scholarly journals Moral judgment is important in COVID-19 pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 615-617
Author(s):  
Turki Abualait ◽  
Shahid Bashir

The nature of moral judgment is not only of longstanding philosophical interest, but also it is a matter of immediate practical concern. Currently, when the information, the advice, even the science and the sequela of the pandemic COVID-19 are all consistently and rapidly changing, it creates inconsistency in our decision making. Nevertheless, we lack of a detailed scientific understanding of how people make moral decisions. The letter is an effort aimed at understanding moral decision-making during the present pandemic of COVID-19.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Sophia Strojny

<p>Moral dilemmas require individuals to make a life-altering choice. Due to the severity of the choice, we argue that there is a degree of fear in moral decision-making. We aimed to see how prevailing fears in each individual predicts moral decision-making habits. We looked into the emotional and physical divisions of fear to deem which dimension of fear is more dominant in each participant. Then analysed these results against reported deontological or utilitarian moral inclinations to see if higher reports of fear impact moral decision-making. Additionally, we included two secondary variables that are most prevalent in fear research (gender and thinking styles) as well as the impact of burden on moral choice. We found that our research was supported; fear tendencies are linked to individual behaviours and burden of moral decisions was influenced by what we fear and affected moral choices.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 591-605
Author(s):  
Jarosław Horowski

Abstract The direct reference point for these analyses is the process of making moral decisions, but a particular point of interest is the difficulty associated with making decisions when acting subjects are aware that their choice of moral good can lead to the breakdown of relationships with those close to them (family members or friends) or to their exclusion from the group(s) that have been most important to them so far in their lives, consequently causing them to experience loneliness. This difficulty is a challenge for education, which in supporting the moral development of a maturing person should prepare her/him for choosing moral good even if this requires personal sacrifices. In these analyses, assuming that knowledge of moral good is not sufficient for morally good actions, I refer mainly to the virtues of character that facilitate making morally good decisions and I seek the answer to the question: what character traits (moral virtues) should be shaped in maturing persons, so that as adults they can resist moral evil, even when this will clearly lead to the experience of loneliness? I propose these character traits as expressing moral virtues—especially the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude (neo-Thomistic approach). In this way, I join in the discussion relating to the teleology of education. I do not touch on the methodology of education, however. The argument is presented in two parts. In the first, I introduce the problem of decision-making implying consent to loneliness. In the second, I reflect on the characteristics of a person who is capable of making such a decision.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Bulger

This treatise is a contribution towards the understanding of why humankind cannot agree on the foundation of morality and why moral pluralism is the logical constitution of moral reality. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the model that will describe how persons can make moral decisions as pluralistic agents. If this model is correct, then it will not be a new discovery, rather, it will be a new description of how pluralistic agents do in fact make moral decisions. This synergistic-reflective-equilibrium description should then be useful not only in giving a fuller understanding of how moral decisions ought to be made, but also how moral philosophy can be united into a pluralistic collective whole. The first part of this paper defines the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium mode. It briefly explains how it is a combination of both the theory model of moral decision-making and the intuition model of moral decision-making. The second part of this paper defines mid-level principles and explains how they are a natural development of the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium method. It will then be shown that both Mill and Kant used this method in their own moral theories. Lastly, it will be shown how "weighing and balancing" and "specification" are integral components in this model and were also practiced by Mill and Kant in their moral systems.


2013 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 33-44
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Noorani ◽  
Khurram Shakir ◽  
Muddasir Hussain

Ethical enigma kernelling concerns about actions against concerns about consequences have been dealt by philosophers and psychologists to measure “universal” moral intuitions. Although these enigmas contain no evident political content, we decipher that liberals are more likely than conservatives to be concerned about consequences, whereas conservatives are more likely than liberals to be concerned about actions. This denouement is exhibited in two large, heterogeneous samples and across several different moral dilemmas. In addition, manipulations of dilemma averseness and order of presentation suggest that this political difference is due in part to different sensitivities to emotional reactions in moral decision-making: Conservatives are very much inclined to “go with the gut” and let affective responses guide moral judgments, while liberals are more likely to deliberate about optimal consequences. In this article, extracting a sample from Western Europe, we report evidence that political differences can be found in moral decisions about issues that have no evident political content. In particular, we find that conservatives are more likely than liberals to attend to the action itself when deciding whether something is right or wrong, whereas liberals are more likely than conservatives to attend to the consequences of the action. Further, we report preliminary evidence that this is partly explained by the kernel of truth from the parodies – conservatives are more likely than liberals to “go with the gut” by using their affective responses to guide moral judgment.


Author(s):  
Sergey N. Enikolopov ◽  
Tatina I. Medvedeva ◽  
Olga M. Boyko ◽  
Oksana Yu. Vorontsova ◽  
Olga Yu. Kazmina

Relevance. The COVID-19 pandemic reveals the problem of moral choices for a large number of people: who should be treated first; who can be considered as a subject for urgent vaccines and drugs testing; choice between personal convenience and observation of restrictions for the sake of the “common good.” The objective of the study was to evaluate whether the stress experienced by people during the COVID-19 pandemic can change moral decision making. Materials and methods. The data of an online survey conducted from March 30 to May 31 (311 people) were analyzed. The survey included sociodemographic questions, questions about assessing one’s current condition, the Simptom Check List-90-Revised (SCL-90-R), and the Moral Dilemmas Test, consisting of 30 dilemmas. The relationship of a number of utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas with sociodemographic characteristics, respondents’ assessments of their state and psychopathological characteristics was analyzed. Solving personal moral dilemmas was considered within subgroups of respondents with a high level of somatization and a high level of psychopathological symptoms and it was reviewed separately. Results. The results showed a high level of distress throughout the survey and an increase of utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas by the end of the survey. The number of choices in personal dilemmas was lower among older respondents, higher among men, and positively correlated with psychopathological symptoms. In the subgroup with a high level of somatization, personal choices slightly decreased by the end of the survey. On the contrary, in the subgroup with high levels of psychopathological symptoms, the number of personal choices significantly increased. Conclusions. Against the background of quarantine, assessments of moral standards change. The level of stress ambiguously affects moral decisions. A high level of somatization leads to a decrease in utilitarian personal choices, and a higher level of psychopathological symptoms leads to an increase in utilitarianш choices. Utilitarian personal choices are more often made by men and younger people


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 425-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Decety

Although empathy drives prosocial behaviors, it is not always a reliable source of information in moral decision making. In this essay, I integrate evolutionary theory, behavioral economics, psychology, and social neuroscience to demonstrate why and how empathy is unconsciously and rapidly modulated by various social signals and situational factors. This theoretical framework explains why decision making that relies solely on empathy is not ideal and can, at times, erode ethical values. This perspective has social and societal implications and can be used to reduce cognitive biases and guide moral decisions.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinhyung Kim ◽  
Andrew Gregory Christy ◽  
Grace Noelle Rivera ◽  
Rebecca Jean Schlegel ◽  
Joshua Hicks

People seem to share a widespread lay belief that true selves are morally good entities. This lay belief has downstream consequences for a variety of domains such as person perception and perceived self-knowledge. The current work examines whether it also has consequences for moral decision-making. We hypothesized that people would make more moral decisions when they were focused on being authentic as opposed to being focused on other decision-making strategies. This hypothesis rests on the idea that if people believe their true selves are morally good, then attempts to follow that true self will make them less willing to behave immorally. Consistent with this hypothesis, three within-subject studies (total N = 573) found that participants reported they would need more money to violate a moral norm if they were focused on trying to be authentic relative to if they were focused on being rational, intuitive or realistic.


2017 ◽  
Vol 120 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Cao ◽  
Jiaxi Zhang ◽  
Lei Song ◽  
Shoupeng Wang ◽  
Danmin Miao ◽  
...  

The present study investigated the effect of dilemma type, framing, and number of saved lives on moral decision making. A total of 591 undergraduates, with a mean age of 20.56 (SD = 1.37) were randomly assigned to 12 groups on the basis of a grid of two dilemma types (the trolley problem or the footbridge dilemma) by three frames (positive, neutral, or negative frame) by two different numbers of workers (5 or 15 people). The main effects of dilemma type, frame, and number of saved workers were all significant. The interaction of dilemma type and number of saved workers and the interaction of the three independent factors were significant. Results indicated that moral judgment is affected by framing. Specifically, people were more inclined to utilitarianism in the positive or neutral frame and more inclined to intuitionism in the negative frame. Furthermore, this effect can be moderated by dilemma type and number of saved lives. Implications of our results are discussed.


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