scholarly journals Of British Representational Practices in the Age of Capitalism/Territorialism (1743-1776)

2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-59
Author(s):  
Michal Kobialka

The issue addressed in this essay is how the notion of history was altered by the embedding of commerce into the discursive field of eighteenth-century Britain. Even though current eighteenth-century, and Enlightenment, studies draw attention to historiographic questions challenging traditional modes of periodization, the methods by which we acquire and organize knowledge, or the extent to which accounts of the eighteenth century have been driven by the imperatives of the times, this project argues that one historiographic issue that has been significantly underplayed is a different concept of history produced in eighteenth-century Britain by the fundamental operation of mercantile society, its logic of exchange, and the predominance of trade within it. David Hume and Adam Smith’s historiographic trajectory was obscured (and, ultimately, eliminated) by the scientific or materialist notion of history advanced in nineteenth-century historiography.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Cynthia Roman

Abstract Focusing on A smoking club (1793/7) by James Gillray, this essay presents satiric representations of smoking clubs in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British prints, arguing that they reflect and mediate contemporary understandings of tobacco as an intoxicant in British associational life. The breadth of potential cultural connotations – from political and social parody to light-hearted humour – is traced through the content and imagery of selected prints. These prints rely on the familiarity of contemporary audiences with political and social knowledge, as well as a visual iconography iconically realized in William Hogarth's A midnight modern conversation (1732).


PMLA ◽  
1946 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 522-576
Author(s):  
Alan S. Downer

In an earlier paper, I undertook to show that the style of acting in the serious drama of the eighteenth century closely paralleled the general interest of the century in the imitation of nature—of nature methodized. Four principal “schools,” varying in technique but not in purpose, were examined: Betterton, the Cibber-Booth-Wilks Triumvirate, Macklin-Garrick, and Kemble-Siddons. The fourth school, with which the paper arbitrarily ended, extends well beyond the eighteenth century and provides a natural introduction to the study of acting techniques in the Romantic and Victorian periods. Like the eighteenth, the nineteenth century is primarily a century of great actors rather than great plays, and it is to the actors, rather than to the playwrights, that we must turn to find the theatrical expression of the spirit of the times. Edmund Kean and William C. Macready represent the earlier and later stages of romanticism as accurately as Shelley and Tennyson, and Victorianism is as plainly marked in Alfred Wigan and Irving as in Ruskin or Trollope.


Author(s):  
Peter Kivy

The concept of genius—artistic genius in particular—is generally thought of as a quintessentially nineteenth-century phenomenon: the cornerstone, in fact, of German Romanticism. Kant’s treatment of the concept has always been recognized as the source from which the early Romantics drew. But the fact of the matter is that it is to the British Enlightenment that we must look for the first modern formulation of the concept of artistic genius. For it was already well formed and clearly recognizable before Kant got his hands on it. In this article, the author begins by suggesting two ancient sources for the concept of genius as it developed in eighteenth-century Britain, then goes on to discuss the contributions to the concept of Joseph Addison, Edward Young, Alexander Gerard, William Duff, and Gerard again, who dipped his oar in twice.


Author(s):  
Mark Knights

This chapter takes the premodern divide, which is framed in English historiography as the end of “old corruption,” as the starting point for a long-term overview of anticorruption in Britain and its colonies. Focusing on anticorruption movements, it adds another dimension to the paradox of modernization by showing that although a transition took place in the period between the late-sixteenth century and the nineteenth century, it was by no means a linear one: anticorruption measures to ensure the scrutiny of public accounts could be introduced in the late-seventeenth century, abandoned and then reintroduced later in the eighteenth century. The chapter also argues that there is a relationship between late-sixteenth-century Reformation and eighteenth-century reforms, both of which involved an attack on corruption.


1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-372
Author(s):  
Robert Cornwall

S. L. Ollard's 1926 study of the Church of England's understanding and practice of the rite of confirmation remains the most significant examination of this topic for the eighteenth century. He insisted that eighteenth-century Anglicans took a low view of the rite, contending that the religious consequences of the Glorious Revolution set the tone for Anglican sacramental views. That the church allowed three unconfirmed monarchs (William III and the first two Georges) to receive the Eucharist provided evidence of the neglect of this rite. Louis Weil more recently echoes Ollard's critique, suggesting that after 1660 Anglican writers “virtually ignored the rite.” Weil believes that interest in the rite was limited to Thomas Wilson, the eighteenth-century bishop of Sodor and Man, and a few like-minded members of the “old high church tradition.” Thus, according to most accounts, Anglicans gave little attention to confirmation until the nineteenth century, when the Tractarians supposedly rediscovered the importance of the rite. Ironically, Weil undermines his own position by pointing out that the only “concentrated material” on the rite in the Tracts for the Times was a reprinting of the work on confirmation by the eighteenth-century bishop of Sodor and Mann, Thomas Wilson.


2019 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 21-38
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

AbstractA survey of theories on the passions and action in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain and western Europe reveals that few, if any, of the major writers held the view that reason in any of its functions executes action without a passion. Even rationalists, like Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth and English clergyman Samuel Clarke, recognized the necessity of passion to action. On the other hand, many of these intellectuals also agreed with French philosophers Jean-François Senault, René Descartes, and Nicolas Malebranche that, for passions to be useful or to become virtues, they must be governed by reason. Without the moderation of reason, passions will be unruly, distort our notions of good, and disrupt our rational volitions. In response to these popular early modern perspectives, Enlightenment thinker David Hume offered a now-famous argument that reason without passion cannot motivate, drawing the further conclusion that reason cannot govern the passions, either. Given that no one in Hume's era seemed to defend the claim that reason alone can motivate action, what was Hume's intention?


Author(s):  
David G. Barrie

This essay examines developments in law enforcement before the birth of the widely heralded “new” police in the nineteenth century, focusing on mainland Britain but drawing comparisons with European experiences to ascertain how British developments fit within an international context. The essay shows that policing arrangements in eighteenth-century Britain were extremely advanced in many parts of the country, and the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act was the culmination of decades of innovation. Modern policing practices evolved from the activities of local elites, private and public watching and prosecution schemes, and a burgeoning print culture. Rather than viewing policing in Europe with suspicion, many British reformers were receptive to and embraced continental policing ideas and practices, underlining the need to acknowledge the important role that intellectual transfer and national and local emulation played in the evolution of modern policing.


Author(s):  
Robert C. Solomon

Emotions have always played a role in philosophy, even if philosophers have usually denied them centre stage. Because philosophy has so often been described as first and foremost a discipline of reason, the emotions have often been neglected or attacked as primitive, dangerous or irrational. Socrates reprimanded his pupil Crito, advising that we should not give in to our emotions, and some of the ancient Stoic philosophers urged a life of reason free from the enslavement of the emotions, a life of apatheia (apathy). In Buddhism, too, much attention has been given to the emotions, which are treated as ‘agitations’ or klesas. Buddhist ‘liberation’, like the Stoic apatheia, becomes a philosophical ideal, freedom from the emotions. Philosophers have not always downgraded the emotions, however. Aristotle defended the view that human beings are essentially rational animals, but he also stressed the importance of having the right emotions. David Hume, the eighteenth-century empiricist, insisted that ‘reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions’. In the nineteenth century, although Hegel described the history of philosophy as the development of reason he also argued that ‘nothing great is ever done without passion’. Much of the history of philosophy can be told in terms of the shifting relationship between the emotions (or ‘passions’) and reason, which are often at odds, at times seem to be at war, but ideally should be in harmony. Thus Plato painted a picture of the soul as a chariot with three horses, reason leading the appetites and ‘the spirited part’, working together. Nietzsche, at the end of the nineteenth century, suggested that ‘every passion contains its own quantum of reason’. Nietzsche’s suggestion, that emotion and reason are not really opposites but complementary or commingled, has been at the heart of much of the debate about emotions since ancient times. Are emotions intelligent, or are they simply physical reactions? Are they mere ‘feelings’, or do they play a vital role in philosophy and in our lives?


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