Information and Legislative Organization

Author(s):  
Keith Krehbiel

2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
RADOSLAW ZUBEK ◽  
CHRISTIAN STECKER

AbstractRelying on social choice theory, this paper argues that uncertainty regarding future public policies is likely to be related to party institutionalization and legislative organization. The argument is evaluated using survey data from businesses in eight EU member states in East Central Europe. It finds that firms report lower concern over policy uncertainty in systems with higher party institutionalization. There is also some evidence, although less robust, that restrictive parliamentary agenda control leads to lower perceptions of policy uncertainty and this effect mediates the influence of party institutionalization. These results tend to hold if one controls for the effect of other national and firm-level factors.



2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Martha Melizza Ordóñez-Díaz ◽  
Luisa María Montes-Arias ◽  
Giovanna Del Pilar Garzón-Cortes

Considering environmental education as a social tool allowing individuals to achieve a significant knowledge of the inhabited environment, to reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster, and to respond to the presence of natural phenomena to which people are vulnerable, this article aims to generate a space for reflection on the importance of environmental education in the management of the social and natural risk in five countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. For this purpose, the paper presents a descriptive review of primary and secondary bibliographical sources referring to the performance of the management of social and natural risks related to environmental education in Colombia, Nicaragua, Mexico, Chile, and Jamaica between 1994 and 2015. In this period, a solid administrative and legislative organization of this management and environmental education is evident, but these two themes are clearly separated when implementing citizen projects: a situation that has generated shortcomings in the management of natural disasters, specifically under the principles of precaution and prevention. For this reason, this article offers a series of recommendations that include the dissemination of information, the creation of centers for the management of risk reduction, the strengthening of communication strategies, and the establishment of response plans and post-disaster recovery. 



Author(s):  
Hiba Mehdi Adnan Al-Fahham, Ammar Kereem Al-Fetlawy

The subject of curative protection to the satisfaction of the weak party in contractual relations is one of the issues that have taken on the opinion of legal jurisprudence, it had to be addressed by research and study, especially in the current situation because of this prominent issue in the relations of people in the field of concluding contracts, despite the importance of this The topic, however, we find that he did not receive a share of the legislative organization commensurate with that importance, because the legislator did not put clear or direct texts through which the weak party’s satisfaction could be protected, but rather different theories scattered in various laws that did not reach the level of familiarity with this issue in all its aspects. Therefore, it is necessary to search for solutions through which we can protect the consent of the weak party ... all that and more that we covered in this study by following both the inductive approach and the comparative approach and the analytical approach, where we extrapolated the most important jurisprudence opinions that were said in this regard, as well as the analysis of legal texts and that Within the scope of Iraqi law and French law, and then we extrapolated the most important doctrinal opinions to the most important results and proposals we have reached to protect the consent of the weak party in contractual relations. The study reached a set of results, among which the researcher reached a set of results, including the creation of the French legislator a new defect in his legislation, which the judiciary had the largest role in alerting to the existence of this defect, its purpose is to protect the consent of the weak party in economic relations, by setting the dependency criterion as the origin of the contractor the weak victim of this kind of coercion. Secondly, the grace period despite thinking is a modern idea, but the French legislator clarified the mechanisms that contractors can follow in their contractual relations and impose a penalty in the event that the weak contracting professional is deprived of it, as it is a right granted to the weak party according to clear and explicit legislative texts. The researcher reached a set of recommendations, among which we recommend the legislator to introduce the defect of economic coercion to address cases of imbalance in the contractual balance that he seeks to achieve in all contractual relationships. We suggest that the Iraqi legislator stipulates the deadline for thinking about its legislation, because the protection that is granted to the weak party is only subsequent protection, at a time when the weak party needs legal protection prior to concluding the contract.



Author(s):  
John M. Carey


2000 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 485 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron


1997 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 965 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Epstein ◽  
David Brady ◽  
Sadafumi Kawato ◽  
Sharyn O'Halloran


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT PEKKANEN ◽  
BENJAMIN NYBLADE ◽  
ELLIS S. KRAUSS

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.



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