scholarly journals Seamen, Railroad Employees, and Uber Drivers: Applying the Section 1 Exemption in the Federal Arbitration Ace to Rideshare Drivers

2021 ◽  
pp. 525
Author(s):  
Conor Bradley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Physical Movement ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Independent Contractors ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
Legal Difficulties ◽  
The Relationship

Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) exempts “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” from arbitration. In 2019, the Supreme Court held in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that this provision exempted independent contractors as well as employees. This decision expanded the reach of the section 1 exemption and may affect the relationship between ridesharing companies, such as Uber, and their drivers. Previously, ridesharing companies argued that courts must enforce the arbitration clauses in their employment contracts because their workers were independent contractors and, therefore, section 1 was inapplicable. Since this argument is now prohibited by the holding in New Prime, rideshare drivers have an opportunity to avoid arbitration using the section 1 exemption. But they still face legal difficulties because of the narrow construction of the exemption employed by courts. This Note argues that the current interpretation of the exemption, which focuses on the physical movement of goods across state lines, is incongruent with the text and history of the FAA and that courts should broaden the exemption to include rideshare drivers.

“Acting Directly on the People”

2019 ◽  
pp. 142-155
Author(s):  
David S. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Race Relations ◽  
Legal Tender ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
Paper Money ◽  
Legislative Authority ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of

Post–Civil War nationalism meant a partial but significant reversion to prewar constitutionalism, recognizing federal legislative authority over “every foot of American soil” and implementing the antebellum Whig-nationalist economic agenda, but allowing states to retain, or regain control over race relations. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of internal improvements, but declined to embrace implied commerce powers, suggesting instead (as in Gibbons v. Ogden) that the question involved the definition of interstate commerce as an enumerated power. The Court seemed to want to confine McCulloch v. Maryland to taxation, banking, and currency matters. The Legal Tender Cases, which relied on McCulloch to uphold the federal power to issue paper money, were a watershed in the history of implied powers, and were recognized as such at the time by many commentators. Yet the Supreme Court over the ensuing decade and a half seemed unwilling to follow through on McCulloch’s full implications.

scholarly journals 4 The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter focuses on explaining the kinds of cases which Ireland’s Supreme Court is authorised to deal with and how it has had very little choice over which cases are brought to it. It analyses relevant legislative provisions, some of which date back to 1924. The relationship between the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal is covered, as are the reasons for the rise in the Supreme Court’s workload since the 1990s. The history of reform proposals is set out and the impact of the new Court of Appeal is considered. The chapter also examines the point that pre-1922 legislation is presumed to continue to apply in Ireland unless Parliament has changed it and shows how the Supreme Court has been careful to ensure that people other than judges do not exercise what is in effect a judicial function. The ‘non-justiciable’ principle is also considered.

Part III The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Political Branches, 10 Judicial–Executive Relations in Nigeria’s Constitutional Development: Clear Patterns or Confusing Signals?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guobadia Ameze
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter examines the relationship between the executive and the judiciary in Nigeria. It sketches the history of assertions of judicial power by Nigerian courts, including the 1966 action by the Supreme Court to assert the continued validity of the 1963 constitution in the face of a military coup. It considers the role of the National Judicial Council in appointing and disciplining judges, an important issue in many systems. It recounts the saga surrounding President of the Court of Appeal Justice Salami, which raises the troubling prospect of the Chief Justice ‘packing’ the Council and possibly colluding with the executive to pursue political goals and discusses the issue of disputes over the appointment of state chief justices, who are appointed by governors on the Council’s recommendation. It also offers the Nigerian perspective on control over judicial budgets and administration, before concluding with a review of some significant cases.

Video as Text/Archive

2019 ◽  
pp. 778-797
Author(s):  
Bennett Capers
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Surveillance Cameras ◽  
American Law ◽  
Supreme Court Case ◽  
History Of ◽  
Constitutional Protections

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.

scholarly journals Insurance related problems in bareboat charter agreements

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Albano Gilabert Gascón
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn 2017, the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in its judgment in the Gard Marine and Energy v China National Chartering (The Ocean Victory) case that, in bareboat charters under the ‘BARECON 89’ form, if both the owner and the charterer are jointly insured under a hull policy, the damages caused to the vessel by the charterer cannot be claimed by the insurer by way of subrogation after indemnifying the owner. The interpretation of the charter party leads to the conclusion that the liability between the parties is excluded. Faced with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) adopted a new standard bareboat charter agreement only a few months later, the ‘BARECON 2017’ form, which amends, among other clauses, the one related to insurance. The present paper analyses (i) the new wording of the clause mentioned above and (ii) its incidence on the relationship between the parties of both the charter agreement and the insurance contract and its consequences for possible third parties. Despite BIMCO’s attempt to change the solution adopted by the Supreme Court and his willingness to allow the insurer to claim in subrogation against the person who causes the loss, the consequences, as it will be seen, do not differ much in practice when the wrongdoer is the co-insured charterer. On the contrary, when the loss is caused by a time charter or a sub-charter, in principle, there will be no impediment for the insurer to sue him.

Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Object ◽  
William Iii ◽  
Science Association

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

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