldman: Conhecimento Empírico e Alternativas Relevantes

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Fernando Dos Santos Souza
Keyword(s):  
Alvin Goldman

Nosso objetivo neste ensaio é discutir o conhecimento empírico a partir das teorias de John L. Austin e Alvin Goldman. Para tal, argumentaremos que a definição tradicional do conhecimento (crença, verdadeira justifica) é insuficiente para tratar de conhecimento empírico. Defenderemos que o modo adequado de analisar o conhecimento empírico deve levar em conta a habilidade do sujeito epistêmico de discriminar a proposição empírica p de alternativas relevantes para o caso.

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