Memperkecil District Magnitude, Menuju Multipartai Sederhana di Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Sahel Muzzammil
Keyword(s):  
District Magnitude

<p><em>Sejak memasuki Era Reformasi, Indonesia melalui amandemen Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 1945) telah meneguhkan komitmen terhadap sistem pemerintahan presidensial, namun sistem kepartaian yang terbangun (multipartisme ekstrem) justru tidak kompatibel dengan sistem tersebut. Penelitian ini bertujuan memaparkan inkompatibilitas tersebut sepanjang perjalanannya hingga masa sekarang. Dengan metode penelitian doktrinal dan pendekatan sejarah di dalamnya, penelitian ini menemukan konsekuensi multipartisme ekstrem yang tidak menguntungkan bagi pemerintahan Indonesia mewujud ke dalam beberapa bentuk, mulai dari impeachment sampai dengan koalisi yang justru menyandera. Ini memberi sinyal bahwa secara subtil sesuatu perlu dilakukan untuk penyederhanaan sistem multipartai di Indonesia, termasuk dengan memperkecil apa yang dinamakan district magnitude.</em></p><p> <strong><em>Kata kunci</em></strong><em>: Presidensialisme; Multipartai; District Magnitude.</em></p>

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

scholarly journals The Effects of District Magnitude on Voting Behavior

2017 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 356-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hix ◽  
Rafael Hortala-Vallve ◽  
Guillem Riambau-Armet
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
District Magnitude

scholarly journals Political finance regimes and party system size: evidence from new and established European democracies

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48
Author(s):  
Ekaterina R. Rashkova ◽  
Yen-Pin Su
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
System Size ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Sociological Factors ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Political Finance ◽  
Campaign Expenditure ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Established Democracies

AbstractStudies of party system size have looked at institutional and sociological factors in their attempt to explain what determines the number of parties. While some recent studies contend that party laws, beyond the district magnitude, have a significant impact on, among others, new party entry, we know very little about whether certain rules matter more in some societies than they do in others. In this paper, we study the extent to which various party finance rules affect party system size and differentiate the effect between new and established democracies. Specifically, we focus on direct and indirect public subsidization and limits on private donation and campaign expenditure. We hypothesize that compared to established countries, new democracies tend to have a larger party system size when the political finance rules create more equal conditions for electoral competition. Using data from 43 Europe democracies, the empirical analyses support our hypothesis.

Dimensions of Variation in Electoral Systems

2017 ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher ◽  
Paul Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Essential Components ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
Dimensions Of Variation

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. This chapter argues that electoral system choice is a highly consequential matter for democratic states and offers a comparative overview of the principal means by which electoral systems vary. What are the essential components of real-world electoral systems? The chapter emphasizes the importance of district magnitude, ballot structure (with three main types: categorical, dividual, and ordinal), “levels” of seat allocation, methods of selecting candidates within parties, and devices for limiting proportionality.

Predicting Party Systems from Electoral Systems

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rein Taagepera ◽  
Matthew Shugart
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Product Model ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Upper Limits ◽  
Predictive Relationships ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Quantities Of Interest

The Seat Product Model matters to electoral and party systems specialists in what it is able to predict, and to all political scientists as one example of how to predict. The seat product (MS) is the product of assembly size (S) and electoral district magnitude (M, number of seats allocated). Without any data input, thinking about conceptual lower and upper limits leads to a sequence of logically grounded models that apply to simple electoral systems. The resulting formulas allow for precise predictions about likely party system outputs, such as the number of parties, the size of the largest party, and other quantities of interest. The predictions are based entirely on institutional inputs. And when tested on real-world electoral data, these predictions are found to explain over 60% of the variance. This means that they provide a baseline expectation, against which actual countries and specific elections can be compared. To the broader political science audience, this research sends the following message: Interconnected quantitatively predictive relationships are a hallmark of developed science, but they are still rare in social sciences. These relationships can exist with regard to political phenomena if one is on the lookout for them. Logically founded predictions are stronger than merely empirical relationships or predictions of the direction of effects. Finally, isolated equations that connect various factors are nice, but equations that interconnect pack even more predictive punch. Political scientists should strive for connections among connections. This would lead to a more scientific political science.

The Electoral Sweet Spot in the Lab

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Labbé St-Vincent ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Jean-Benoit Pilet
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Sweet Spot ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Accurate Representation ◽  
Moderate Number ◽  
Good Outcome ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Lab Experiments ◽  
Number Of Parties

AbstractCarey and Hix (2011) propose that a proportional electoral system with a moderate number of seats per district offers the best compromise between (1) accurate representation and (2) strong accountability. The argument is that there is a district magnitude (DM) level where the trade-off between proportionality and fragmentation of parties is optimal. This DM is called the sweet spot. We explore this proposition through lab experiments conducted in Brussels and Montreal. We find that the probability of achieving a “good” outcome on both proportionality and the number of parties is slightly higher at moderate DMs. We note, however, that this probability remains low.

scholarly journals The Ethnic Implications of Preferential Voting

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 671-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Coakley ◽  
Jon Fraenkel
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Papua New Guinea ◽  
New Guinea ◽  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Engineered Systems ◽  
Southern Rhodesia

Around the turn of the century, political developments in Northern Ireland, Fiji and Papua New Guinea encouraged claims that preferential voting systems could steer polities in the direction of ‘moderate’ multi-ethnic government. Sixteen years later, we have a longer time period and larger volume of data to reassess these verdicts. This article investigates ballot transfer and party vote–seat share patterns in the seven deeply divided polities with some experience of preferential voting for legislative elections or direct presidential elections (Northern Ireland, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Estonia, Sri Lanka, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Southern Rhodesia). We find little support for centripetalist claims that such systems encourage ‘moderate’ parties. We argue that where district magnitude is low, where voters are required to rank preferences and where ticket voting prevails, departures from vote–seat proportionality may favour ‘moderate’ parties, but such heavily engineered systems may simply advantage the larger parties or yield erratic outcomes.

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