Historical and legal basis of animal rights

ANCIENT LAND ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (03) ◽  
pp. 12-14
Author(s):  
Fidan Vahid qızı Nuri ◽  

As we know, animals take care of each other without any legal obligation and, if necessary, even protect others at the cost of their own lives. The concept of "law" was conceived by us humans, and it does not apply to any living thing other than man. So why are we talking about animal rights? The answer is simple: animal rights are the rights that govern the boundaries of human-animal relations. If we cannot determine the extent of human-animal relations, then we cannot hold some people accountable for cruelty to animals. Humans must be held accountable for their cruelty to animals. That's where animal rights come from. Key words: right, animal rights, welfare of animals, protection of animal rights

2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 247-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Flegel

There is a central contradiction in human relationships with animals: as Erica Fudge notes, “We live with animals, we recognize them, we even name some of them, but at the same time we use them as if they were inanimate, as if they were objects” (8). Such a contradiction is also, of course, present in human interactions, in which power relations allow for the objectification of one human being by another. In an analysis of images and texts produced by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) in the nineteenth-century, I want to examine the overlap in representations of animals and humans as subject to objectification and control. One common way of critiquing human treatment of animals within the RSPCA's journals, Animal World and Band of Mercy, was to have humans trade places with animals: having boys fantastically shrunk to the size of the animals they tortured, for example, or imagining the horrors of vivisection when experienced by humans. Such imaginative exercises were meant to defamiliarize animal usage by implying a shared experience of suffering: what was wrong for a human was clearly just as wrong for an animal. However, I argue that some of the images employed by the society suggest the opposite; instead of constructing animal cruelty in a new light, these images instead work to underline the shared proximity of particular humans with animals. In texts that focus specifically upon humans wearing animal bonds – reins, collars, and muzzles – the RSPCA's anti-cruelty discourse both critiqued the tools of bondage and, I suggest, invited the audience to see deep connections between animals and the humans taking their place. Such connections ultimately weaken the force of the animal/human reversal as an animal rights strategy, suggesting as they do that humans themselves often have use value in economies of labor, affect, and are subject to the same power relations that produce an animal as “animal.”


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 698 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN MORSS

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>[</span><span>In many ways HLA Hart’s critical analysis of the concept of law, with its repudiation of simple command theories of legal obligation, is at the same time a critique of the notion of state sovereignty. It is therefore an adumbration, if no more, of a radical reconceptualisation of interna- tional law, one which redefines the distinction between municipal and in- ternational jurisdiction. This paper is an exploration of what Hart could or ‘should’ have said about international law, based as much as possible on what he did say about international law and law in general. After some introductory comments it outlines Hart’s general analysis of law, with particular reference to the relevance for our understanding of inter- national law.</span><span>] </span></p></div></div></div>


Author(s):  
Ditlev Tamm

Abstract This contribution deals with the influence of the Reformation on the law in Denmark. The Reformation was basically a reform of the church, but it also affected the concept of law and state in general. In 1536, King Christian III dismissed the catholic bishops and withheld the property of the church. The king, as custos duarum tabularum, guardian of both the tablets of law, also took over the legislation for the church. Especially in subjects of morals and criminal law new principles and statutes were enacted. Copenhagen University was reformed into a protestant seminary even though the former faculties were maintained. For that task Johannes Bugenhagen was summoned who also drafted the new church ordinance of 1537. In marriage law protestant principles were introduced. A marriage order was established in 1582.


Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

H.L.A. Hart’s (1961) book The Concept of Law already caught my fancy as an undergraduate student in Ireland. It seemed to do more in illumination of its theme than most of the tomes in analytical, continental or scholastic philosophy to which I was introduced in a wonderfully idiosyncratic syllabus. What I attempt here, many years later, is guided by a desire to explore the possibility of providing for ethics and morality the sort of perspective that Hart gave us on the law....


Animals ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 512
Author(s):  
Samuel Camenzind

Criticism of Kant’s position on our moral relationship with animals dates back to the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Leonard Nelson, but historically Kantian scholars have shown limited interest in the human-animal relationship as such. This situation changed in the mid-1990s with the arrival of several publications arguing for the direct moral considerability of animals within the Kantian ethical framework. Against this, another contemporary Kantian approach has continued to defend Kant’s indirect duty view. In this approach it is argued, first, that it is impossible to establish direct duties to animals, and second, that this is also unnecessary because the Kantian notion that we have indirect duties to animals has far-reaching practical consequences and is to that extent adequate. This paper explores the argument of the far-reaching duties regarding animals in Kant’s ethics and seeks to show that Kantians underestimate essential differences between Kant and his rivals today (i.e., proponents of animal rights and utilitarians) on a practical and fundamental level. It also argues that Kant’s indirect duty view has not been defended convincingly: the defence tends to neglect theory-immanent problems in Kant’s ethics connected with unfounded value assumptions and unconvincing arguments for the denial of animals’ moral status. However, it is suggested that although the human-animal relationship was not a central concern of Kant’s, examination of the animal question within the framework of Kant’s ethics helps us to develop conceptual clarity about his duty concept and the limitations of the reciprocity argument.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 670-687
Author(s):  
Anna L. Peterson

Abstract Canine rescue is a growing movement that affects the lives of tens of thousands of nonhuman animals and people every year. Rescue is noteworthy not only for its numbers, but also because it challenges common understandings of animal advocacy. Popular accounts often portray work on behalf of animals as sentimental, individualistic, and apolitical. In fact, work on behalf of animals has always been political, in multiple ways. It is characterized both by internal political tensions, especially between animal rights and welfare positions, and by complex relations to the broader public sphere. I analyze canine rescue, with a focus on pit bull rescue, to show that an important segment of canine rescue movements adopts an explicitly political approach which blurs the divide between rights and welfare, addresses the social context of the human-animal bond, and links animal advocacy to social justice.


1962 ◽  
Vol 71 (6) ◽  
pp. 1185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alf Ross ◽  
H. L. A. Hart

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