scholarly journals Filtering Semantics for Counterfactuals: Bridging Causal Models and Premise Semantics

2015 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Santorio
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Computer Science ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Causal Models ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Premise Semantics

<p>I argue that classical counterfactual semantics in the style of Stalnaker, Lewis, and Kratzer validates an inference pattern that is disconfirmed in natural language. The solution is to alter the algorithm we use to handle inconsistency in premise sets: rather than checking all maximally consistent fragments of a premise sets, as in Krazter's semantics, we selectively remove some of the premises. The proposed implementation starts from standard premise semantics and involves a new 'filtering' operation that achieves just this removal. The resulting semantics is interestingly related to the semantics for counterfactuals emerging from Judea Pearl's causal models framework in computer science: in particular, filtering is a possible worlds semantics counterpart of Pearl's interventions.</p>

Meaning, Modality, and Possible Worlds Semantics

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Formal Languages ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Natural Languages ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Richard Montague ◽  
Close Parallel

This chapter begins with a discussion of Kripke-style possible worlds semantics. It considers one of the most important applications of possible worlds semantics, the account of counterfactual conditionals given in Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. It then goes on to examine the work of Richard Montague. Montague specified syntactic rules that generate English, or English-like, structures directly, while pairing each such rule with a truth-theoretic rule interpreting it. This close parallel between syntax and semantics is what makes the languages of classical logic so transparently tractable, and what they were designed to embody. Montague's bold contention is that we do not have to replace natural language natural languages with formal substitutes to achieve such transparency. The same techniques employed to create formal languages can be used to describe natural languages in mathematically revealing ways.

scholarly journals Truthmaker semantics for natural language: Attitude verbs, modals, and intensional transitive verbs

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 159-200
Author(s):  
Friederike Moltmann
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Object Based ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Transitive Verbs ◽  
Language Attitude ◽  
Attitude Verbs ◽  
Truthmaker Semantics ◽  
Further Development

Abstract This paper gives an outline of truthmaker semantics for natural language against the background of standard possible-worlds semantics. It develops a truthmaker semantics for attitude reports and deontic modals based on an ontology of attitudinal and modal objects and on a semantic function of clauses as predicates of such objects. The semantics is applied to factive verbs and response-stance verbs as well as to cases of modal concord. The paper also presents new motivations for ‘object-based truthmaker semantics’ from intensional transitive verbs such as need, look for, own, and buy and gives an outline of their semantics based on a further development of truthmaker semantics.

The Failure of Conceptual Analysis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Conditional Statements ◽  
Reductive Analysis

Dispositions are often regarded with suspicion. Consequently, some philosophers try to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions to sentences containing only non-dispositional vocabulary. Typically, reductionists attempt to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. These conditional statements, like other modal claims, are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds semantics. However, conditional analyses are subject to a number of problems and counterexamples, including random coincidences, void satisfaction, masks, antidotes, mimics, altering, and finks. Some analyses fail to reduce disposition ascriptions to non-modal vocabulary. If reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions fails, then perhaps there can be metaphysical reduction of dispositions without semantic reduction. However, the reductionist still owes us an account of what makes disposition ascriptions true. But to posit a causal power for every unreduced dispositional predicate is an overreaction to the failure of conceptual analysis.

Using NLP for Fact Checking: A Survey

Designs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Eric Lazarski ◽  
Mahmood Al-Khassaweneh ◽  
Cynthia Howard
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language Processing ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Computer Science ◽  
Language Processing ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Fact Checking ◽  
The Many ◽  
Human Powered ◽  
The Web

In recent years, disinformation and “fake news” have been spreading throughout the internet at rates never seen before. This has created the need for fact-checking organizations, groups that seek out claims and comment on their veracity, to spawn worldwide to stem the tide of misinformation. However, even with the many human-powered fact-checking organizations that are currently in operation, disinformation continues to run rampant throughout the Web, and the existing organizations are unable to keep up. This paper discusses in detail recent advances in computer science to use natural language processing to automate fact checking. It follows the entire process of automated fact checking using natural language processing, from detecting claims to fact checking to outputting results. In summary, automated fact checking works well in some cases, though generalized fact checking still needs improvement prior to widespread use.

Possible Worlds Counterfactual Theories of Causation

1980 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Richard Adler
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Great Length ◽  
Current Interest ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Its Analysis ◽  
Counterfactual Theory ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Counterfactual Approach

The numerous difficulties facing the traditional Humean regularity approach to the problem of causation have been discussed in the literature at great length. In view of the current interest in possible worlds semantics, it is not surprising that the only serious alternative treatment of causation presently available, the counterfactual approach, has been explored recently as a means of circumventing the apparently unresolvable difficulties facing regularity causal theories. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that such a strategy holds little promise. Specifically, I will argue that, in addition to giving rise to problems directly analogous to those facing regularity accounts, the counterfactual approach fails in principle to reflect important properties of causal relations as we understand them intuitively. David Lewis's possible worlds account, the most comprehensive counterfactual theory to date, is further criticized for implicit problems with natural lawhood even more serious than those typically raised for regularity accounts, for additional inadequacies in its analysis of causal relations, and for its failure to satisfy basic empiricist epistemological standards.

Language, Meaning, and Information

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Language Meaning

This chapter is a case study of the process by which the attempt to solve philosophical problems sometimes leads to the birth of new domains of scientific inquiry. It traces how advances in logic and the philosophy of mathematics, starting with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, provided the foundations for what became a rigorous and scientific study of language, meaning, and information. After sketching the early stages of the story, it explains the importance of modal logic and “possible worlds semantics” in providing the foundation for the last half century of work in linguistic semantics and the philosophy of language. It argues that this foundation is insufficient to support the most urgently needed further advances. It proposes a new conception of truth-evaluable information as inherently representational cognitive acts of certain kinds. The chapter concludes by explaining how this conception of propositions can be used to illuminate the notion of truth; vindicate the connection between truth and meaning; and fulfill a central, but so far unkept, promise of possible worlds semantics.

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