Linear Voting Rules

Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2037-2077 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Peter Grüner ◽  
Thomas Tröger
Keyword(s):  
Decision Process ◽  
Weighted Sum ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Election Result ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Linear Rule ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Participation Costs ◽  
Independent Private Values

How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly, and monetary transfers are not feasible? Assuming symmetric independent private values, we show that it is utilitarian‐optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternative‐dependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Any combination of weights and threshold can be optimal. A standard quorum rule can be optimal only when it yields the same outcome as a linear rule. A linear rule is called upper linear if the default is upset at every election result that meets the threshold exactly. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria of voting rules in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for any two‐sided upper linear rule that is optimal under compulsory participation.

scholarly journals Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCO BATTAGLINI ◽  
REBECCA MORTON ◽  
THOMAS PALFREY
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Voting Games ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Participation Costs ◽  
Voting Mechanisms ◽  
Better Than

We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies, in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games. We find a tradeoff between information aggregation, efficiency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information environments, but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs.

scholarly journals Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

2011 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omer Biran ◽  
Françoise Forges
Keyword(s):  
Private Values ◽  
Independent Private Values

scholarly journals Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilat Levy
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
The Right

In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)

Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH ◽  
TIMOTHY J. FEDDERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Preference Uncertainty ◽  
Voting Rule

A deliberative committee is a group of at least two individuals who first debate about what alternative to choose prior to these same individuals voting to determine the choice. We argue, first, that uncertainty about individuals' private preferences is necessary for full information sharing and, second, demonstrate in a very general setting that the condition under which unanimity can support full information revelation in debate amounts to it being common knowledge that all committee members invariably share identical preferences over the alternatives. It follows that if ever there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under unanimity rule, there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under any voting rule. Moreover, the converse is not true of majority rule if there is uncertainty about individuals' preferences.

scholarly journals Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Brandl ◽  
Felix Brandt ◽  
Christian Geist ◽  
Johannes Hofbauer
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Large Problem ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Natural Conditions ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Joint Decisions ◽  
Sat Solver ◽  
Unsatisfiable Core ◽  
Positive Results

Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. A common flaw of some voting rules, known as the no-show paradox, is that agents may obtain a more preferred outcome by abstaining from an election. We study strategic abstention for set-valued voting rules based on Kelly's and Fishburn's preference extensions. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that, whenever there are at least five alternatives and seven agents, every Pareto-optimal majoritarian voting rule suffers from the no-show paradox with respect to Fishburn's extension. This is achieved by reducing the statement to a finite - yet very large - problem, which is encoded as a formula in propositional logic and then shown to be unsatisfiable by a SAT solver. We also provide a human-readable proof which we extracted from a minimal unsatisfiable core of the formula. Secondly, we prove that every voting rule that satisfies two natural conditions cannot be manipulated by strategic abstention with respect to Kelly's extension and give examples of well-known Pareto-optimal majoritarian voting rules that meet these requirements.

The Study of Strategic Voting

2019 ◽  
pp. 291-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Blais ◽  
Arianna Degan
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Strategic Vote ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Lab Experiments ◽  
Voting Rule

This chapter stresses the necessity of distinguishing between a strategic vote and a strategic voter. The sincere voter always casts a sincere vote, while the strategic voter casts a sincere or strategic vote depending on the context and the voting rule. This leads to two definitions of strategic voting: a broad one, where a strategic vote is one that is partly based on expectations about the outcome of the election, and a narrow one, where a strategic vote also entails not voting sincerely. The chapter then reviews three types of empirical research that differ with respect to the type of data used: the observation of electoral outcomes, survey data, and lab experiments. That literature has confirmed that indeed some voters cast a strategic vote, though many studies have found most votes to be sincere. That research has also shown that there is some degree of strategic voting under all kinds of voting rules; that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is as much strategic voting under proportional representation as under plurality rule; and that the propensity to vote strategically depends very much on the type of information that is available.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document