Elasticity, Total Revenue, and the Linear Demand Curve

2014 ◽  
Vol 912-914 ◽  
pp. 1865-1873
Author(s):  
Xing You Gao

Equilibrium production, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly firms with 2 sub markets by complete information static game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets while discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.


HortScience ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (5) ◽  
pp. 742-748
Author(s):  
Jong Woo Choi ◽  
Chengyan Yue ◽  
James Luby ◽  
Shuoli Zhao ◽  
Karina Gallardo ◽  
...  

We conducted choice experiments with both strawberry producers and consumers. Consumer and producer willingness to pay (WTP) for the fruit attributes were estimated using mixed logit models. Through simulation using the mixed logit model results, we derived the market equilibrium prices, supply and demand curve, as well as quantities demanded and supplied for every fruit attribute. We found the highest equilibrium price was for strawberry internal color followed by flavor. Strawberry breeders can use the information when setting breeding targets, allocating resources appropriately during their breeding process and focusing on the improvement of attributes that produce the highest social surplus and total revenue.


Author(s):  
Mohammad Torshizi ◽  
Murray E. Fulton ◽  
Richard S. Gray

Abstract In Hotelling’s linear town model characteristics are implicitly assumed to be related in such a way that preferences for them can be mapped into a one-dimensional town. This results in perfectly correlated willingness to pay levels. Many differentiated products, however, embody characteristics that are functionally at least somewhat unrelated to other characteristics. This paper makes the implicit assumption of perfectly correlated preferences in the original Hotelling model explicit, and examine the implications of this assumption for the economics of competition. We develop a simple theoretical model to show that shape of the demand curve for differentiated products depends on distribution of consumers’ preferences, which is determined by the nature of the relationship between the corresponding characteristics. Misrepresentation of correlated preferences in differentiated product models impacts demand elasticity and can result in unreliable outcomes. This issue is particularly important in agricultural and food markets where many factors such as expectations about weather and information on social media can impact consumer ranking of one product versus another in ways that are not fully observable or measurable by the researcher.


2004 ◽  
Vol 06 (03) ◽  
pp. 417-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAN TUINSTRA

We consider a price adjustment process in a model of monopolistic competition. Firms have incomplete information about the demand structure. When they set a price they observe the amount they can sell at that price and they observe the slope of the true demand curve at that price. With this information they estimate a linear demand curve. Given this estimate of the demand curve they set a new optimal price. We investigate the dynamical properties of this learning process. We find that, if the cross-price effects and the curvature of the demand curve are small, prices converge to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. The global dynamics of this adjustment process are analyzed by numerical simulations. By means of computational techniques and by applying results from homoclinic bifurcation theory we provide evidence for the existence of strange attractors.


2020 ◽  
pp. 105-116
Author(s):  
N. I. Shagaida

The article clarifies the concept of “agricultural holding”, using an approach to assessing the size on the basis of the total revenue of all agricultural organizations within the agricultural holding. It has been revealed that only 100 of the total number of agricultural holdings that were identified can be attributed to large business entities. They comprise about 3% of agricultural organizations in the country, while their share in the proceeds is about 37%. A large share of agricultural holdings — large business subjects under the control of Russian entities operate in one, and under the control of foreign legal entities — in three or more regions of the Russian Federation. Vertical integration within the framework of large agricultural holdings with different schemes for including the stages of processing and sale of products produced in their agricultural organizations allows them to receive advantages. Strengthening the role of large business entities in agriculture puts on the agenda the issue of differentiating approaches to taxation and state support in agriculture, depending on the size of the companies’ agricultural businesses.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Jordan ◽  
Bouke Klein Teeselink ◽  
Nicholas Adolph ◽  
Shane Frederick
Keyword(s):  

1967 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takashi Negishi
Keyword(s):  

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