Islamophobia

This chapter discusses how, misled by Islamophobic propaganda, Britain and America were unable to come to terms with what they called ‘Islamism’. The origins of what is variously known as Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, and radical Islamism lie in the 1960s, in the ideas of a handful of Muslims in Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran who believed that Muslims had been led astray from their religion by nationalist movements. Although some Muslims were critical of Western morality and politics, Islamism was not primarily anti-Western: it was essentially a reaction against what were widely seen as the corrupt, authoritarian, and secular regimes that controlled much of the Muslim world. The aim was to evict them, return to a purer form of Islam and re-create an Islamic state. In view of the exaggerated reputation it enjoys in the West, it is worth remembering that this movement has largely been a failure. Yet while fundamentalism appeals to only a small minority, it is also the case that large numbers of Muslims have become aggrieved by the policies of the Western powers. The explanation for this can be found in long-term frustration with the consistently pro-Israeli policy of Britain and the United States over Palestine, in addition to the proximate causes in the shape of two Afghan wars, the genocide in Bosnia, the Rushdie affair, and the first Gulf War in 1990, which made many Muslims see themselves as the victims of Western aggression and interventionism.

Muslims and the Crisis of British National Identity

This chapter demonstrates how, despite their experience of prejudice, Muslims became involved in a gradual process of integration into mainstream society; in this period they largely thought of themselves as ‘black’ or as Asians, rather than as Muslims. First-generation British Muslims had been fairly relaxed about social behaviour and religious observation. Meanwhile, the second generation of Muslims were not in Britain as temporary economic migrants, and consequently were less passive than their predecessors, more confident and aware of their opportunities and rights in Britain. For them, integration into mainstream society went hand in hand with an increasing assertiveness in the face of prejudice and an awareness of their identity as Anglo-Asians. By the 1980s and 1990s, the younger generation were becoming alienated from their parents due to familiarity with a secular society; many regarded the world of the mosque as boring. Muslims also began to reflect mainstream practice in other ways: more women in their twenties remained unmarried and, with their better language skills and qualifications, they were more likely to be in paid employment.

The Great War and the Re-drawing of the Ottoman Empire

This chapter details how, during the 14 years before the outbreak of the First World War, Britain comprehensively revised her diplomatic alignments, readjusted her military strategy, and rearranged her armed forces to meet the threat posed by the European powers. In the process, she signed an alliance with Japan and ententes with France and Russia, she concentrated her fleet in the North Sea and the Channel, and developed a plan to prevent Germany from imposing a quick defeat on France by mobilising a new British Expeditionary Force. However, there remained one flaw in all this: she had not really considered the Ottoman Empire or, indeed, the wider question of her relations with the Muslim societies in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and especially India. This oversight was a by-product of her new strategy, which frankly made security in Europe the chief object and in effect downgraded the importance of the imperial world. As a result, Britain failed to take full account of changes in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa engendered by the Great War.

The Impact of the Reformation

This chapter focuses on the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Following Henry VIII's break with Rome in 1531, the English Reformation led Britain into a protracted struggle with the two great Catholic powers, Spain and France, for the next 300 years. The long-term effect was to define Britain as the leading Protestant power; but more immediately, it posed a far greater threat to England than Islam, and effectively destroyed the rationale for crusading activities. In this situation, the Islamic empires actually became a valuable balancing factor in European diplomacy. Henry's readiness to deal with the Muslim powers was far from eccentric during the sixteenth century. Both King Francis I of France and Queen Elizabeth I of England took the policy of collaboration much further.

The Victorians, Islam and the Idea of Progress

This chapter assesses Victorian progress, and considers a marked shift in British thinking during the nineteenth century. After the comparative tolerance of the eighteenth century, the Victorian era saw a distinct deterioration in British attitudes towards Islam, culminating in an almost fanatical view of Muslims by the later nineteenth century. While there is a variety of explanations for the long-term trend, the fundamental one lay in the impact of the process of industrialisation that had set in during the late eighteenth century and that had left Britain apparently the world's leading power by the 1850s. Many Victorians convinced themselves that their success was underpinned by something distinctive in the English national character or experience. Even when confronted with the evidence produced by mid-century investigations into widespread poverty, many Victorians retained their self-confidence, arguing that if industrial development continued for another generation it would inevitably generate employment and spread prosperity for all who were able and willing to work.

The Myths of the Crusades

This chapter examines the Crusades, which stamped their indelible mark on English identity. They formed a heroic episode, generated some of the iconic English figures, resulted in the adoption of the red cross as a symbol of England, and created a narrative that was to be resurrected later in the Victorian period. Yet the fact remains that they loom much larger in European history than in the history of the Muslim world; and even in Europe, their impact was largely erased during the period from the Reformation to the eighteenth century. Moreover, as one leading historian of the subject has put it: ‘Most of what passes in public as knowledge of the Crusades is either misleading or false’. Consequently, their significance must be heavily qualified in a number of ways. The most obvious is that they proved to be a failure. It is also arguable that not only did crusading fail, but it even undermined Christendom, in that it eventually weakened the Byzantine Empire, which lost its ability to protect Christians against the expansion of Turkish power in south-east Europe. Moreover, the motivation for participating in the Crusades was, at best, a mixture of the secular and the religious.