scholarly journals The effect of spatial distance between objects on categorization level

Author(s):  
Iris K. Schneider ◽  
André Mattes

AbstractWe show that spatial distance between two objects influences how people categorize these objects. We report three (two pre-registered) experiments that show that when objects are presented close together (proximal), they are more likely to be categorized in a superordinate category than when they are presented further apart (distant). In Experiments 1A and 1B, participants provided spontaneous category labels in an open response format. In Experiment 2, we asked participants to indicate their preference for either of two category labels. We found that when objects were close together, they were categorized more often into superordinate categories than when objects were far apart (Experiments 1A and 2). Our findings demonstrate that the categorization of objects is, in part, determined by where they are in relation to other objects.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris K. Schneider ◽  
André Mattes

We show that spatial distance between two objects influences how people categorize these objects. We report three (two pre-registered) experiments that show that when objects are presented close together (proximal), they are more likely to be categorized in a superordinate category than when they are presented further apart (distant). In Experiments 1A and 1B, participants provided spontaneous category labels in an open response format. In Experiment 2, we asked participants to indicate their preference for either of two category labels. We found that when objects are close together, they are categorized more often into superordinate categories than when objects are far apart (Experiment 1A and 2). Our findings demonstrate that the categorization of objects is, in part, determined by where they are in relation to other objects


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattson Ogg ◽  
Dustin Moraczewski ◽  
Stefanie Kuchinsky ◽  
L. Robert Slevc

Human listeners can quickly and easily recognize different sound sources (objects and events) in their environment. Understanding how this impressive ability is accomplished can improve signal processing and machine intelligence applications along with assistive listening technologies. However, it is not clear how the brain represents the many sounds that humans can recognize (such as speech and music) at the level of individual sources, categories and acoustic features. To examine the cortical organization of these representations, we used patterns of fMRI responses to decode 1) four individual speakers and instruments from one another (separately, within each category), 2) the superordinate category labels associated with each stimulus (speech or instrument), and 3) a set of simple synthesized sounds that could be differentiated entirely on their acoustic features. Data were collected using an interleaved silent steady state sequence to increase the temporal signal-to-noise ratio, and mitigate issues with auditory stimulus presentation in fMRI. Largely separable clusters of voxels in the temporal lobes supported the decoding of individual speakers and instruments from other stimuli in the same category. Decoding the superordinate category of each sound was more accurate and involved a larger portion of the temporal lobes. However, these clusters all overlapped with areas that could decode simple, acoustically separable stimuli. Thus, individual sound sources from different sound categories are represented in separate regions of the temporal lobes that are situated within regions implicated in more general acoustic processes. These results bridge an important gap in our understanding of cortical representations of sounds and their acoustics.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Machunsky ◽  
Thorsten Meiser

This research investigated whether relative ingroup prototypicality (i.e., the tendency to perceive one’s own ingroup as more prototypical of a superordinate category than the outgroup) can result from a prototype-based versus exemplar-based mental representation of social categories, rather than from ingroup membership per se as previously suggested by the ingroup projection model. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a prototype-based group was perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category than an exemplar-based group supporting the hypothesis that an intergroup context is not necessary for biased prototypicality judgments. Experiment 3 introduced an intergroup context in a minimal-group-like paradigm. The findings demonstrated that both the kind of cognitive representation and motivational processes contribute to biased prototypicality judgments in intergroup settings.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document