1914: The Early Months of the War

Author(s):  
Robb Robinson

This chapter recounts how Winston Churchill ordered the Grand Fleet to take up their war station at the remote anchorage of Scapa Flow on 29 July 1914. It discusses Germany's invasion of Belgium that drew Britain into the conflict just within two days of the Grand Fleet's arrival in Orkney. It also theorizes how the anchorage at Scapa enabled the Royal Navy's fleet of dreadnoughts to command the North Sea and anticipate threats from its smaller German counterpart, the High Seas Fleet. The chapter cites the Koenigen Luise vessel that laid the first minefield of the Great War, implying that the British could expect the Germans to pursue an aggressive and defensive mining policy. It details how the minefield disrupted coastal shipping up and down the coast.

Author(s):  
Robb Robinson

This chapter reflects on the British fishing industry that boomed in 1913 and in the years preceding the outbreak of the Great War. It refers to the Grimsby steam trawler Zenobia that was detained for several hours in Heligoland after being stopped by a German gunboat on 4 August 1914, but then was eventually allowed to proceed. It also recalls the German trawler Else Kunkel and fishing smack Hammil Warden that were detained after sailing into Aberdeen, unaware that war had been declared the previous night. The chapter mentions the Admiralty that had been keen to get fishing vessels off the North Sea as the waters were likely to be on the front line of the maritime war, providing no place for civilian fishing vessels. It elaborates how substantial numbers of fishermen and fishing vessels became required for wartime naval security duties.


2019 ◽  
pp. 166-197
Author(s):  
Martin Pugh

This chapter details how, during the 14 years before the outbreak of the First World War, Britain comprehensively revised her diplomatic alignments, readjusted her military strategy, and rearranged her armed forces to meet the threat posed by the European powers. In the process, she signed an alliance with Japan and ententes with France and Russia, she concentrated her fleet in the North Sea and the Channel, and developed a plan to prevent Germany from imposing a quick defeat on France by mobilising a new British Expeditionary Force. However, there remained one flaw in all this: she had not really considered the Ottoman Empire or, indeed, the wider question of her relations with the Muslim societies in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and especially India. This oversight was a by-product of her new strategy, which frankly made security in Europe the chief object and in effect downgraded the importance of the imperial world. As a result, Britain failed to take full account of changes in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa engendered by the Great War.


Author(s):  
S. Raghu Kumar

SynopsisQuantitative studies on marine Phycomycetes (thraustochytrids) were carried out at 6 stations between the Fladenground area of the North Sea and the mouth of the River Tay, between September 1975 and September 1976. Five samplings were made of the surface water and the sediment during this period. The number of fungi/litre sea water or sediment increased with the proximity to the mouth of the river compared to the high seas. The fungal population exhibited a seasonal fluctuation, a high number occurring in September and an extremely low number occurring in March. The sediments revealed a very high number of propagules/litre (up to 73,000) compared to the water (up to 384).


Author(s):  
Matthew S. Seligmann

Under the leadership of Alfred von Tirpitz, the German navy concentrated on building a battle fleet based in the North Sea rather than cruisers designed for operations in distant waters. This has led many historians to assume that commerce warfare (Handelskrieg) played no real part in German preparations for war against Britain before 1914. This chapter disputes this analysis. It shows that Germany’s naval planners in the Admiralstab believed that by converting merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers and using them to attack British commerce on the high seas the German navy would be able to cause considerable damage to British shipping and so force the Royal Navy to divert forces from the main theatre of war to distant oceans. It goes on to examine the reality of this plan during the First World War.


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