Framing Effect in the Trolley Problem and Footbridge Dilemma

2017 ◽  
Vol 120 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Cao ◽  
Jiaxi Zhang ◽  
Lei Song ◽  
Shoupeng Wang ◽  
Danmin Miao ◽  
...  

The present study investigated the effect of dilemma type, framing, and number of saved lives on moral decision making. A total of 591 undergraduates, with a mean age of 20.56 (SD = 1.37) were randomly assigned to 12 groups on the basis of a grid of two dilemma types (the trolley problem or the footbridge dilemma) by three frames (positive, neutral, or negative frame) by two different numbers of workers (5 or 15 people). The main effects of dilemma type, frame, and number of saved workers were all significant. The interaction of dilemma type and number of saved workers and the interaction of the three independent factors were significant. Results indicated that moral judgment is affected by framing. Specifically, people were more inclined to utilitarianism in the positive or neutral frame and more inclined to intuitionism in the negative frame. Furthermore, this effect can be moderated by dilemma type and number of saved lives. Implications of our results are discussed.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 615-617
Author(s):  
Turki Abualait ◽  
Shahid Bashir

The nature of moral judgment is not only of longstanding philosophical interest, but also it is a matter of immediate practical concern. Currently, when the information, the advice, even the science and the sequela of the pandemic COVID-19 are all consistently and rapidly changing, it creates inconsistency in our decision making. Nevertheless, we lack of a detailed scientific understanding of how people make moral decisions. The letter is an effort aimed at understanding moral decision-making during the present pandemic of COVID-19.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinan Alper

Abstract. Past research produced mixed results regarding the effect of abstract/concrete mindset on the moral judgment of hypothetical scenarios. I argued that an abstract mindset could decrease or increase deception as different lines of research suggested that the effect could be in both directions. In four experiments, three different paradigms were used to manipulate mindset and its effect on participants’ own deceptive behavior was examined. Abstract mindset manipulation increased the level of deception in Study 1 and 2, but not in Study 3. Study 4 provided an opposite result as abstractness decreased deception. The results suggested that mindset manipulation might trigger multiple mechanisms having contradictory effects. I argued that future research should account for these mechanisms and individual differences in understanding the effect of abstract mindset on moral decision-making.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Nasello ◽  
Benoit Dardenne ◽  
Michel Hansenne ◽  
Adélaïde Blavier ◽  
Jean-Marc Triffaux

BackgroundThe present study demonstrated a causal effect of participants’ perspectives on moral decision-making by using Trolley problems and variants. Furthermore, we investigated whether empathy and borderline personality traits (BDL traits) significantly predicted participants’ choices. We used a classical Trolley problem (a causing harm scenario) and an everyday trolley-like problem (a causing inconvenience scenario). MethodsSubjects voluntarily participated in our study (N = 427, women: 54%), fulfilled BDL traits and empathy questionnaires, and randomly completed the two types of Trolley problems, presenting both three perspectives. ResultsWe provided strong evidence that participants’ perspectives on trolley problems and variants caused significant changes in their moral decision-making. Additionally, affective empathy and BDL traits significantly predicted participants’ decisions of the causing inconvenience scenario, while only BDL traits predicted choices in the causing harm scenario. ConclusionsThis study addressed several originalities by providing new experimental materials, causal results, and the significant influence of BDL traits and affective empathy on moral decision-making. These findings raised fundamental questions that are developed in the discussion.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. e0164012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustav Tinghög ◽  
David Andersson ◽  
Caroline Bonn ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
Michael Kirchler ◽  
...  

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