scholarly journals What is the Role of ‘Human Nature’ and ‘Human Dignity’ in Our Biotechnological Age?

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Roberto Andorno
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Ruth Kinna

This book is designed to remove Peter Kropotkin from the framework of classical anarchism. By focusing attention on his theory of mutual aid, it argues that the classical framing distorts Kropotkin's political theory by associating it with a narrowly positivistic conception of science, a naively optimistic idea of human nature and a millenarian idea of revolution. Kropotkin's abiding concern with Russian revolutionary politics is the lens for this analysis. The argument is that his engagement with nihilism shaped his conception of science and that his expeditions in Siberia underpinned an approach to social analysis that was rooted in geography. Looking at Kropotkin's relationship with Elisée Reclus and Erico Malatesta and examining his critical appreciation of P-J. Proudhon, Michael Bakunin and Max Stirner, the study shows how he understood anarchist traditions and reveals the special character of his anarchist communism. His idea of the state as a colonising process and his contention that exploitation and oppression operate in global contexts is a key feature of this. Kropotkin's views about the role of theory in revolutionary practice show how he developed this critique of the state and capitalism to advance an idea of political change that combined the building of non-state alternatives through direct action and wilful disobedience. Against critics who argue that Kropotkin betrayed these principles in 1914, the book suggests that this controversial decision was consistent with his anarchism and that it reflected his judgment about the prospects of anarchistic revolution in Russia.


Moreana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (Number 207) (1) ◽  
pp. 36-56
Author(s):  
Gerard Wegemer

After establishing a context of More's lifelong engagement with the “calculus” of pleasure, this essay shows how the section devoted to the Utopians' pleasure philosophy is structured around five formulations of a “rule” to calculate “true and honest [honesta]” pleasure in ways that playfully imitate and echo the “rule” Cicero formulates several times in De officiis to discern one's duty when there seems to be a conflict between honestas et utilitas. When followed, the Utopian pleasure calculus shows the necessary role of societas, officii, iustitia, caritas, and the other aspects of human nature, most importantly friendship, that Cicero stresses in his rule and that he argued Epicurus ignored. Much of the irony and humor of this section depends on seeing the predominance of Ciceronian vocabulary in Raphael's unusual defense [patrocinium] of pleasure, rather than a Ciceronian defense of duty rooted in honestas. Throughout, however, this essay also shows how More goes beyond Cicero by including Augustinian and biblical allusions to suggest ways that our final end is not as Epicurus or the Stoics or Cicero claim; the language and allusions of this section point to a level of good cheer and care for neighbors and for God in ways quite different from any classical thinker.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 324-337
Author(s):  
Jan-Olav Henriksen
Keyword(s):  

1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Kocis

At the root of the conflict between Berlin and his critics is a fundamental disagreement over the possibility of certainty and over the relation of human ends to politics. Gerald MacCallum's formalist critique obscures the political question of whose values a free person is at liberty to pursue. Macpherson's attempt to defend positive liberty as not rationalistic is shown to fail because he (a) conflates liberty with its conditions and (b) assumes a rational pattern to human moral development. And Crick charges Berlin with ignoring politics, understood as active participation in the polis. Finally, Berlin's conception of politics as a form of human interaction aimed at creating the conditions of human dignity in a situation where we sincerely disagree over the ends of life is shown to be an effort to liberate us to live life for our own purposes. Yet Berlin's defense of liberty is problematic because it is too skeptical; to overcome this difficulty, a non-teleological yet developmentalist account of human nature and a weakly hierarchical account of human values is suggested.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pritam Baruah

Employing moral values as justifications in judicial decisions has been controversial. At present, there is increasing controversy over the application of human dignity. Contemporary debates on the role of dignity in law and adjudication are heavily influenced by Christopher McCrudden’s account of dignity as a placeholder, and much thinking on the contested nature of values is influenced by WB Gallie’s idea of Essentially Contested Concepts. In this paper I argue that both these accounts have limited explanatory and normative potential. McCrudden’s account is illuminating in terms of the role of dignity in the UDHR, but weak in terms of explaining why employing dignity in adjudication yields diverging conclusions, and why dignity should be understood to be a placeholder. His reliance on Gallie’s idea of Essentially Contested Concepts is also misplaced. Gallie’s views often serve as a philosophical basis for understanding the contested nature of values generally. I argue that his account is an external-descriptive one, which cannot explain why persistent disagreement ensues because of the peculiar nature of some concepts. Neither does it point out any property of essential contestability that is unique to some concepts. Thinking on how values such as dignity can figure as justifications for decisions, therefore, must explore other alternatives.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-288
Author(s):  
James Hill

This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume's understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is ‘nothing but’ an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual power of intuitive and demonstrative reason that is not itself an instinct. At first sight it may look as if this intellectual reason, that is capable of grasping ‘relations of ideas’, is not even grounded in instinct but is a thoroughly non-natural element in human nature. On closer analysis, however, it is shown that intellectual reason, in its apprehension of ‘abstract’ and general relations, is dependent on language – the use of ‘terms’ – and that language itself is grounded in instinctive associations of ideas. Thus, Hume's overall view is that even the intellect is an outgrowth of instinct and his conception of human nature is, therefore, shown to be fully naturalistic. Yet this naturalism can still make room for the ‘exceptionalism’ of human mathematical thought, which has no counterpart in the animal kingdom where language is lacking.


Diacovensia ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-456
Author(s):  
Mislav Kutleša

The paper seeks to establish a relationship between bioethics and biopolitics in the context of elderly people. Although aging itself is not a phenomenon, the attitude towards elderly people is highlighted as a phenomenon. Given that they often lose their psychophysical abilities and are faced with personal limitations, they inevitably face both the value system and the treatment of society. In this sense, biopolitics is manifested as the force and power whose instruments allow it to transform and shape a new culture, however, not by independent work, but relying on the help of bioethics, whose main concern is the attitude towards human dignity, life and health. Contrary to the culture of materialism and consumerism, bioethics has the task to reawaken in the modern society the meaning and value of human nature as the basis of ethics and healthy biopolitics in order to raise awareness of virtues as part of the nature of the human person. This aims to highlight the ethics of virtues as a new paradigm of biopolitics because it corresponds to that original and primordial human.


Zograf ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 89-106
Author(s):  
Marka Tomic-Djuric

The paper discusses the figures on the bema of the altar apse in the Church of St. Demetrios of Markov Manastir (Marko?s Monastery) painted in 1376/1377. It offers a more detailed overview of the programmatic and iconographic characteristics of previously known depictions of the Virgin?s ancestors and identifies the second ancestral couple. Following a reexamination of hypotheses that have been suggested so far, the paper concludes that the second pair of Old Testament personages should be identified as representing the original ancestors of humanity - Adam and Eve. The visual solution incorporating Sts. Joachim and Anne as well as Adam and Eve is highly unusual. The paper also discusses the peculiar thematic concept in the central apse of Markov Manastir, which was conceived so as to draw attention of the faithful to the human nature of Christ, while the choice of ancestors underlines the role of the Virgin?s parents in the economy of salvation and emphasizes the theological idea of absolution from ancestral sin and the rebirth of humanity beginning with the incarnation of God-Man.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Khairul Nizam Bin Zainal Badri

This article aims to analyze the importance of humanistic education from a psychological standpoint. Humanistic education can be considered as a form of education that promotes positive psychological development. Through humanistic education, human dignity is elevated as much as human intellect can be, and thinking can be further developed. Humanistic education also enlivens human nature through the realization of one's existence. However, humanistic education must be in line with religion so that students will not be confused by the true meaning of freedom. True human values must be based on religion and not on mere logic


Author(s):  
David Lloyd Dusenbury

Nemesius of Emesa’s On Human Nature (De Natura Hominis) is the first Christian anthropology. Written in Greek, circa 390 CE, it was read in half a dozen languages—from Baghdad to Oxford—well into the early modern period. Nemesius’ text circulated in two Latin versions in the centuries that saw the rise of European universities, shaping scholastic theories of human nature. During the Renaissance, it saw a flurry of print editions, helping to inspire a new discourse of human dignity. This is the first monograph in English on Nemesius’ treatise. On the interpretation offered here, the Syrian bishop seeks to define the human qua human. His early Christian anthropology is cosmopolitan. ‘Things that are natural’, he writes, ‘are the same for all’. In his pages, a host of texts and discourses—biblical and medical, legal and philosophical—are made to converge upon a decisive tenet of Christian late antiquity: humans’ natural freedom. For Nemesius, reason and choice are a divine double-strand of powers. Since he believes that both are a natural human inheritance, he concludes that much is ‘in our power’. Nemesius defines humans as the only living beings who are at once ruler (intellect) and ruled (body). Because of this, the human is a ‘little world’, binding the rationality of angels to the flux of elements, the tranquillity of plants, and the impulsiveness of animals. This book traces Nemesius’ reasoning through the whole of On Human Nature, as he seeks to give a long-influential image of humankind both philosophical and anatomical proof.


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