scholarly journals Learning From Coworkers

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 647-676
Author(s):  
Gregor Jarosch ◽  
Ezra Oberfield ◽  
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg

We investigate learning at the workplace. To do so, we use German administrative data that contain information on the entire workforce of a sample of establishments. We document that having more‐highly‐paid coworkers is strongly associated with future wage growth, particularly if those workers earn more. Motivated by this fact, we propose a dynamic theory of a competitive labor market where firms produce using teams of heterogeneous workers that learn from each other. We develop a methodology to structurally estimate knowledge flows using the full‐richness of the German employer‐employee matched data. The methodology builds on the observation that a competitive labor market prices coworker learning. Our quantitative approach imposes minimal restrictions on firms' production functions, can be implemented on a very short panel, and allows for potentially rich and flexible coworker learning functions. In line with our reduced‐form results, learning from coworkers is significant, particularly from more knowledgeable coworkers. We show that between 4 and 9% of total worker compensation is in the form of learning and that inequality in total compensation is significantly lower than inequality in wages.

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Tapan Biswas ◽  
Jolian McHardy

We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a spatially segregated  Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions whose utility functions depend on both wages and employment. We show that with neoclassical as well as Leontief technology, unions raise wages to appropriate fully the gains from labor-saving technological (or organisational) improvements, leaving the firm with no incentive to invest in increasing the efficiency of workers. However, capital-saving     technological improvement may be profitable depending on the elasticity of substitution. Finally, we examine the implication of a fixed minimum wage (or competitive labor market) in one country.


Author(s):  
Amitabh Chandra ◽  
Craig Garthwaite

In this article, we develop an economic framework for Medicare reform that highlights trade-offs that reform proposals should grapple with, but often ignore. Central to our argument is a tension in administratively set prices, which may improve short-term efficiency but do so at the expense of dynamic efficiency (slowing innovations in new treatments). The smaller the Medicare program is relative to the commercial market, the less important this is; but in a world where there are no market prices or the private sector is very small, the task of setting prices that are dynamically correct becomes more complex. Reforming Medicare should focus on greater incentives to increase competition between Medicare Advantage plans, which necessitates a role for government in ensuring competition; premium support; less use of regulated prices; and less appetite for countless “pay for performance” schemes. We apply this framework to evaluate Medicare for All proposals.


ILR Review ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 628-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Clarke

Using a range of official and survey data, the author evaluates the relative success of two approaches—competitive labor market theory and industrial relations theory/institutional economics—in explaining wage determination in Russia. Following a review of the analysis of wage determination by an influential team of World Bank economists, the author shows that increased wage inequality in Russia is dominated by inequality within occupational categories within local labor markets. Such inequality, he suggests, is primarily associated with inter-firm differences in wage levels, rather than barriers to labor mobility or differences in “human capital.” Such a pattern of differentiation entirely accords with the analyses of those institutional economists and industrial relations theorists who stress the role of the wage in regulating and motivating the labor force above its role in securing labor market equilibrium. The paper concludes by outlining the institutional framework of wage determination that underlies the observed results.


1981 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
K Burdett ◽  
Dale T Mortensen

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Paolo Merlino

This paper studies how search externalities and wage bargaining distort vacancy creation and the allocation of workers to jobs in markets with two-sided heterogeneity. To do so, I propose a model of a frictional labor market where heterogeneous workers decide which job to look for and firms decide which technology to adopt. At equilibrium, there is perfect segmentation across sectors, which is determined by a unique threshold of workers' productivity. This threshold is inefficient because of participation and composition externalities. The Pigouvian tax scheme that decentralizes optimal sorting shows that these externalities have opposite signs. Furthermore, their relative strength depends on the distribution of workers' skills, so that when there are many (few) skilled workers, too many (few) high-technology jobs are created.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-147
Author(s):  
Hyalle Abreu Viana ◽  
Ana Raquel Rosas Torres ◽  
José Luis Álvaro Estriamana

This article aimed to analyze the stereotypes attributed to "egalitarian men", understood here as men who support gender equality in relation to domestic and family responsibilities as well as inclusion in the workforce. To do so, two studies were carried out. The first study investigated the attribution of stereotypes to egalitarian men through a single open question. A total of 250 university students participated in this study, of which 51.1% were male, and their average age was 21.5 years (SD = 4.39). The second study analyzed the attribution of stereotypes to egalitarian or traditional men and women in a work context considered masculine. Participants included 221 university students with a mean age of 21.9 years (SD = 4.19), the majority (54.3%) being male. Taken together, the results of the two studies indicate that the egalitarian man is perceived as fragile and possibly homosexual. On the other hand, he is also seen as being more competent than traditional men.


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